Russian forces have carried out sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBC) against Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war since the beginning of Russia’s aggression in 2014. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, such crimes have skyrocketed in their gravity, frequency, territorial scope, and victim spectrum. According to the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, victims include girls and boys, women and men from ages four to 80. Russian military and occupation authorities perpetrate SGBC “with brutality, and in combination with other grave violations” such as inhuman treatment, torture, unlawful detention, enslavement, unlawful killings and, summary executions, according to the UN inquiry report.
Ukraine’s responses to these crimes have focused on both criminal justice and reparations for the survivors. The Ukrainian government, human rights NGOs, and international stakeholders have contributed to the documentation and prosecution of direct perpetrators and their commanders for SGBC. In 2022, the War Crimes Department of Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General established a focused unit on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). As of November, Ukraine had 326 CRSV cases, of which 117 concerned male victims.
Ukraine is also pursuing reparations. The government is striving to provide comprehensive medical and psychological support, vocational training, and other measures to help SGBC survivors and their families heal and feel empowered to move forward. In 2024, Ukraine implemented a pilot program for urgent interim reparations for CRSV survivors. As of December, 607 survivors (354 men, 241 women, 10 girls, and two boys) applied for reparations under the program. Out of them, 379 survivors (202 men, 172 women, four girls, and one boy) received urgent interim reparations. In late 2024, Ukraine’s parliament supported a more long-term reparations policy. Whether it’s pursuing criminal justice or assessing the need for reparations, the Ukrainian government is trying to take advantage of technological tools to help bring justice for Ukrainian survivors of these crimes, but the process is not without challenges.
Two key factors determine whether and how technology is used: first, the type of response (whether it is criminal proceedings or a reparations process); and second, the stage of response (with or without survivors’ engagement). The following issues have emerged as Ukraine has expanded its use of technology for SGBC investigations.
Server security: Server security is foundational to ensuring the integrity of collected data and, crucially, survivors’ private information and therefore personal security. Prosecution and reparation teams have adopted different strategies for where to house servers storing sensitive information. Stakeholders who keep servers with SGBC information within Ukraine stress Ukraine’s expertise with repelling cyberattacks. Those who use servers outside Ukraine do so with the understanding of the cybersecurity reputation of the chosen jurisdiction. In these situations, only a limited number of professionals have access to the server-stored information, through a multi-step authentication process.
Engagement with survivors: Ukraine’s pilot program for urgent interim reparations for SGBC has been commendably flexible in allowing both online and in-person, on-paper applications. Although the online process offers more convenience, some survivors – particularly older people, or survivors from rural, poorer, or less tech-savvy backgrounds – prefer having human, especially peer-to-peer engagement. This includes peer-to-peer communication with survivors further along in the recovery process and/or those who are engaged in SGBC awareness-raising. This in-person engagement can also include the involvement of trusted civil society lawyers, local paralegal professionals, and psychologists. Such direct human contact facilitates accounts, which are consequently more nuanced and less retraumatizing (as much as it is possible for horrendous SGBC circumstances). In sum, human engagement proves to be crucial at all stages of communication with Ukrainian survivors. Technology is an important tool, but it is secondary to talking directly with survivors.
Open-source investigations: Open-source data can provide important evidence of sexual and gender-based crimes. It can also be used to establish the broader context of the coercive environment in which these crimes take place and can help to link individual crimes to the chain of command. Both criminal justice and reparations investigations search for, classify, and analyze non-confidential, open-source public data (such as social media posts) for evidence of conflict-related SGBC. Initially, there were doubts in Ukraine about whether open-source materials could be used for SGBC investigations, since SGBC tends to take place indoors and in private. However, open-source materials are useful for identifying SGBC red flags such as: the separation of males and females during filtration or other procedures by Russian occupying authorities; footage of forced nudity or executions of naked and/or burned or otherwise mutilated victims; satellite or drone imagery of detention centers, especially amid the mounting evidence of Russia’s policy of widespread and systematic torture, including sexual violence; and social media posts, intercepted communications about, and other footage of batons, sticks, recording equipment, “tapik” field military telephones, and other objects often used for physical and mental sexual torture.
Open-source materials can also help to reduce the number of survivor interviews needed and, thus, can help to minimize re-traumatization. However, they are not enough on their own for establishing SGBC in an armed conflict context, for which survivors’ and witnesses’ statements remain the core source.
Technological training: A significant challenge for criminal justice professionals involved in SGBC investigations in Ukraine is the lack of proper training for newly introduced technology. This lack of training has led investigators to make operational mistakes while conducting interviews and/or working with evidence while using technology, resulting in the production of inadmissible records or, in some cases, even loss of testimonies and evidence. Although technology can enhance efficiency in investigative processes, it must be used correctly to ensure a survivor-centered approach. Ukraine’s criminal justice professionals require more training regarding the newest available technology and its secure use. Such training should be regular and equally reach all criminal justice professionals: investigators, prosecutors, judges and their staff. Finally, training should benefit professionals across Ukraine, especially those in the most affected northeast and southeast regions.
Informed consent, procedural clarity, and data security: In prosecution and reparation processes involving technology, Ukrainian SGBC survivors emphasized that they require clear and respectful explanations of how the information they provide will be digitally stored and used, and the security protocols that will be applied. Some survivors are concerned that they have not been provided with this information. As survivors stress, and international standards require, even with the utmost security protocols for the digital preservation and processing of their data, survivors must be kept informed through accessible and respectful explanations. For open-source investigations, engaged actors should at all times consider the degree of a possible exposure of a survivor’s identity and, where needed, try to seek their consent to respective proceedings. Instruments such as the Open-Source Practitioner’s Guide to the Murad Code could offer helpful guidance.
