Across conflict-affected borderlands, checkpoints are often treated as informal sites of taxation or obstruction along otherwise coherent trade routes. The TRACE project challenges this view.
Bringing together a set of comparative case studies from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, TRACE examines checkpoints as central political and economic institutions that shape how trade, authority and violence are organised. Rather than sitting on top of existing systems, checkpoints frequently constitute the infrastructure of circulation itself – enabling, regulating and transforming flows of goods, people and information.
TRACE explores the politics of circulation through detailed empirical research across diverse settings, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, Libya, Yemen, Myanmar, West Africa, Afghanistan and South Sudan.
Across these cases, the research highlights three broad insights:
Together, these findings push beyond state-centric frameworks and offer a new way of understanding how power operates in conflict-affected economies.
Checkpoints, not territory: rethinking conflict | Peer Schouten
This policy brief challenges conventional understandings of conflict by showing that control over circulation – rather than territory – lies at the centre of many contemporary wars. Drawing on comparative research across Yemen, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, South Sudan, Myanmar, and West Africa, it argues that checkpoints offer a critical but underexplored lens on conflict dynamics. In doing so, the brief highlights how these systems of control shape power, governance and everyday life, and sets out important implications for policy and programming.
The TRACE working papers are designed not only as stand-alone contributions, but as building blocks for a broader comparative argument. Taken together, the research moves beyond describing checkpoint practices to explaining how checkpoint regimes emerge, evolve and reshape political and economic order. The following papers illustrate this collective effort, bringing together country-based studies led by individual authors whose work grounds the wider comparative insights.
On 18 June XCEPT hosted a briefing on how checkpoint economies shape conflict dynamics, governance, humanitarian access, and livelihoods across fragile and conflict-affected settings. Watch the recording of the briefing below.
The lives and livelihoods of local communities in the borderlands of the Lake Chad Basin are disrupted by both climate change and conflict, which are mutually reinforcing. Conflict undermines social cohesion and public trust and degrades the ability of communities to adapt to the effects of climate change. At the same time, climate change adds additional stress on food, land, and water security, reinforcing the political and socioeconomic conditions that drive armed conflict. In the context of a long history of marginalization, underdevelopment, and weak governance in the region, this conflux can drive people to turn to armed groups in search of alternative governance structures, economic incentives, and spiritual and social dignity and meaning.
Syria’s border with Jordan has long reflected the state of relations between the two neighbors. The border itself, delineated by France and Britain in October 1931, was tightly enforced only from 1970 onward, after the Black September crisis, when Syrian tanks entered Jordan in support of Palestinian militant organizations.
Since that time, Syria has opened and closed the Nassib-Jaber crossing—the main crossing point between the two countries—several times depending on the political relations between Amman and Damascus. The first decade of the century was something of a golden age for bilateral relations. Syria and Jordan cooperated on many fronts, especially in trade, which reached $674 million in 2007, up 166 percent from 2003. This can be seen in figures released by Jordan’s Department of Statistics, which provides the most detailed and up-to-date figures on the Jordanian economy, converted from Jordanian dinars to U.S. dollars at a rate of $1.41 per dinar. At the time, relations were such that Syria even sought to open a new crossing through Suwayda, alongside Nassib-Jaber and the crossing between Daraa and Ramtha.
In this episode of KCL Department of War Studies podcast, Dr Nafees Hamid speaks with Dr Craig Larkin, Dr Clara Voyvodic, and Maria El Sammak about the powerful and often divisive role of nostalgia in global politics.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or Soundcloud
In this episode of the NUPI podcast The World Stage, Cedric de Coning (NUPI) sits down with Louise Lieberknecht (formerly GRID-Arendal) who is one of the authors of a new report investigating the environmental dimensions of conflict in the Lake Chad region. The authors have examined how insecurity impacts the environment and how conflict dynamics are shaped by environmental factors.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
For all the attention on conflict zones, whether through political debate, social commentary, or a flood of hot takes on social media, there is often relatively little high-quality empirical data about the experiences of people living through the conflict. How exactly are people affected by conflict and violence? How do people remember and memorialise events? Does this hold across time, geographies, and sociodemographic groups? And what does all of this mean for policies regarding, say, justice and reconciliation? Here, qualitative interviews can give rich insight.
When a peacekeeping mission transitions out of a country, it’s often the culmination of years of planning and negotiation. Indeed, modern peacekeeping doctrine requires that a peace operation include withdrawal conditions in its initial deployment plan. But at a time of financial crisis and free-falling budgets across the UN, several missions are now being forced to draw down without a transition plan in place – leaving countries without the critical protections and support they’ll need as UN peacekeepers depart.
