In December 2024, the Assad regime in Syria was overthrown. Today, Ahmed al-Sharaa is acting as the interim president of Syria, at the head of a new transitional government.
What will the future look like for Syria under its new leader? Will the coalition of rebel factions be able to work together to build a stable future for Syrians?
In this episode, Dr Nafees Hamid, Dr Rahaf Aldoughli, Nils Mallock, and Broderick McDonald discuss their research surveying and interviewing Syrian rebel fighters both before and after the fall of Assad, sharing insights into the motivations and values of Syria’s new rulers.
*This episode was recorded before the announcement of the new government. Follow ICSR_Centre on X to stay up to date with this research.
In early 2025, the March 23 Movement (M23) armed group seized control of Goma and then Bukavu, two major cities in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). M23’s continuing advance in eastern DRC, in defiance of ceasefire agreements, has terrorised communities and led to mass displacement. The M23 group is a major non-state armed group, but had been relatively inactive in recent years prior to a rapid escalation of violence in 2022, which hit new crisis levels in early 2025 with the capture of the two cities. Over two million people have since been internally displaced in eastern DRC; close to one million people were displaced in 2024 alone.
As Angola and other regional actors attempt to mediate peace talks, civilians are caught in a devastating humanitarian crisis, one of the most critical parts of which is sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This not only contributes to displacement, but displaced women are also more at risk of SGBV. Furthermore, signs point to gendered violence worsening: in just the last two weeks of February 2025, UNHCR reported 895 reports of rape made to humanitarian actors.
In order to understand these risks, in December 2024, researchers with the Congolese organisation Solidarité Féminine Pour La Paix et le Développement Intégral (SOFEPADI) interviewed 89 displaced women and 30 civil society organisations working in internally displaced person (IDP) camps around Goma. The overwhelming majority of respondents had experienced or witnessed SGBV; while interviewers were careful to avoid direct questions so as not to induce trauma, dozens of women nonetheless disclosed personal experiences. These interviews show just how vulnerable the population is, and how an already dire situation for women and girls has been made exponentially worse over the past six months. This blog outlines some of the key findings of the forthcoming research report.
The risks and drivers of displacement
Displaced women were extremely likely to have experienced conflict-related SGBV: 97% of those interviewed were victims of or had witnessed violence during the conflict, with some stating that sexual violence had contributed to their displacement. One IDP camp resident stated:
“I was living in Kitshanga and then the war started, but I didn’t leave right away. One day I went to the field and I was raped. That’s the day I left Kitshanga and I came here [to the camp]”.
Members of community organisations working in the IDP camps identified an increase in the perpetration of sexual violence over the course of the conflict, with more women arriving to the IDP camps having suffered sexual violence than earlier in the war. Many women also explained they had witnessed killing and massacres in their home communities. Some women had lost close family members or had themselves been wounded in the fighting.
The vast majority of respondents—over 70% —identified M23 as the direct cause of their displacement. A further 5% indicated that their displacement had been caused by Rwanda’s armed forces, either alone or in conjunction with M23. One woman from Kitshanga, a town over 150km away from Goma, stated that she had been displaced to the IDP camp following “massacres, rapes, and the war…caused by the M23”.
Perpetrators everywhere, protection nowhere
M23 troops were not the only group identified as being responsible for perpetrating SGBV during displacement and in the camps. The crisis has led to widespread gender violence perpetrated by armed groups and forces, including the Congolese military and military-allied militias, civilians, and groups of bandits.
Despite the significant number of international forces operating in eastern DRC, which includes the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, The South African Development Community mission, and, previously, the East African Regional Force, both civil society representatives and displaced women expressed little confidence in these forces’ ability to prevent SGBV. Goma remains the operational centre of the MONUSCO mission. Yet of the 89 displaced women interviewed, only one identified MONUSCO troops as a group as providing security in the areas surrounding the camps. This is despite MONUSCO being a named option in the interviews. In the eyes of most of the respondents, international forces are simply absent.
Scattered survivors and thwarted justice
Since the M23 takeover, international attention has been drawn to the crisis, and there is renewed focus on by the International Criminal Court on combatting impunity and securing accountability for atrocity crimes. Organisations on the ground, however, remain under-resourced and over-stretched. Access to healthcare (including mental health support), economic support, children’s education, and justice are all severely constrained – a point consistently emphasised by affected women interviewed. Repeated displacement of vulnerable people, including SGBV survivors, is likely to further frustrate attempts at holding responsible actors to account.