AI and other tech abuse by perpetrators: A third significant challenge for both prongs of SGBC responses is identifying AI- and other artificially generated “evidence,” specifically designed and planted in the public domain to compromise investigations. Russian perpetrators often use more “traditional” technology such as recording sexual and other abuse and sending harrowing pictures and videos to victims’ loved ones, to blackmail them into dropping charges, devastate them or dissuade them and other Ukrainians from armed resistance, to avoid similar abuse. Investigators require regular training on AI-related abuse and its key identifying flaws (for example, persons whose hands have more than five fingers in AI-generated “photos”). The state and first responding human rights NGOs should also provide constant psychological and cybersecurity advice to survivors and their families considering possible atrocity footage coming from perpetrators.
Technological progress is expanding investigative toolkits in real time. The challenges outlined above, however, underscore the necessity for continuous ethical consideration, adaptation, and cross-sector collaboration in the use of technology, to ensure justice which is both empathetic and effective for SGBC victims and witnesses.
For example, SGBC survivors in Ukraine are not always ready to communicate with more than one investigator in the room. Therefore, the classic two-person documentation approach (with one person asking questions and another recording the exchange) often cannot be used. In many cases, survivors do not give consent to the use of any type of recording device, except for written notes. Such circumstances put significant technical responsibilities on the interviewer, as they need to maintain eye contact and type or write the information they receive simultaneously. The challenges in doing so lead to the deterioration of humane interactions and personal connection that are very much needed during trauma-informed interviews. In such cases, investigators feel that they would benefit from the development of accessible software that accurately transcribes oral questions and answers, or that can turn written notes into typewritten transcripts. Such technology would allow the interviewer to keep their attention on the interviewee and would improve the efficiency and accuracy of the recorded testimonies while mitigating the secondary trauma on the interviewer, sparing them from going through the traumatic narrative again when deciphering the notes.
Another important area of improvement concerns data preservation. International experience demonstrates how the suspension of mandates, the lack of transfer protocols, and the non-availability of secured storage platforms can undermine the most meticulously assembled evidence. The recent shutdown by the Trump administration of Yale University’s database tracking Ukraine’s deported children is a striking example of why pre-emptive data preservation strategies are crucial. In the context of Ukraine, all involved stakeholders—prosecution, reparations actors, and human rights NGOs working on the documentation and analysis of SGBC—should constantly reassess the security of servers storing or processing SGBC information. This includes considerations about placing servers in Ukraine or internationally. Ukrainian stakeholders should also constantly reassess the reliability of private technology companies providing their support for Ukraine’s SGBC responses in light of the changing geopolitical and U.S. climate. Where possible, technology service providers should be diversified, to represent different jurisdictions and sources of funding, and, thus, mitigate the risks of a sweeping withdrawal.
This article originally appeared in Just Security.
Global conflicts have doubled over the past five years. In 2024, one in eight people was exposed to political conflict.[i] Unsurprisingly, one consequence of conflict is a significant burden of trauma and mental health issues, with more than one in five people in conflict-affected countries reported to be suffering from diagnosable mental health disorders at any point in time.[ii] An even larger number of people are likely to be affected by a wider range of psychosocial problems related to conflict trauma.
Despite this, only 0.3% of health-allocated foreign aid is spent on mental health.[iii] This has wide-reaching implications, ranging from the continued suffering of affected populations to the perpetuation of existing conflict. As part of the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) programme, our multidisciplinary team of researchers at King’s College London is studying the connection between trauma, mental health, and violence in our Impact of Trauma Survey (IoTS), with the hope of informing efforts to break cycles of violence.
Breaking cycles of conflict
It is known that some of those who experience the trauma of conflict are more likely to engage in violence themselves, creating what has been called a ‘cycle of violence’.[iv] However, the role of trauma and mental health problems in driving further violence, or in blocking reconciliation efforts, is under-researched. Using an extensive psychometric survey fielded in Iraq, Lebanon, and South Sudan, we hope to better understand the factors that contribute to people’s attitudes to reconciliation and violence in order to interrupt these cycles.
Alongside the IoTS, we will be testing various psychological interventions through a complementary study in Iraq. Participants will take part in an intervention ‘tournament’, which will test different approaches to promoting reconciliation. The most effective intervention from the tournament will be scaled up in a randomised controlled trial (RCT). By including IoTS participants in these interventions, we can use baseline data from the IoTS to examine in greater detail how psychological interventions work among different subpopulations, and how factors such as mental health might influence how effective these interventions are.
The connection between trauma, mental health, and conflict
Building on existing research, the IoTS examines the psychological effects of conflict exposure on individuals, exploring how trauma and mental health might influence political beliefs and behaviours. Recognising that many participants may have witnessed events such as bombings, experienced the loss of loved ones, or seen people killed, we are looking at the association between these experiences, mental health, and propensity to violence. To capture a more comprehensive picture beyond conflict, we are also examining other trauma that people may have suffered, such as childhood abuse, neglect, and exposure to domestic violence.
We will supplement the quantitative data collected in the IoTS with hundreds of semi-structured interviews and life histories that will allow participants to tell their personal stories of conflict in their own words. This will also enable them to share stories that have been passed down through generations that can contribute to intergenerational trauma. By taking this wider perspective, and using both quantitative and qualitative data, we aim to account for the layered nature of trauma in conflict-affected populations, rather than attributing it solely to war-related experiences, and to avoid reducing it to a narrow clinical conceptualisation of trauma.