In this episode of the NUPI podcast The World Stage, Dr Cedric de Coning from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) takes listeners into the heart of the Lake Chad region and into a two‑year research project Managing climate, peace and security risks from the borderlands of the Lake Chad. Joined by Freedom Onuoha from the University of Nigeria, and Thor Olav Iversen and Andrew E. Yaw Tchie from NUPI, they explore how the Regional Strategy for Stabilization, Resilience and Recovery (RS‑SRR) is being used to address climate‑related conflict risks.
Watch the podcast episode below, or listen on Spotify, Apple podcasts or Acast
The Rwandan Civil War (1990-1994), which was fought between the army and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rebel group, was rooted in long-standing tensions between the two main ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Tutsis and the Hutus. The four-year conflict saw the RPF, a group primarily made up of Tutsis who had fled the country when the Hutu government came into power, clash with the government’s armed forces, and eventually culminated in the Rwandan genocide: a three-month period during which extreme Hutus massacred over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus[i]. In the aftermath of the civil war, the new Tutsi-led government sought to overcome these divisions by creating a unified identity. They proclaimed that there were no Hutus or Tutsis, only Rwandans.
Identity can play a key role in the origins, dynamics, and outcomes of a conflict. Intergroup conflicts can often be traced back to, or exacerbated by, people segregating their personal and their group’s identity from that of the group they are in conflict with. As the barriers between groups are defined, favouritism and superiority are often accredited to members of the ingroup, and there is greater exclusion of the outgroup group. When this occurs in combination with political divides, instability, or a perceived threat, it can increase hostility[ii] .On the other hand, promoting a common identity or encouraging identification with a benevolent group can be useful tools to promote post-conflict reconciliation. Understanding how identity can drive people towards reconciliation or radicalisation can help guide efforts to achieve post-conflict stability.
Group identity
As identity can cause division between groups, one strategy used to promote reconciliation in the aftermath of a conflict is ‘recategorisation’. This focuses on creating an all-encompassing larger group categorisation that both sides can identify with. The theory is that, by including the outgroup in a shared identity, the favouritism saved for those seen as members of the ingroup will be extended to include the outgroup[iii] .As noted above, reconstructing the national Rwandan identity was one way in which the Rwandan government sought to foster reconciliation following the end of the civil war. Ethnicity was removed from identity cards, and any mention of ethnic groups and identities was banned in the public sphere[iv] .Although enforcing this shared identity encouraged people to move beyond intergroup antagonism, it proved to be an ineffective method to promote reconciliation, as it limited freedom of discussion, and denied both sides the opportunity to express their grievances[v] .Recategorisation strategies often favour the dominant group, who want to focus on similarities, but they can cause difficulties for the disadvantaged group, who are denied opportunities to highlight power differences and systemic injustices. One study conducted with ‘survivors’ and ‘non-victims’ of the Rwandan genocide in 2009 found that, while the groups did not differ in their level of identification with the nation, the non-victim (i.e. dominant) group were more willing to reconcile than members of the survivor group[vi].
Dual identity
Depending on the situation, it is also unrealistic to assume people will be open to replacing one closely held identity with an entirely new, more inclusive one. In some circumstances, it can be more feasible to reframe people’s ideas of their identity by instead encouraging them to hold a dual identity. A dual identity means someone can retain their original identity, but, at the same time, adopt a second more inclusive identity, and it allows for recognition of both the similarities and differences between groups. This was studied in America by asking white Americans about their opinions on policies that were more favourable for ethnic minorities. Those who felt more strongly about their dual identities – identifying as Americans and with their ethnicity group – were more supportive of the policies than those who had more of a connection to their ethnicity than their American identity[vii]. Research in the case of migrants has also found that, when individuals identify with both their minority ingroup and their society of residence, it constrains politicisation, encouraging nonviolent forms of political action that are more likely to be widely accepted as legitimate. When two identities are incompatible, however, there is a risk this could encourage political radicalisation. In such cases, the dominant group has a responsibility to welcome the differences within a dual identity as a ‘promising contribution to a pluralistic society’, rather than treating them as a liability[viii].