With the recent order from M23 for civilians to leave IDP camps, already uprooted women are displaced once again, with little access to humanitarian aid. Civilians have been dispersed, with many unable to return to their villages due to fighting. This repeated displacement and dispersal of vulnerable women has made it near-impossible to track where women are going, to provide necessary and ongoing support, and to record reports of future SGBV cases.
The need for action
The security situation in eastern DRC is shifting rapidly, and the context that these interviews took place in only three short months ago has changed. What remains consistent, however, are high levels of forced displacement, SGBV, and an internationalised conflict that has worsened women’s security. The data is clear: responses to this dire security situation, with women and girls uniquely and disproportionately impacted, must include and urgent and durable ceasefire and increased humanitarian support. Immediate steps must be taken to alleviate humanitarian suffering, to protect women and girls from further SGBV, and to move toward a peaceful resolution that results in Congolese civilians able to return to their homes and begin the process of recovering from this devastating conflict.
*SOFEPADI (Solidarité Féminine Pour La Paix et le Développement Intégral) is a Congolese NGO which has been working for 25 years to promote and defend the rights of women and girls in DRC: through prevention of gender-based violence, skills training, medical and psychological support, and legal services for SBGV survivors. The authors worked with a team of researchers from SOFEPADI, coordinated by Martin Baguma and SOFEPADI Executive Director Sandrine Lusamba, and with research assistance from Cora Fletcher, an MA student at Dalhousie University. This brief would not have been possible without their collaboration.
Uganda, a model for refugee management?
Uganda is widely cited as a model country for the hospitality and integration of refugees having implemented an open-door policy and refugee self-reliance approaches since 1999.1 Currently, Uganda has the world’s third-largest refugee population, with over 1.7 million refugees, the majority of whom are women, mainly from South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, and Eritrea as of December 2024.2 Once in Uganda, refugees are allocated land in settlements for shelter, but also farming to get food for home consumption or to earn an income. In the spirit of self-reliance, refuges access public services such as health care, education, water, and land with host communities.
Refugee Welfare Committees (RWC) as a forum for participation
In line with its often praised progressive approach and open-door policy for refugees, Uganda has established a refugee-led leadership structure known as Refugee Welfare Committees (RWCs) in all refugee settlements, including Nakivale and Oruchinga, to ensure that refugees participate in community programs and critical decisions that shape their lives. These committees, based on the Refugee Act of 2006,3 operate on three levels: RWCI (clusters), RWCII (zones/villages), and RWCIII (entire settlement). Elections are held every two years. RWCs are the formal representative body for refugees, ensuring protection and access to justice. RWCs are the first point of contact for issues and communicate with the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), UNHCR, local authorities, aid agencies, and host communities. Each RWC level runs a committee with various secretariats for sectors such as finance, health, and education. Originally intended to foster relations between refugees and nationals, RWCs in Uganda have become crucial for enhancing service delivery, community organization, identity, and political participation among refugees.
Challenges to women’s participation in decision-making
While the formation of RWCs in Uganda aims to promote inclusive leadership, it does so without addressing systemic gender challenges to participation in decision-making processes. The RWC guidelines assume that women and men are able to compete on the same footing for elective positions. This assumption is far from reality given the socio-cultural challenges faced by women. Research carried out in Nakivale and Oruchinga refugee settlements located in Southwest Uganda in April 2024 showed the limited involvement of women in RWCs (see Figure 1). Despite limited participation, women’s participation is still perceived as important (see Figure 2).
Explanations for the low representation of women in RWCs fall into institutional, cultural, and individual factors. Institutional factors are largely related to the gender-neutral legal framework of the RWC, which does not explicitly encourage women’s participation; for example, there are no gender quotas or monitoring mechanisms to ensure women’s participation. In addition, social and cultural factors – such as gender stereotypes and socially ascribed roles that make women responsible for children, the elderly, and domestic work – hinder women’s participation. As a result, women are often overburdened and do not have time to fully engage in decision-making processes. Women and girls face challenges related to harmful practices such as early and/or forced marriage, and unequal access to, or control over, services and resources. Girls are often pushed to drop out of school and help with household chores. Sexual gender-based violence and reproductive health-related factors including rape, sex slavery, and forced pregnancy, lower their self-esteem and confidence to participate in public life. Systemic institutional and cultural challenges lead to significant gender disparities in property ownership and greatly hinder women’s participation. These challenges particularly affect women’s education, especially their literacy skills, which are essential for leadership roles. Consequently, women are often at a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. A female refugee observed, “If a girl is not in school, she is expected to get married, regardless of age.” Another noted, “Being a woman is restrictive enough, and when you add being a refugee, [it] is a double tragedy” (KII and FGDs).