How psychology and society interact to drive conflict
While there is an association between trauma-related mental health problems and the risk of using violence, most of those with mental health problems never become violent. This is because a vast range of individual and societal factors interact to shape people’s responses to trauma. People develop in nested contexts: growing up in a family, which is embedded in a community, which is part of a society. Factors at these different levels interact with each other to shape how people think, feel, and behave. Examining individual factors within their broader context can uncover systemic issues, such as government neglect in regions with high rates of trauma and mental health issues.
The IoTS is novel in the way it incorporates wider societal dimensions into its analysis, instead of focusing narrowly on mental health. Participants are asked about a range of social and political factors, including social support, social cohesion, their trust in institutions, identity, experiences of discrimination, sense of threat to their community, and perceptions of their community’s ability to bring about change (known as collective efficacy). Our more open-ended semi-structured interviews and life histories will also ask about wider social experiences, such as social exclusion, social norms, reconciliation, justice, and forgiveness.
Overall, it is the interplay between individual and societal factors that drives violence. Our broad approach will enable us to investigate this interaction, providing a richer understanding of the dynamics at play in conflict and post-conflict settings.
Studying conflict trauma where it is needed most
Many studies on conflict trauma focus on particular population samples, such as army veterans or members of armed groups. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the factors associated with the support of violence or of peace, however, we have recruited participants from varied backgrounds.
Most previous research has also been conducted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) countries, and so existing measures have typically been developed in those contexts. To ensure relevance, we have worked with our partners in each country, as well as local and regional experts, to ensure that the IoTS is tailored to each context, using locally developed measures where available, or adapting scales for use across different fragile and conflict-affected settings.
In South Sudan, we used the South Sudan Mental Health Assessment Scale, recently developed by a team working in the country, which measures mental health problems in terms commonly used to express and make sense of distress in that context.[v] For example, in South Sudan, people may describe having ‘pain in the heart’ rather than using terms that are more familiar in the West, such as depression. Where locally developed scales were not available, we took a multi-step approach to adapting and piloting existing measures. This included working with local translators to translate measures; carrying out cognitive interviewing with a diverse range of people to establish how they understood the questions and to identify sensitive topics; and pilot testing the measures in local populations.
We hope the development of this survey can inform future research by sharing measurement tools and practical and ethical frameworks for research in conflict-affected settings and, ultimately, making data available for other researchers to use.
How do violent attitudes change over time?
With data collected from 2023 to 2025, the longitudinal design of the IoTS adds another dimension to this research. In Iraq, we are conducting the IoTS in two waves, following up with participants around six months later. This will allow us to examine how changes in individual or social factors – such as mental health or trust in institutions – may alter people’s attitudes toward violence. These findings will be enriched by integrating external data sources, such as the ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) database. Using detailed records of incidents of political violence, especially those that occur between survey waves and close to where research participants live, we will explore how these events influence attitudes to violence and peace.
The IoTS offers a unique opportunity to test diverse hypotheses of pathways to violence across multiple countries, leveraging a combination of psychological, social and political factors. By looking at a wide variety of questions, such as how perceptions of injustice predict support for different types of political action, and whether trauma-related mental health problems, collective trauma or competitive victimhood affect attitudes towards reconciliation and violence, we hope this study can inform interventions to break cycles of violence in conflict-affected regions.
As of May 2025, IoTS data collection has been completed in South Sudan (fieldwork was carried out in 2024) and for the first wave in Iraq (fieldwork was carried out in 2024-25). The second wave in Iraq and data collection in Lebanon are set to be completed by autumn 2025. Initial findings will be shared later this year – follow @ICSR_Centre and @XCEPT_Research on X to stay up to date with our research.
[i] ACLED. (2025) Acled conflict index: Global conflicts double over the past five years. Available at: https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/ (Accessed: 18 March 2025).
[ii] Charlson, F. et al. (2019) ‘New WHO prevalence estimates of mental disorders in conflict settings: A systematic review and meta-analysis’, The Lancet, 394(10194), pp. 240–248. doi:10.1016/s0140-6736(19)30934-1.
[iii] United for Global Mental Health. (2023) Financing of mental health: the current situation and ways forward. rep. Available at: https://unitedgmh.org/app/uploads/2023/10/Financing-of-mental-health-V2.pdf
[iv] Lumsden, M. (1997) ‘Breaking the cycle of violence’, Journal of Peace Research, 34(4), pp. 377–383. doi:10.1177/0022343397034004001.
[v] Ng, L.C. et al. (2021) ‘Development of the South Sudan Mental Health Assessment Scale’, Transcultural Psychiatry, 59(3), pp. 274–291. doi:10.1177/13634615211059711.
In the last two weeks of February, humanitarian agencies reported 895 cases of conflict-related rape as M23 rebels advanced through the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). According to a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees official, this was an average of more than 60 rapes a day.
UNICEF officials reported similarly grim figures. Between Jan. 27 and Feb. 2, 2025, the number of rape cases treated across 42 health facilities in DRC jumped five-fold, with 30 per cent of these cases being children.
While immediate responses are needed to stop the violence, provide health care to the survivors and assist the displaced, the pursuit of justice also plays a critical role.
Investigative bodies, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), are increasingly using technology to investigate conflict-related sexual violence. In a recent research project, my team interviewed experts who specialize in conflict-related sexual violence investigations around the world.
The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, visited DRC at the end of February and met with sexual violence survivors. The ICC has the mandate to investigate rape, sexual slavery and other gender-based violence amounting to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The office had reactivated investigations in October 2024.