Identity fusion
Aspects of identity can also fuel extremist behaviour when someone’s personal identity becomes intertwined with that of the group they are a member of. As the identities merge, people begin to view attacks on their group as a personal attack on them. This gives people a sense of responsibility for the group’s wellbeing and makes them more willing to fight back, give support, and risk themselves for the benefit of the group[ix]. It provides feelings of strength and immunity for the individual when they’re acting on behalf of something larger than themselves. The influence identity fusion can have on a person’s behaviour was analysed in a study on self-sacrificing behaviour in Spaniards. The participants’ fusion with their national identity was measured, and they were presented with a hypothetical situation and asked about their willingness to die to save multiple other lives. Those who were more strongly fused with their Spanish identity were more likely to sacrifice themselves for the ‘ingroup’ (fellow Spaniards), but not for the ‘outgroup’ (Americans)[x]. Having a strongly fused identity does not just encourage people to engage in radical or violent behaviour, however. If an individual’s identity becomes closely connected with a different group or with family members that do not take part in radical behaviour, it has the capability to move people towards more peaceful actions. One study in Spanish prisons with Latino gangs found fusion with one’s family helped to protect against radicalisation and prompted people to move away from more radical groups and behaviours[xi].
Conclusion
Exploring the role identity can play in encouraging reconciliation or radicalisation can provide insight into how to mitigate violence in a post-conflict setting. The influence of this factor is highly context dependent, so understanding the intricacies of a conflict is essential to being able to appropriately apply these theories. Interventions aimed at promoting a shared identity and fusion with an alternative identity could aid in the reconciliation process as long as they are adapted for each individual situation. If not, they could have the opposite effect and exacerbate the issue.
Rwandan flag waving at Kigali Genocide Memorial (August 8th 2008). Credit: MilanoPE / Shutterstock.com
[i] Sentama, E. (2022). National Reconciliation in Rwanda: Experiences and Lessons Learnt. European University Institute.
[ii] Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup hate?. Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 429-444. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022- 4537.00126
[iii] Gaertner, S., Dovidio, J., Nier, J., Banker, B., Ward, C., Houlette, M., & Loux, S. (Eds.) (2000). The common ingroup identity model for reducing intergroup bias: Progress and challenges. SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446218617
[iv] Kanazayire, Clémentine, Laurent Licata, Patricia Mélotte, Jean Pierre Dusingizemungu, and Assaad E. Azzi. “Does Identification With Rwanda Increase Reconciliation Sentiments Between Genocide Survivors and Non-Victims? The Mediating Roles of Perceived Intergroup Similarity and Self-Esteem During Commemorations.” Journal of social and political psychology 2, no. 1 (2014): 489–504.
[v] Staub, E. (2014). The challenging road to reconciliation in Rwanda: Societal processes, interventions and their evaluation. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2(1), 505-517. https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v2i1.294
[vi] Kanazayire, Clémentine, Laurent Licata, Patricia Mélotte, Jean Pierre Dusingizemungu, and Assaad E. Azzi. “Does Identification With Rwanda Increase Reconciliation Sentiments Between Genocide Survivors and Non-Victims? The Mediating Roles of Perceived Intergroup Similarity and Self-Esteem During Commemorations.” Journal of social and political psychology 2, no. 1 (2014): 489–504.
[vii] Huo, Y. J., Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1996). Superordinate identification, subgroup identification, and justice concerns: is separatism the problem: Is assimilation the answer? Psychological Science, 7(1), 40- 45. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00664.x
[viii] Simon, B., Reichert, F., & Grabow, O. (2013). When Dual Identity Becomes a Liability: Identity and Political Radicalism Among Migrants. Psychological Science, 24(3), 251-257. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612450889
[ix] Gómez, Á, Brooks, M. L., Buhrmester, M. D., Vázquez, A., Jetten, J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2011). On the nature of identity fusion: Insights into the construct and a new measure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(5), 918-933. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0022642
[x] Buhrmester, M., & Swann, W. (2015). Identity Fusion. In Emerging trends in the social and behavioral sciences: An interdisciplinary, searchable, and linkable resource. John Wiley & Sons; Swann, William B., Ángel Gómez, John F. Dovidio, Sonia Hart, and Jolanda Jetten. “Dying and Killing for One’s Group: Identity Fusion Moderates Responses to Intergroup Versions of the Trolley Problem.” Psychological science 21, no. 8 (2010): 1176–1183.
[xi] Gómez, A., Atran, S., Chinchilla, J., Vázquez, A., López-Rodríguez, L., Paredes, B., … & Davis, R. (2022). Willingness to sacrifice among convicted Islamist terrorists versus violent gang members and other criminals. Scientific Reports, 12(1), 1- 15. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-06590-0
Across Myanmar and its neighbouring borderlands, protracted conflict, sanctions regimes, illicit economies and gendered forms of agency continue to shape political order and everyday life. These border regions are characterised by overlapping authorities, militarised governance, fragmented markets and the circulation of goods, capital and people through both formal and illicit channels. Understanding how local actors adapt to sanctions, financial oversight, armed conflict and gendered constraints is vital for informing more effective policy responses.