Women at the frontlines of water and land conflicts
Since water and food provision are among the roles socially ascribed to women, they are often at the risk of water and land conflicts. Women engage in water collection for household use. Water collection can be arduous: travel to and from water sources, and waiting in queues, can take hours, and the distance is often covered on foot. They are exposed to conflict risks: verbal and physical fights are not unknown at water collection points.
Women also engage in subsistence farming and firewood collection – these resource generation and gathering activities can come with the same risks as water collection.
Empowering women in land and water management
Over half of all refugees are women and girls, yet their voices are visibly missing in decision-making on the affairs that affect their day-to-day lives. Lack of women’s participation in water and land decision-making negatively impacts their daily lives by perpetuating gender inequalities and stereotypes, hindering access to resources, and limiting their ability to shape water and land related policies and laws that directly affect them. This short-coming is critical considering women’s involvement adds value to resource management, results from the research suggest that the gender of the household head has the highest positive effect on household water provision, with more female-headed households paying water user fees than male-headed households. The presence of women in RWCs also increases the information flow and awareness among women in the larger settlement. Women leaders experience challenges at home and community and therefore understand the unique challenges other women experience daily (KII, Nakivale). The importance of women’s participation is further underscored by evidence that women tend to be better custodians of water and better land use managers, precisely due to their socially ascribed roles and dependence on these resources.
A way forward
Since women are most affected by land and water conflicts, and have a higher stake in water provision and household food security, their voices need to be heard in decision-making. Gender-responsive and inclusive management policies should be implemented as a step towards social cohesion, better resource use, and improved service delivery. Leveraging women’s participation in refugee leadership broadens their horizons, enabling them to support themselves and their communities. It ensures that services and policies are informed by women’s voices and experiences, aligns humanitarian efforts with gender-specific needs, and equips women with skills for future reintegration into their home countries or relocation to new ones.
Hence, there is a need to deliberately use affirmative action, including quotas, to support women’s involvement. Therefore, gender-responsive and inclusive guidelines, such as clearly defined quotas in RWCs, are crucial to facilitate women’s participation. The majority are refugees are women, who are better understood and advocated for by women leaders who share their daily experiences. Moreover, there is evidence that having more women in decision-making positions increases the level of public sector effectiveness and accountability.4 This is particularly relevant in Uganda as the country seeks to enable and encourage refugee self-governance.
In 2016, the Colombian government signed a historic peace agreement with guerilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, also known as FARC. The agreement brought an end to 52 years of war, but today, eight years after the agreement was ratified, Colombia is still not at peace.
In this episode, Dr Nafees Hamid and Dr Andrés Casas discuss the motivations of guerilla group members in Colombia, public attitudes towards the 2016 peace agreement, and how behavioural science can facilitate peacebuilding efforts.
Since 2019, the number of people attempting to flee Lebanon via irregular boat crossings has drastically increased. Driven by compounding political, economic and security crises, Lebanese citizens are now increasingly joining Syrian and Palestinian refugees attempting the sea crossing to Europe.
As the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) consolidates its control over Lebanon’s borders, and with a new, reform-oriented government in place, now is the time to think more broadly about how security resources are allocated. While the international community has primarily focused its attention on reinforcing the LAF’s capabilities, there has been significantly less discussion about how the state may relieve the LAF of its non-military responsibilities as part of a wider shift towards improved security sector cooperation and long-term sectoral resilience.
One area for reform is Lebanon’s management of irregular maritime migration – attempts to cross to Europe in boats without the requisite travel documentation. With a new reform-focused government in place, the country has an opportunity to craft a more sustainable national framework to address sea crossings as a humanitarian challenge – not solely as a security issue – managing this through a whole-of-government approach that includes the police, social ministries, and civil society organisations. Addressing the root causes of social problems that lead many to migrate must be seen as a priority, rather than further militarising migration governance.
The rising tide of desperation
Irregular maritime migration from Lebanon has surged in recent years – while only 200 individuals landed in Cyprus in 2019, by 2023 this figure had jumped to over 5,000. In the first half of 2024 alone, nearly 3,300 people attempted to leave Lebanon by boat. While there has been a ‘low but steady’ return of Syrian refugees following the collapse of the Assad regime, many factors still prevent a mass return to Syria. Sea crossings are continuing, and this includes many desperate Lebanese citizens, driven by overlapping crises in the country to seek a better life elsewhere, with a sense of hopelessness unlikely to change in the near term. In interviews conducted for the research this blog draws from, many see irregular boat migration as their only option, with land routes also presenting logistical and security risks.