Investigators start by speaking to survivors, following guidelines such as the 2023 Policy on Gender-Based Crimes or the Global Code of Conduct for Gathering and Using Information About Systematic and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. The Global Code of Conduct is known as the Murad Code after Nobel Peace Prize recipient and advocate Nadia Murad.
In our research, we found that survivors of conflict-related sexual violence are connecting with investigators through various technologies, such as directly using encrypted apps like Signal. Survivors also go through civil society organizations equipped to take video or electronic statements — Yazda, for example, which works with Yazidi survivors of ISIS crimes in northern Iraq — or via portals like the ICC’s OTPLink. The UN’s Commissions of Inquiry also encourage and receive email submissions.
International courts and investigative bodies are also analyzing open-source information on conflict-related sexual violence, such as videos, photos and statements posted on online platforms. Guided by the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, this information can be useful to support witness statements, place alleged perpetrators at the scene of the violations and link incidents into a pattern of similar violence.
For example, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria described how ISIS used the encrypted app Telegram and other online platforms to buy and sell captured Yazidi women and girls across the Iraq-Syria border to sustain its sabaya (sexual slavery) system.
In Ukraine, our study found that the main technology-related concern in open-source data gathering is identifying AI-created and other artificially generated images, specifically designed and planted in the public domain as a form of disinformation or to compromise investigations.
Conflict-related sexual violence is often perpetrated indoors which makes certain technologies like satellite or drone imagery less useful. However, other forms of technology have proven to be beneficial in Ukraine’s investigations. In particular, face and voice recognition software have supported efforts to identify alleged perpetrators.
While Ukraine’s experience points to some successes, investigations into sexual violence committed by ISIS in northern Iraq have been hampered. This is partly due to the lack of automated translation software in the Yazidi language to facilitate the transcription and translation of testimonies.
This speaks to the importance of developing software to translate minority languages spoken in armed conflict zones.
Survivors have expressed concerns about the turn to the digital. They fear that their identities and experiences may be revealed through hacking or poor data handling, which could put them at risk of reprisals from perpetrators or their accomplices. It could also lead to stigmatization and ostracization in some communities, undoing survivors’ efforts to rebuild their lives.
To address these concerns, international courts and investigative bodies have adopted data protection protocols. However, the lack of a standardized framework for the use of technology in the investigation of conflict-related sexual violence remains a significant concern for the investigators we interviewed.
Such a framework would incorporate best practices in supporting survivors providing evidence, tracking and preserving open source information and developing new technological applications.
If there is to be justice for survivors of conflict-related rape in DRC and elsewhere, technology — provided it is used with great sensitivity — will likely be an important and timely aid.
This article originally appeared in The Conversation.
In early 2025, the March 23 Movement (M23) armed group seized control of Goma and then Bukavu, two major cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s continuing advance in eastern DRC, in defiance of ceasefire agreements, has terrorised communities and led to mass displacement. The M23 group is a major non-state armed group, but had been relatively inactive in recent years prior to a rapid escalation of violence in 2022, which hit new crisis levels in early 2025 with the capture of the two cities. Over two million people have since been internally displaced in eastern DRC; close to one million people were displaced in 2024 alone.
As Angola and other regional actors attempt to mediate peace talks, civilians are caught in a devastating humanitarian crisis, one of the most critical parts of which is sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This not only contributes to displacement, but displaced women are also more at risk of SGBV. Furthermore, signs point to gendered violence worsening: in just the last two weeks of February 2025, UNHCR reported 895 reports of rape made to humanitarian actors.
In order to understand these risks, in December 2024, researchers with the Congolese organisation Solidarité Féminine Pour La Paix et le Développement Intégral (SOFEPADI) interviewed 89 displaced women and 30 civil society organisations working in internally displaced person (IDP) camps around Goma. The overwhelming majority of respondents had experienced or witnessed SGBV; while interviewers were careful to avoid direct questions so as not to induce trauma, dozens of women nonetheless disclosed personal experiences. These interviews show just how vulnerable the population is, and how an already dire situation for women and girls has been made exponentially worse over the past six months. This blog outlines some of the key findings of the forthcoming research report.
The risks and drivers of displacement
Displaced women were extremely likely to have experienced conflict-related SGBV: 97% of those interviewed were victims of or had witnessed violence during the conflict, with some stating that sexual violence had contributed to their displacement. One IDP camp resident stated:
“I was living in Kitshanga and then the war started, but I didn’t leave right away. One day I went to the field and I was raped. That’s the day I left Kitshanga and I came here [to the camp]”.
Members of community organisations working in the IDP camps identified an increase in the perpetration of sexual violence over the course of the conflict, with more women arriving to the IDP camps having suffered sexual violence than earlier in the war. Many women also explained they had witnessed killing and massacres in their home communities. Some women had lost close family members or had themselves been wounded in the fighting.
The vast majority of respondents—over 70% —identified M23 as the direct cause of their displacement. A further 5% indicated that their displacement had been caused by Rwanda’s armed forces, either alone or in conjunction with M23. One woman from Kitshanga, a town over 150km away from Goma, stated that she had been displaced to the IDP camp following “massacres, rapes, and the war…caused by the M23”.
Perpetrators everywhere, protection nowhere
M23 troops were not the only group identified as being responsible for perpetrating SGBV during displacement and in the camps. The crisis has led to widespread gender violence perpetrated by armed groups and forces, including the Congolese military and military-allied militias, civilians, and groups of bandits.