XCEPT’s research on Myanmar and its neighbouring borderlands brings together four projects that examine how conflict actors navigate sanctions, how financial flows from borderland economies move through regional hubs, and how gendered norms create both obstacles and openings for women’s political and economic influence. These projects analyse how conflict economies evolve under international pressure, how anti‑money‑laundering and counterterrorism financing frameworks affect borderland financial networks, and how women in militarised borderlands shape governance, mobility and local security.
The projects
Sanctions and Conflict Economies in the Borderlands of Myanmar and Somalia
This project examines how borderland conflict actors adapt to increasingly targeted sanctions and how these adaptations affect local communities.
This study investigates how regional financial hubs such as Accra, Nairobi and Bangkok interact with illicit financial flows from conflict‑affected borderlands, and how AML and CFT frameworks can strengthen oversight and disrupt conflict‑linked networks.
Gendered authority and feminist agency across the Myanmar‑Bangladesh Rohingya borderlands
This project explores how women involved in border monitoring, armed groups, security structures and civil society navigate contradictory gender expectations to exert influence over territorial control and political economies.
Gendered frontlines: Structural disjunctures and women’s agency in the Indo-Myanmar borderlands
This project examines how women in the militarised Indo–Myanmar borderlands strategically exploit contradictions between overlapping gender systems to reshape conflict dynamics.
Across the Horn of Africa, shifting political centres, digital infrastructures, urban governance, historical state formations, and gendered forms of authority are reshaping how power is organised and contested. XCEPT’s 2026 research in the Horn of Africa brings together five studies that examine these dynamics across Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Somaliland.
The projects explore how historical legacies, new economic and geopolitical hubs, digital innovation, emerging urban centres, and women’s grassroots leadership are transforming political order across the region.
The projects
Historical and contemporary centers of power in Sudan
A study examining how historical state formation and shifting centres of authority in the greater Nile Valley help explain contemporary and future patterns of fragmentation.
Shifting centres & geopolitical futures of the Horn’s subnationalisms
Research on how emerging hubs such as Semera, Port Sudan, and Berbera are transforming political authority, investment dynamics, and centre–periphery relations.
Contested digital sovereignty in Sudan and Somali Horn of Africa
An examination of how digital innovation hubs and connective infrastructure shape state capacity and political contestation in fragmented contexts.
Beyond state fragmentation: How emerging urban centres are reshaping political order in Somalia
A study analysing how cities such as Garowe, Baidoa, Las Anod, and Kismayo act as quasi‑sovereign authorities through control over mobility, verification, and extraction.
Embodied Knowledge and Feminist Agency in a South Sudan borderland
Research examining how the Kabarze movement of older Murle women in Greater Pibor challenges invisibility in conflict‑affected borderlands and asserts culturally grounded moral authority.
Across the Levant, economic pressures, climate stress, and shifting political and security dynamics are transforming the way borderlands function. Fragmented governance, long‑running conflict, and illicit cross‑border flows continue to shape livelihoods and state authority along the region’s key frontiers, from the Syria–Iraq and Lebanon–Syria borders to Yemen’s coastal zones. Understanding these changes is essential for developing policies that support stability, formal trade, and climate resilience.
XCEPT’s Levant research brings together three projects that examine how border governance, climate‑driven adaptation, and illicit networks intersect across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. The projects explore practical pathways for more coordinated cross‑border commerce, assess how drought and livelihood strain influence informal and illicit trade, and analyse how evolving smuggling networks reflect wider geopolitical transformations. They offer a grounded picture of the forces reshaping borderland economies and political orders in the Levant.
The projects
The Levant corridor: Policy pathways for rebuilding cross‑border commerce
This project develops policy tools that support gradual economic reintegration across the Levant Corridor by strengthening cross‑border regulation, customs coordination, and key trade mechanisms.
Fragile borderlands: Drivers of drought adaptation and instability in MENA
This project examines how drought‑driven livelihood pressures reshape informal and illicit trade in food, fuel, livestock, and water, and how these networks can either support climate adaptation or increase insecurity.
Illicit networks in the Levant: Political and economic implications in a post-war order
This project investigates changing patterns of smuggling and illicit trade, analysing how they reflect broader political shifts, weakened state structures, and transnational economic networks.