A military stretched thin
In tandem with its role managing increasing security threats across the country, the LAF leads on managing irregular maritime migration from Lebanon. The armed forces are already stretched as they respond to threats on land: the LAF has frequently been deployed on the eastern border with Syria; in February, a further 1,500 troops were deployed along the southern border with Israel to reinforce the approximately 4,000 already stationed there. This is only about half the troops Lebanon agreed to deploy in the south as part of the US brokered ceasefire deal.
Alongside discussions about increasing military resources, Lebanon’s political transition offers an opportunity to strategically allocate security resources and ensure that the military is not overburdened with duties better suited to either the police or social ministries. With a new government in place and Joseph Aoun, the former LAF commander, as President, the country has a unique opportunity to shift its approach to both national and human security, and reviewing maritime migration governance falls under this pivot.
A security-first approach isn’t working
The prevailing ‘security-first’ approach to governing maritime migration frames boat crossings as a national security threat to Europe, rather than as an entrenched humanitarian issue. Treating migration as something to be militarily deterred misses the deeper political and economic forces that drive people to leave the country. Without a holistic political and socio-economic solution, people will continue to flee in the desperate search for a better life.
International donors have directed a large number of resources to bolster the capacity of the LAF to control borders. In May 2024, the EU earmarked €200 million to strengthen the LAF’s border management efforts, including its capacity to oversee the maritime border and manage attempted boat crossings to Cyprus or Italy. Interviews for this research, however, revealed that the over-prioritisation of the army in foreign-funded security interventions comes at the expense of the wider Lebanese security sector. Other domestic agencies (namely the Internal Security Forces and the General Security Office) play a key role in internal safety and security but are less able to meet their mandates in a manner that complements the LAF’s activity because of asymmetrical resourcing, training and equipment challenges.
The dominance of security-first approaches has not only ignored the underlying drivers of migration, particularly economic factors; it has also obscured critical human rights concerns. With new internationally funded radars and boats, interceptions at sea may have increased, yet there is little oversight over what happens to migrants. Meanwhile, reports suggest that migrants can be detained or face deportations. Humanitarian actors working directly with affected Syrian and Lebanese communities also remain largely excluded from decision-making. To ensure a rights-based approach, internationally funded border security programmes should engage with these humanitarian actors in the consultation, design, implementation and monitoring of programmes.
A call for balance
The new government in Lebanon, led by President Aoun, is in a unique position to re-evaluate Lebanon’s security strategy. As the former commander of the LAF, he will have seen first-hand how the underfunding of Lebanon’s police and other civilian security bodies undermines their capacity to support the army. By developing a more balanced approach to migration that integrates human rights, legal protections, and a focus on the socio-economic drivers of migration, resources can be more effectively used.
Lebanon’s reform process needs a national security strategy that empowers law enforcement agencies to fulfil their mandates – an approach that would enhance border management while relieving the LAF of non-military responsibilities. This would free up military resources to focus on critical priorities such as establishing a monopoly of violence and a deterrent against Israel in the south of Lebanon, and working toward the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1701. The President has already called for a comprehensive defence and security policy: as he moves forward with this, ensuring that maritime migration governance is included in a broader security recalibration is vital. If Lebanon can achieve this, it will not only improve maritime migration management but also build a more effective, balanced, and sustainable security sector for the years ahead.
Using local approaches to respond to climate change in Asia’s conflict-affected borderlands
Climate change is increasingly listed as a major risk in future security considerations. This blog explores the particular ways in which communities living in border regions experience the intersection of climate change and insecurity, through several examples observed in Asia. As many of the world’s most climate vulnerable countries are also those experiencing the highest levels of conflict, it is important to understand how this intersection plays out, particularly for people who are marginalised from political decision-making and development responses, as those living in border regions often are.
Rising temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events, and growing populations in Asia, are putting pressure on existing ways of accessing and managing water, energy, and food, affecting all sectors of the economy and society. Government actors are largely focusing their responses around the impacts on economic development and livelihoods. Volatile weather patterns and environmental degradation over time pose risks to traditional income-generating activities, particularly around agriculture and livestock. Vulnerable populations in conflict areas may miss out on organized assistance and face increased risks of violence around access to these resources. A major coping mechanism for people who have lost land, stable incomes, or a safe living environment is to move to ‘safer’ environments which may be in urban centres or across borders.
Often considered as the outer limits of a state system, border regions and the communities who live in them may be perceived as peripheral and perhaps less connected to the social, political and economic activity taking place in capitals. These areas often experience first-hand the impacts of the ebbs and flows of bilateral relationships between bordering nations. Where there are tensions along borders over land, shared resources, or waterways, local communities face high risks of violence. In unstable border regions, governments may struggle to safeguard against or respond to climate-related disasters. Policymakers and development actors working in fragile and conflict-affected regions need to consider how climate change increases and multiplies risks to human security, and what appropriate responses look like.