Despite the significant number of international forces operating in eastern DRC, which includes the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, The South African Development Community mission, and, previously, the East African Regional Force, both civil society representatives and displaced women expressed little confidence in these forces’ ability to prevent SGBV. Goma remains the operational centre of the MONUSCO mission. Yet of the 89 displaced women interviewed, only one identified MONUSCO troops as a group as providing security in the areas surrounding the camps. This is despite MONUSCO being a named option in the interviews. In the eyes of most of the respondents, international forces are simply absent.
Scattered survivors and thwarted justice
Since the M23 takeover, international attention has been drawn to the crisis, and there is renewed focus on by the International Criminal Court on combatting impunity and securing accountability for atrocity crimes. Organisations on the ground, however, remain under-resourced and over-stretched. Access to healthcare (including mental health support), economic support, children’s education, and justice are all severely constrained – a point consistently emphasised by affected women interviewed. Repeated displacement of vulnerable people, including SGBV survivors, is likely to further frustrate attempts at holding responsible actors to account.
With the recent order from M23 for civilians to leave IDP camps, already uprooted women are displaced once again, with little access to humanitarian aid. Civilians have been dispersed, with many unable to return to their villages due to fighting. This repeated displacement and dispersal of vulnerable women has made it near-impossible to track where women are going, to provide necessary and ongoing support, and to record reports of future SGBV cases.
The need for action
The security situation in eastern DRC is shifting rapidly, and the context that these interviews took place in only three short months ago has changed. What remains consistent, however, are high levels of forced displacement, SGBV, and an internationalised conflict that has worsened women’s security. The data is clear: responses to this dire security situation, with women and girls uniquely and disproportionately impacted, must include and urgent and durable ceasefire and increased humanitarian support. Immediate steps must be taken to alleviate humanitarian suffering, to protect women and girls from further SGBV, and to move toward a peaceful resolution that results in Congolese civilians able to return to their homes and begin the process of recovering from this devastating conflict.
*SOFEPADI (Solidarité Féminine Pour La Paix et le Développement Intégral) is a Congolese NGO which has been working for 25 years to promote and defend the rights of women and girls in DRC: through prevention of gender-based violence, skills training, medical and psychological support, and legal services for SBGV survivors. The authors worked with a team of researchers from SOFEPADI, coordinated by Martin Baguma and SOFEPADI Executive Director Sandrine Lusamba, and with research assistance from Cora Fletcher, an MA student at Dalhousie University. This brief would not have been possible without their collaboration.
Uganda, a model for refugee management?
Uganda is widely cited as a model country for the hospitality and integration of refugees having implemented an open-door policy and refugee self-reliance approaches since 1999.1 Currently, Uganda has the world’s third-largest refugee population, with over 1.7 million refugees, the majority of whom are women, mainly from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea as of December 2024.2 Once in Uganda, refugees are allocated land in settlements for shelter, but also farming to get food for home consumption or to earn an income. In the spirit of self-reliance, refuges access public services such as health care, education, water, and land with host communities.
Refugee Welfare Committees (RWC) as a forum for participation
In line with its often praised progressive approach and open-door policy for refugees, Uganda has established a refugee-led leadership structure known as Refugee Welfare Committees (RWCs) in all refugee settlements, including Nakivale and Oruchinga, to ensure that refugees participate in community programs and critical decisions that shape their lives. These committees, based on the Refugee Act of 2006,3 operate on three levels: RWCI (clusters), RWCII (zones/villages), and RWCIII (entire settlement). Elections are held every two years. RWCs are the formal representative body for refugees, ensuring protection and access to justice. RWCs are the first point of contact for issues and communicate with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), UNHCR, local authorities, aid agencies, and host communities. Each RWC level runs a committee with various secretariats for sectors such as finance, health, and education. Originally intended to foster relations between refugees and nationals, RWCs in Uganda have become crucial for enhancing service delivery, community organization, identity, and political participation among refugees.
Challenges to women’s participation in decision-making
While the formation of RWCs in Uganda aims to promote inclusive leadership, it does so without addressing systemic gender challenges to participation in decision-making processes. The RWC guidelines assume that women and men are able to compete on the same footing for elective positions. This assumption is far from reality given the socio-cultural challenges faced by women. Research carried out in Nakivale and Oruchinga refugee settlements located in Southwest Uganda in April 2024 showed the limited involvement of women in RWCs (see Figure 1). Despite limited participation, women’s participation is still perceived as important (see Figure 2).
Explanations for the low representation of women in RWCs fall into institutional, cultural, and individual factors. Institutional factors are largely related to the gender-neutral legal framework of the RWC, which does not explicitly encourage women’s participation; for example, there are no gender quotas or monitoring mechanisms to ensure women’s participation. In addition, social and cultural factors – such as gender stereotypes and socially ascribed roles that make women responsible for children, the elderly, and domestic work – hinder women’s participation. As a result, women are often overburdened and do not have time to fully engage in decision-making processes. Women and girls face challenges related to harmful practices such as early and/or forced marriage, and unequal access to, or control over, services and resources. Girls are often pushed to drop out of school and help with household chores. Sexual gender-based violence and reproductive health-related factors including rape, sex slavery, and forced pregnancy, lower their self-esteem and confidence to participate in public life. Systemic institutional and cultural challenges lead to significant gender disparities in property ownership and greatly hinder women’s participation. These challenges particularly affect women’s education, especially their literacy skills, which are essential for leadership roles. Consequently, women are often at a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. A female refugee observed, “If a girl is not in school, she is expected to get married, regardless of age.” Another noted, “Being a woman is restrictive enough, and when you add being a refugee, [it] is a double tragedy” (KII and FGDs).
Women at the frontlines of water and land conflicts
Since water and food provision are among the roles socially ascribed to women, they are often at the risk of water and land conflicts. Women engage in water collection for household use. Water collection can be arduous: travel to and from water sources, and waiting in queues, can take hours, and the distance is often covered on foot. They are exposed to conflict risks: verbal and physical fights are not unknown at water collection points.
Women also engage in subsistence farming and firewood collection – these resource generation and gathering activities can come with the same risks as water collection.
Empowering women in land and water management
Over half of all refugees are women and girls, yet their voices are visibly missing in decision-making on the affairs that affect their day-to-day lives. Lack of women’s participation in water and land decision-making negatively impacts their daily lives by perpetuating gender inequalities and stereotypes, hindering access to resources, and limiting their ability to shape water and land related policies and laws that directly affect them. This short-coming is critical considering women’s involvement adds value to resource management, results from the research suggest that the gender of the household head has the highest positive effect on household water provision, with more female-headed households paying water user fees than male-headed households. The presence of women in RWCs also increases the information flow and awareness among women in the larger settlement. Women leaders experience challenges at home and community and therefore understand the unique challenges other women experience daily (KII, Nakivale). The importance of women’s participation is further underscored by evidence that women tend to be better custodians of water and better land use managers, precisely due to their socially ascribed roles and dependence on these resources.
A way forward
Since women are most affected by land and water conflicts, and have a higher stake in water provision and household food security, their voices need to be heard in decision-making. Gender-responsive and inclusive management policies should be implemented as a step towards social cohesion, better resource use, and improved service delivery. Leveraging women’s participation in refugee leadership broadens their horizons, enabling them to support themselves and their communities. It ensures that services and policies are informed by women’s voices and experiences, aligns humanitarian efforts with gender-specific needs, and equips women with skills for future reintegration into their home countries or relocation to new ones.
Hence, there is a need to deliberately use affirmative action, including quotas, to support women’s involvement. Therefore, gender-responsive and inclusive guidelines, such as clearly defined quotas in RWCs, are crucial to facilitate women’s participation. The majority are refugees are women, who are better understood and advocated for by women leaders who share their daily experiences. Moreover, there is evidence that having more women in decision-making positions increases the level of public sector effectiveness and accountability.4 This is particularly relevant in Uganda as the country seeks to enable and encourage refugee self-governance.
In 2016, the Colombian government signed a historic peace agreement with guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC. The agreement brought an end to 52 years of war, but today, eight years after the agreement was ratified, Colombia is still not at peace.
In this episode, Dr Nafees Hamid and Dr Andrés Casas discuss the motivations of guerilla group members in Colombia, public attitudes towards the 2016 peace agreement, and how behavioural science can facilitate peacebuilding efforts.
Since 2019, the number of people attempting to flee Lebanon via irregular boat crossings has drastically increased. Driven by compounding political, economic and security crises, Lebanese citizens are now increasingly joining Syrian and Palestinian refugees attempting the sea crossing to Europe.
As the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) consolidates its control over Lebanon’s borders, and with a new, reform-oriented government in place, now is the time to think more broadly about how security resources are allocated. While the international community has primarily focused its attention on reinforcing the LAF’s capabilities, there has been significantly less discussion about how the state may relieve the LAF of its non-military responsibilities as part of a wider shift towards improved security sector cooperation and long-term sectoral resilience.
One area for reform is Lebanon’s management of irregular maritime migration – attempts to cross to Europe in boats without the requisite travel documentation. With a new reform-focused government in place, the country has an opportunity to craft a more sustainable national framework to address sea crossings as a humanitarian challenge – not solely as a security issue – managing this through a whole-of-government approach that includes the police, social ministries, and civil society organisations. Addressing the root causes of social problems that lead many to migrate must be seen as a priority, rather than further militarising migration governance.
The rising tide of desperation
Irregular maritime migration from Lebanon has surged in recent years – while only 200 individuals landed in Cyprus in 2019, by 2023 this figure had jumped to over 5,000. In the first half of 2024 alone, nearly 3,300 people attempted to leave Lebanon by boat. While there has been a ‘low but steady’ return of Syrian refugees following the collapse of the Assad regime, many factors still prevent a mass return to Syria. Sea crossings are continuing, and this includes many desperate Lebanese citizens, driven by overlapping crises in the country to seek a better life elsewhere, with a sense of hopelessness unlikely to change in the near term. In interviews conducted for the research this blog draws from, many see irregular boat migration as their only option, with land routes also presenting logistical and security risks.
A military stretched thin
In tandem with its role managing increasing security threats across the country, the LAF leads on managing irregular maritime migration from Lebanon. The armed forces are already stretched as they respond to threats on land: the LAF has frequently been deployed on the eastern border with Syria; in February, a further 1,500 troops were deployed along the southern border with Israel to reinforce the approximately 4,000 already stationed there. This is only about half the troops Lebanon agreed to deploy in the south as part of the US brokered ceasefire deal.
Alongside discussions about increasing military resources, Lebanon’s political transition offers an opportunity to strategically allocate security resources and ensure that the military is not overburdened with duties better suited to either the police or social ministries. With a new government in place and Joseph Aoun, the former LAF commander, as President, the country has a unique opportunity to shift its approach to both national and human security, and reviewing maritime migration governance falls under this pivot.