Where climate interruptions and conflict overlap, responses are challenging
In Myanmar, climate change manifests within a context of sustained civil conflict which has severely impacted the country’s agricultural sector. Functioning state systems are mostly absent across the border regions where anti-junta resistance has been fiercest since the 2021 coup. At the same time, the withdrawal of much development and humanitarian infrastructure due to the widespread instability may leave food-insecure communities without support. Regular approaches to adaptation or mitigation seem impossible to imagine, as local communities struggle with day to day safety concerns, authorities accelerate the exploitation of natural resources to supplement their decreasing income, and civil society activism risks reprisals.
Pakistan is also highly vulnerable, experiencing increasingly extreme weather events like floods and heatwaves. Their economic impacts are significant, with agricultural output reduced, exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the risk of conflict over scarce resources. Responses from authorities have been limited and are likely to face implementation challenges in the highly securitised border regions, such as the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Effective local action may be diminished by a volatile political landscape.
Migration is a major coping mechanism for climate-affected populations. The World Bank forecasts that climate change will cause 143 million individuals to move in and from Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America by 2050. If not properly managed, these patterns could cause significant demographic shifts and risk social unrest. Urban areas, often the primary destination for people immediately impacted by climate events, may not be prepared to receive the new arrivals, leaving them to live in precarious or illegal settlements, often unsafe and outside formal welfare systems.
Local solutions for local impacts
Positive developments in supporting climate responses in fragile or conflict-affected regions include greater multilateral engagement on the topic and efforts to increase accessibility of climate financing. The 2024 Conference of Parties (COP) meeting in Azerbaijan culminated with a call to recognise climate change as “a catalyst for conflict and instability,” that has “disproportionate impacts on the most vulnerable”. Action also needs to move from the general to the local so that solutions are contextually relevant and practical. This point is particularly salient for communities in border regions, where policymakers must recognise unique geographical and political contexts, and not apply uniform climate change mitigation or adaptation strategies from a state-centric perspective.
To understand regional nuances better, and design locally effective solutions, more research that prioritises local experiences and perspectives in climate change-affected fragile border areas is needed. The Centre for Peace and Justice at BRAC University, with support from XCEPT, is working in some of Bangladesh’s most climate-vulnerable communities adjacent to the southwestern border with India. New research explores how communities already experiencing political and economic dispossession and structural violence due to their peripheral location navigate successive climate crises. The report includes suggestions for local action to support communities in mitigating and recovering from disasters which are easily implemented and scalable,
As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, and pressure on resources and livelihoods increases, contextually relevant and cost-effective solutions are needed more than ever. Fragile border areas face intersecting security risks that can be multiplied by climate change. Responses should be multi-faceted, encouraging greater community resilience, equitable access to resources, and better cooperation between bordering nations.
In this interview, Clara May, Communications Manager for the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) project at King’s College London, speaks to Dr Inna Rudolf about her research on the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), and explores why we need to challenge the idea that Shi’a militants are simply Iranian proxies.
Inna Rudolf: The goal of my articles was to shed light on the landscape of Islamic resistance factions in Iraq and to provide nuance regarding the differences between the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) and thePopular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), otherwise known as hashd. The IRI consists of different resistance factions that have, specifically since the events of 7 October 2023, been engaging in armed operations outside of the formal chain of command in Iraq, and the PMF is a state-recognised paramilitary umbrella group, which is recognised as part of the Iraqi armed forces. In most of the public discourse, however, the two umbrella organisations are often confused.
In my paper, All the Mahdi’s Men: Contextualising Nuances Within Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, I examine the ideological, historical, political, and pragmatic factors shaping the sometimes diverging resistance practices favoured by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH), two prominent Iran-leaning PMF factions. In The war on Gaza and Iraq’s resistance state, I explore how the differing responses of Iraqi resistance factions to Israel’s war on Gaza reflect their efforts to balance domestic and transnational considerations.
Most analysis of the resistance factions in Iraq considers the groups through the lens of proxy warfare, neglecting their agency and organisational identity, and instead framng them as pawns in a geopolitical chess match. This simplified portrayal is not only incorrect, but it is also dangerous, as it can lead to misguided policy decisions. It is important to understand that these groups have autonomy and possess agency to make decisions based on their own identity, values, interests, and ambitions.
In both articles, I sought to offer a fresh analytical perspective, allowing us to move away from seeing the groups as simply remotely controlled proxy actors and instead to consider their ability to act independently, while pursuing their own domestic and transnational visions. If we can understand the motivations, identity, and agency at the group level, this will allow us to paint a more accurate picture of the dynamics of the Islamic resistance landscape and thereby to adequately inform policymaking.
IR: The IRI is an umbrella brand, and there is no accurate data available on its operational capacities or the numbers of its constitutive members. As a result, it’s very difficult to trace which factions were involved in particular attacks. It’s plausible that, in some instances, there has been a higher degree of co-ordination between different groups, and, in other instances, one faction may have chosen to take the lead, while the others have merely followed suit or claimed credits.
I argue there is a logic to maintaining this ambiguity. Particularly for Iran-affiliated groups in the IRI which also have a presence in the PMF, it’s important not to jeopardise their affiliation with the PMF and the integrity of the paramilitary structure as a whole. The PMF provides a source of legitimacy, legal cover, economic benefits, and access to power, and it also retains a sacred status, as its origin is grounded in the fatwa of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Attributing attacks to the IRI umbrella, therefore, rather than to specific PMF groups, provides those factions with presumedly double membership with a convenient smoke screen. This is something that has allowed many of the veteran Iraqi resistance actors to pursue their domestic agendas while, at the same time, still positioning themselves as defenders of a transnational resistance cause.
IR: I always try to argue against this simplistic application of the label ‘proxy warrior’. Firstly, because there is no catch-all definition of what being a proxy entails, and secondly, because the term in itself is very static.
If a group engages in a military operation that involves actors from the so-called Axis of Resistance, or that aligns with Iran’s general interests, there is a tendency to believe that this group must be acting on the orders of Iran. Similarly, if a group chooses not to engage in such operations, then the assumption is that this conduct or hesitation signals a move away from Iran. While, in some cases, both of these presumptions may turn out to be true, neither of them necessarily reflects the real-time calculations of the actor involved. For instance, a group that is ideologically in sync with Iran’s vision for the region may also be focused on domestic matters and hence decide not to get engaged in armed resistance operations on Iraqi soil. Similarly, another faction may be opposed to some of Iran’s day to day policies regarding Iraq and its neighbours, but still decide to execute kinetic operations against Israel or US-led coalition forces, regardless of whether military escalation is in Iran’s imminent interest. As I argue in my papers, the way in which the Iraqi militants practice resistance is shaped by a complex interplay of motivations, ideological convictions, and interests, with each group possessing distinct and constantly evolving priorities, visions, and agendas.
We also need to consider the agility and learning curve of these veteran militant formations. A group may have acted as a conventional proxy agent under specific circumstances at a certain point in time, but its positioning vis-à-vis the Iran-led Axis of Resistance can evolve over the years. At a later point in time, the same group may have representatives in parliament, for example, and would re-evaluate the extent to which it wants to leverage its connections to Iran and other Axis actors. The relationship between Iran and the Iran-aligned militants is fluid and can’t be neatly summed up by the term ‘proxy warfare’.
One other key issue I want to highlight here is that sometimes we can be misled into thinking that Iran’s main interest in the PMF is in flexing the paramilitary’s muscle strength and exploiting its combat capabilities. Having pro-Iranian factions in the PMF means having allies embedded in a security agency which offers access to formal state legitimacy, financial resources, and domestic political leverage. This is far more beneficial to the Islamic Republic, especially at a time when Iran is politically and economically weakened and is likely to suffer further now that President Trump has restored his ‘maximum pressure’ campaign. Being able to rely on support from factions in the PMF also enables Iran to benefit from the smoke screen I mentioned earlier. The ambiguity means that Iran can play the PMF as a bargaining chip to sustain a threat perception, but it also offers Iran an opportunity to engage in plausible deniability where needed or whenever the factions’ affairs or readiness to escalate tend to spin out of control.
IR: It’s important to know what drives the different factions in order to understand how best to evaluate their actions and engage them accordingly. If you believe a group is simply acting as an Iranian proxy, your approach may neglect the group’s embeddedness in domestic formal and informal networks and therefore disregard the implications of an ill-timed targeted assassination campaign. Furthermore, if a group is pursuing a national political agenda in Iraq, you might have more success in sabotaging its influence and legitimacy claims if you simply focus on mapping and publicly highlighting incidents where it has acted outside of the formal chain of command of the state, or where it has disregarded or acted against the interests of Iraqi constituencies. Shedding light on such contradictions and exposing malign behaviour can, in the long run, be far more damaging to the group’s political and economic prospects than poorly executed targeting of its leadership cadres, especially whenever there is a risk of high collateral damage.