A security-first approach isn’t working
The prevailing ‘security-first’ approach to governing maritime migration frames boat crossings as a national security threat to Europe, rather than as an entrenched humanitarian issue. Treating migration as something to be militarily deterred misses the deeper political and economic forces that drive people to leave the country. Without a holistic political and socio-economic solution, people will continue to flee in the desperate search for a better life.
International donors have directed a large number of resources to bolster the capacity of the LAF to control borders. In May 2024, the EU earmarked €200 million to strengthen the LAF’s border management efforts, including its capacity to oversee the maritime border and manage attempted boat crossings to Cyprus or Italy. Interviews for this research, however, revealed that the over-prioritisation of the army in foreign-funded security interventions comes at the expense of the wider Lebanese security sector. Other domestic agencies (namely the Internal Security Forces and the General Security Office) play a key role in internal safety and security but are less able to meet their mandates in a manner that complements the LAF’s activity because of asymmetrical resourcing, training and equipment challenges.
The dominance of security-first approaches has not only ignored the underlying drivers of migration, particularly economic factors; it has also obscured critical human rights concerns. With new internationally funded radars and boats, interceptions at sea may have increased, yet there is little oversight over what happens to migrants. Meanwhile, reports suggest that migrants can be detained or face deportations. Humanitarian actors working directly with affected Syrian and Lebanese communities also remain largely excluded from decision-making. To ensure a rights-based approach, internationally funded border security programmes should engage with these humanitarian actors in the consultation, design, implementation and monitoring of programmes.
A call for balance
The new government in Lebanon, led by President Aoun, is in a unique position to re-evaluate Lebanon’s security strategy. As the former commander of the LAF, he will have seen first-hand how the underfunding of Lebanon’s police and other civilian security bodies undermines their capacity to support the army. By developing a more balanced approach to migration that integrates human rights, legal protections, and a focus on the socio-economic drivers of migration, resources can be more effectively used.
Lebanon’s reform process needs a national security strategy that empowers law enforcement agencies to fulfil their mandates – an approach that would enhance border management while relieving the LAF of non-military responsibilities. This would free up military resources to focus on critical priorities such as establishing a monopoly of violence and a deterrent against Israel in the south of Lebanon, and working toward the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1701. The President has already called for a comprehensive defence and security policy: as he moves forward with this, ensuring that maritime migration governance is included in a broader security recalibration is vital. If Lebanon can achieve this, it will not only improve maritime migration management but also build a more effective, balanced, and sustainable security sector for the years ahead.
Christianne Aikins and AnnaSophia Gallagher work on security sector reform and research projects at Siren Associates, which helps organisations remove barriers to safety, justice and freedom. Siren works across the security, public, and social sectors, using research, change management and digital innovation to build their partners’ responsiveness, efficiency, and impact.
1 February 2025 marked the fourth anniversary of the 2021 military coup d’état in Myanmar, which energized pre-existing conflicts in the country and led to new unarmed and armed opposition movements against the junta. The military junta’s violent and indiscriminate response to the anti-coup opposition has come at a great human cost and has also led to the displacement of millions of Myanmar civilians both within and across the country’s borders to Thailand, India, and Malaysia. In the latter case, the new arrivals often join Myanmar diaspora communities of both migrant labourers and refugees fleeing previous waves of war and repression.
On 20 January 2025, nearly coinciding with the anniversary of the coup, dozens of civil society organisations supporting the Myanmar refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border were informed by USAID of an immediate suspension of critical aid. Some six weeks later, this suspension became a permanent termination. The USAID cuts are a major setback and are not the only aid reductions undercutting programmes critical to supporting Myanmar refugees abroad. Other donors have or are planning to reduce their overall aid budgets, including the UK Government. Moreover, the US has withdrawn funding from key humanitarian agencies, such as the World Food Program. Simultaneously, the political environment in countries hosting Myanmar refugees has become increasingly hostile to refugees, and hundreds of Myanmar citizens have been repatriated – which for many, both women and men, has meant an immediate forced conscription by the junta into its war against the opposition forces.
Prior to these developments, our team had conducted XCEPT-supported research in Thailand and in Mizoram State in northeastern India from March – May 2024, which focused on the different displacement experiences of Myanmar refugee women. Even before the complications brought on by aid cuts and increasingly hostile political environments in the host countries, almost all refugee women struggled to survive economically, had minimal access to services, feared deportation and forced conscription, and struggled to connect with Thai and Mizoram host communities due to language barriers and a lack of proper documentation. However, different women and gender diverse persons were exposed to these burdens, risks, and challenges differently. Unsurprisingly, the more access to social and financial capital one has, the more one is buffered from some of these risks and the more services one can access. Those with less (or without) capital, clout, and connections struggled more. Women heads of households and widows, who were often the sole providers for their families, struggled to cope with the financial burden, and often highlighted their fatigue and depletion in the interviews. This was even truer for women who had disabilities or chronic illnesses, and/or who had care responsibilities for family members with disabilities. For elderly women refugees, old age loneliness was an issue, especially in urban centres, where they lacked contacts to the host communities and their younger family members were busy at work.
Most of our interviewees strongly felt that the anti-junta uprising had indeed increased women’s political and social participation and, to a lesser degree, led to more openness on LGBTIQ+ rights. However, the struggle for economic survival and the double burdening of women, who were juggling with both domestic care responsibilities and paid labour, left little time for participation. Moreover, deeply entrenched heteronormativity and patriarchy, including amongst male leaders of the opposition, has kept decision-making power in the hands of (older) men.