Similarly, it’s important to identify and acknowledge the ideological and structural differences between these groups if you are considering engaging them kinetically. If a member of a PMF-registered formation – which is part of the Iraqi security forces – is eliminated – let us say in the midst of a residential neighbourhood in the capital, this could be framed as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty. Such an action would simply give more fuel to the resistance rhetoric of Iraqi militants who claim that their ‘right to resist’ is rooted in the continued controversial presence of US forces, which is regarded by many of these factions as a form of foreign-imposed military occupation and thereby as a violation of Iraqi national sovereignty.
IR: The situation is continually evolving, but there are three key points to highlight. The first is that, despite widespread speculation, there has been no interference from the PMF in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. The Iraqi government has shown a strong focus on restoring a degree of what we in a Western context would refer to as a state monopoly on violence, but this shouldn’t be mistaken for a disarmament of the PMF or a top-down stripping of their power. In the Iraqi security and political landscape, it is not uncommon for political parties to entertain an affiliated armed wing. By law, the PMF is part of the Iraqi security forces and so having registered brigades under the PMF roof is not viewed as an anomaly or even a violation. The PMF will thus undoubtedly continue to play a crucial role in Iraq’s security sector, but it remains to be seen whether the current Prime Minister will succeed in restraining certain PMF affiliates that act outside of the formal chain of command.
The second point to consider is the volatile dynamics in the security relationship between the US and Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister has signalled that the focus would be on transforming the security assistance received from the US-led coalition forces into a bilateral security sector cooperation between the US and Iraq. Even pro-Iranian militants tend to appreciate the need to continue cooperating with the US in the security field, especially with concerns over the resurgence of ISIS and a possible spillover of violence from Syria. However, provided such a beneficial arrangement does materialise, it would be quite a stretch for them to use this form of cooperation as a justification for waging armed resistance.
Furthermore, the breaking of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas is likely to shape the domestic approaches of the resistance-leaning factions. Pro-Iranian factions in Iraq had announced a suspension of attacks on Israel following the news of a ceasefire, but, on numerous occasions since, they have signalled their continued commitment to defending the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people. If Israel continues to attack Gaza, or if all parties fail to reach an inclusive agreement on ending the conflict that secures the future of Palestine, we are likely to see stronger responses coming from within Iraq. The perceived ‘responsibility to resist injustice’ is still central justification for the actions undertaken by representatives of Iraq’s Islamic resistance, regardless of whether or not this aligns with Iran’s geopolitical priorities. Without an end to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and its continued violations of the truce agreement in Lebanon, it’s difficult to envision a scenario in which Iraq’s resistance warriors would voluntarily and sustainably lay down their weapons.
Nonetheless, while the moral imperative to defend the Palestinian cause offers a perpetual excuse for resistance-leaning factions to operate outside of the state’s chain of command, seasoned politicians from the Iran-leaning current are urgently seeking to project a more or less convincing veneer of a state monopoly over the use of force. The success of this delicate balancing act largely hinges on effectively managing the ongoing Security Sector Reform (SSR) process. The proclaimed goal is to neutralise rogue resistance factions – and prevent them from provoking an untimely military escalation in Iraq – by integrating them into a restructured and disciplined PMF, thereby reducing its perception as a challenge to state sovereignty. This manoeuvre seeks to appease Iraq’s American counterparts in the Trump administration, while consolidating the PMF’s status in the state defence infrastructure as an existential guarantee for the existing elite power-sharing framework.
In 2018, The Asia Foundation, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the Rift Valley Institute, and their local research partners came together to establish the X-Border Local Research Network. The goal was to deepen global understanding of the political, economic, and social dynamics shaping conflict-affected borderlands.
This podcast episode examines the network’s lasting impact, highlighting its contributions to locally-led research in conflict and peacebuilding. It explores key lessons learned and provides insights into how donors and organizations can support and sustain community-driven research. Through discussions, the program team underscores the importance of fostering inclusive, long-term research networks that empower local voices, ensuring that knowledge remains relevant, contextual, and impactful in addressing complex challenges.
Disclaimer: The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the partner organizations or the UK government.
1 February 2025 marked the fourth anniversary of the 2021 military coup d’état in Myanmar, which energized pre-existing conflicts in the country and led to new unarmed and armed opposition movements against the junta. The military junta’s violent and indiscriminate response to the anti-coup opposition has come at a great human cost and has also led to the displacement of millions of Myanmar civilians both within and across the country’s borders to Thailand, India, and Malaysia. In the latter case, the new arrivals often join Myanmar diaspora communities of both migrant labourers and refugees fleeing previous waves of war and repression.
On 20 January 2025, nearly coinciding with the anniversary of the coup, dozens of civil society organisations supporting the Myanmar refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border were informed by USAID of an immediate suspension of critical aid. Some six weeks later, this suspension became a permanent termination. The USAID cuts are a major setback and are not the only aid reductions undercutting programmes critical to supporting Myanmar refugees abroad. Other donors have or are planning to reduce their overall aid budgets, including the UK Government. Moreover, the US has withdrawn funding from key humanitarian agencies, such as the World Food Program. Simultaneously, the political environment in countries hosting Myanmar refugees has become increasingly hostile to refugees, and hundreds of Myanmar citizens have been repatriated – which for many, both women and men, has meant an immediate forced conscription by the junta into its war against the opposition forces.
Prior to these developments, our team had conducted XCEPT-supported research in Thailand and in Mizoram State in northeastern India from March – May 2024, which focused on the different displacement experiences of Myanmar refugee women. Even before the complications brought on by aid cuts and increasingly hostile political environments in the host countries, almost all refugee women struggled to survive economically, had minimal access to services, feared deportation and forced conscription, and struggled to connect with Thai and Mizoram host communities due to language barriers and a lack of proper documentation. However, different women and gender diverse persons were exposed to these burdens, risks, and challenges differently. Unsurprisingly, the more access to social and financial capital one has, the more one is buffered from some of these risks and the more services one can access. Those with less (or without) capital, clout, and connections struggled more. Women heads of households and widows, who were often the sole providers for their families, struggled to cope with the financial burden, and often highlighted their fatigue and depletion in the interviews. This was even truer for women who had disabilities or chronic illnesses, and/or who had care responsibilities for family members with disabilities. For elderly women refugees, old age loneliness was an issue, especially in urban centres, where they lacked contacts to the host communities and their younger family members were busy at work.
Most of our interviewees strongly felt that the anti-junta uprising had indeed increased women’s political and social participation and, to a lesser degree, led to more openness on LGBTIQ+ rights. However, the struggle for economic survival and the double burdening of women, who were juggling with both domestic care responsibilities and paid labour, left little time for participation. Moreover, deeply entrenched heteronormativity and patriarchy, including amongst male leaders of the opposition, has kept decision-making power in the hands of (older) men.
The recent combined development of the aid cuts with the increasingly restrictive policies of host countries have created new pressures on a scale that the refugee communities have not faced before. The aid cuts will mean that refugees will have to rely even more on the informal support networks which they have established themselves instead. However, these informal support networks, as well as wider political participation for minority groups, will be harder to maintain as even more time will now go towards ensuring economic survival as a direct consequence of the aid cuts. Meanwhile, given increasing political hostility toward refugees in host countries, we anticipate that the refugees will attempt to make themselves less visible and less likely to advocate for assistance or participate in activism, due to fears of deportation and subsequently forced conscription.
Though we have no doubt that the women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights activists amongst the refugees will continue to work for a more equitable Myanmar, the preexisting struggles they face have become even more fraught due to the external forces coalescing around Myanmar refugees.
Chatham House’s XCEPT research explores transnational conflict across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. By tracing the movement of people, goods, and capital across borders, the programme examines how conflict extends beyond national boundaries and what this means for effective policy and programming. In the below short videos, Chatham House researchers discuss their research projects for the XCEPT programme.
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA programme, discusses the business of migrant smuggling in and through Libya, which has, since 2011, become the primary corridor for irregular migration to Europe from sub-Saharan Africa.
Read Tim’s paper, coauthored with Lubna Yousef, here. Other recent XCEPT-Chatham House research papers examining the political economies of migration from Africa to Europe include “Tracing the ‘continuum of violence’ between Nigeria and Libya” by Leah de Haan, Iro Aghedo, and Tim Eaton; and “Tackling the Niger–Libya migration route” by Peter Tinti.
The Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’ suffered significant setbacks in 2024, amid conflict with Israel and other political turbulence, leading some observers to conclude that it has been seriously weakened or is even on the verge of defeat. However, the axis has historically proven highly resilient. Chatham House Senior Research Fellow Renad Mansour discusses how Iran and its networks adapt to external pressures.
Read “The shape-shifting ‘axis of resistance’”, by Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid.
Local conflicts, such as those in Sudan and Ethiopia, have wider transnational impacts — showing how violence and competition over resources quickly spill across borders, shaping broader political and economic dynamics. Chatham House Africa Programme Senior Research Fellow Ahmed Soliman discusses the regional economic effects of these conflicts.
Read “Gold and the war in Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, and “The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie.