The recent combined development of the aid cuts with the increasingly restrictive policies of host countries have created new pressures on a scale that the refugee communities have not faced before. The aid cuts will mean that refugees will have to rely even more on the informal support networks which they have established themselves instead. However, these informal support networks, as well as wider political participation for minority groups, will be harder to maintain as even more time will now go towards ensuring economic survival as a direct consequence of the aid cuts. Meanwhile, given increasing political hostility toward refugees in host countries, we anticipate that the refugees will attempt to make themselves less visible and less likely to advocate for assistance or participate in activism, due to fears of deportation and subsequently forced conscription.
Though we have no doubt that the women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights activists amongst the refugees will continue to work for a more equitable Myanmar, the preexisting struggles they face have become even more fraught due to the external forces coalescing around Myanmar refugees.
Chatham House’s XCEPT research explores transnational conflict across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. By tracing the movement of people, goods, and capital across borders, the programme examines how conflict extends beyond national boundaries and what this means for effective policy and programming. In the below short videos, Chatham House researchers discuss their research projects for the XCEPT programme.
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA programme, discusses the business of migrant smuggling in and through Libya, which has, since 2011, become the primary corridor for irregular migration to Europe from sub-Saharan Africa.
Read Tim’s paper, coauthored with Lubna Yousef, here. Other recent XCEPT-Chatham House research papers examining the political economies of migration from Africa to Europe include “Tracing the ‘continuum of violence’ between Nigeria and Libya” by Leah de Haan, Iro Aghedo, and Tim Eaton; and “Tackling the Niger–Libya migration route” by Peter Tinti.
The Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’ suffered significant setbacks in 2024, amid conflict with Israel and other political turbulence, leading some observers to conclude that it has been seriously weakened or is even on the verge of defeat. However, the axis has historically proven highly resilient. Chatham House Senior Research Fellow Renad Mansour discusses how Iran and its networks adapt to external pressures.
Read “The shape-shifting ‘axis of resistance’”, by Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid.
Local conflicts, such as those in Sudan and Ethiopia, have wider transnational impacts — showing how violence and competition over resources quickly spill across borders, shaping broader political and economic dynamics. Chatham House Africa Programme Senior Research Fellow Ahmed Soliman discusses the regional economic effects of these conflicts.
Read “Gold and the war in Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, and “The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie.
War leaves scars – physical and mental. Refugees fleeing conflict do not simply leave their experience of war behind them when they cross a border towards safety. For instance, even as the war in Syria drove millions of people from their homes and their country—making Syrians one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with Jordan hosting over 619,000 Syrian refugees within and outside camps in urban communities—their experiences of the war back home continue to shape their lives in Jordan, affecting their mental health, social trust, and ability to rebuild support networks.
Exposure to conflict before displacement continues to influence the social well-being of refugees many years later. We find that not only do refugees face substantial barriers to establishing stable lives and livelihoods, but that integration outcomes vary widely based on location, with those in urban settings facing different opportunities and challenges compared to those in refugee camps. In addition, the variation in refugees’ places of origin in Syria and their arrival dates in Jordan means they carry diverse pre-displacement experiences, which continue to shape their adaptation and social well-being in their new environment.
Social well-being is an important factor in evaluating whether an individual lives a fulfilling life. We include three key aspects:
These dimensions of social well-being influence not only a refugee’s ability to cope with hardship but also their prospects for integration and long-term stability.
We show that not all conflict experiences have the same impact on social well-being. Having been close to conflict events does not necessarily lead to long-term suffering. Instead, we find that the severity of the violent conflict—particularly exposure to fatalities—has profound and lasting effects. Refugees who experienced many fatalities in Syria report lower life satisfaction and have weaker social safety nets. The experience of past violent conflict events can continue to shape lives, even years later.
Mental health shapes how the experience of violent conflict shapes long-term social well-being. We find that depression is a key mechanism through which past trauma continues to affect refugees today. Those who were exposed to severe conflict are more likely to suffer from depressive symptoms, which in turn reduces their trust in others and weakens their social ties. Women, in particular, report higher levels of depressive symptoms when they had experienced intense conflict before displacement. Without proper mental health support, these emotional wounds persist, making it harder for refugees to rebuild their lives.
Refugees often face multiple challenges at once, creating what is known as a ‘polycrisis’. In our forthcoming study, we find that experiencing environmental stressors—such as drought—before displacement exacerbates the difficulties faced by displaced populations today. Syrian refugees who experienced both severe conflict and environmental hardship suffer even greater social isolation. These overlapping crises make it harder for refugees to establish stable support systems, further deepening their vulnerabilities.
Not all refugees experience displacement in the same way. Household structure plays a crucial role in shaping social well-being. Individuals in female-majority households suffer greater declines in life satisfaction after experiencing conflict, while individuals in male-majority households experience a steeper decline in social support networks. These findings suggest that gender dynamics influence how families cope with displacement and trauma.
Another important insight concerns the difference between refugees living in camps versus those living in host communities. We find that the lasting adverse legacies of conflict exposure on social well-being are concentrated among refugees in camps. This difference suggests that while camps may provide basic necessities for survival, they may also isolate refugees more from broader society.
Five key takeaways from our research can guide policies and programs to better support refugee communities:
The legacies of war do not end when refugees cross a border. Past trauma continues to shape the social well-being of refugees for years to come. By acknowledging these realities and implementing evidence-based policies, host countries and international organizations can better support refugees in rebuilding their lives. Understanding the long-term impacts of conflict is a crucial step toward creating programs and systems that support the most vulnerable and alleviate suffering around the world.
We thank the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for data access and support.
