Jihadi groups in the Sahel have not yet won any of the insurgencies in which they have been involved, yet they remain the most adaptive and resilient of all insurgent groups. Ansar al-Dine, Al-Mourabitoun, and the Sahara branch of Al-Qa‘eda in the Islamic Maghreb have shown remarkable staying power, defying predictions that their military rout by France in 2013 in northern Mali would be a crippling blow. What explains the endurance and proliferation of Salafi-jihadi groups in the Sahel?
Since Algerian terrorist groups relocated to northern Mali during the first decade of the century, rebel leaders in the Sahel have become more inclined to adopting Salafi-jihadism as a means of survival and recruitment, and to outcompete other armed actors. In contexts of contending warring groups, ethnic or religious divisions, and state misrule, a basic challenge of rebel mobilization is the collective action problem, because the natural inclination of individuals is to stay out of conflicts, given the high costs of participation. Insurgent groups try to mitigate this problem by providing material benefits—protection, money, social services—in return for becoming a supporter or fighter. Extremists also have the advantage of using ideology wrapped in religious ideas to motivate, coordinate, and retain recruits.
Violent extremism helps draw the most devoted recruits on the cheap. This is important in contexts of intense rebel competition where switching sides and the realignment of alliances is more the norm than the exception. In such fractured environments, extremist groups can also become appealing to moderates, as they appear as the only ones able to follow through on their commitments to reshape state-society relationships. This is critical in the early phases of conflict as recruits tend to flock to groups that have the potential to win and a fearsome reputation for enforcing law and order.
It is not a coincidence that an essential theme in the discourse of jihadi groups is morality, honor, and justice—values that individuals and communities who are repressed, exploited, and discriminated against crave. For example, in analyzing a trove of unearthed documents by the so-called Islamic State group, New York Times correspondent Rukmini Callimachi revealed how the group used a rough and ready dispensation of justice to win over the population it controlled, including those whom it abused. The Islamic State also distinguished itself by its willingness to hold its own fighters to account. It is this revolutionary character—backed by a moralizing and revolutionary language—that builds the credibility and reputation of jihadis as enforcers of order and purveyors of security.
Armed jihadi groups in the Sahel have quickly learned that ideological purity and religious zeal can act as a useful branding strategy to differentiate themselves from rival groups. The case of Ayad Ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar al-Dine and a Machiavellian fixture of Tuareg insurrections in northern Mali, is revealing in this regard. According to several observers, Ag Ghali’s embrace of extreme ideology was determined by the fast-moving events that led to the January 2012 uprising launched by the secular National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) against the government of Mali. Ag Ghali had wanted to be the movement’s secretary general but was rebuffed in November 2011, leading to his marginalization during the crucial preparatory stages of the rebellion. It is a matter of conjecture whether Ag Ghali’s radical trajectory would have been the same had he been allowed to lead this revolt against the Malian state.
Regardless what one might think about Ag Ghali’s 2012 reinvention as a firebrand intent on imposing an extreme form of Islamic law, the adoption of a radical jihadi posture allowed him to differentiate himself from the MNLA, while at the same time benefiting from the critical material support of violent extremist organizations operating in northern Mali. The result is that a few months after the start of the northern Mali conflict in early 2012, the charismatic Ag Ghali emerged as the most prominent leader of the Tuareg insurgency. An appreciable number of those who joined him did not share the radical ideology he had set for his organization. Alghabass Ag Intallah, the son of the hereditary chief of the Ifoghas, who first joined the MNLA, acknowledged that his defection to Ansar al-Dine was based on the group’s power and better organization. Ag Intallah also reportedly mocked the conversion of Ag Ghali into a radical jihadi.
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), a jihadi group active in southern Algeria and northern Mali between 2011 and 2013, had an even more ambivalent relationship with religion. A non-negligible portion of its members was made up of drug traffickers not known for radical religiosity. Their primary objective was to secure their position in the bitter competition over access to trafficking revenues and control over trafficking routes, “without any particular regard to the harsh religious dogma held by the organization they lead,” as Mathieu Pellerin, a French specialist on Africa, has written.
In an environment marked by intense fear, uncertainty, and competition among insurgent factions, the leaders of MUJAO understood that the embrace of radical ideology could quickly yield a critical early advantage in attracting the most dedicated fighters. This was necessary for building a winning force that could, over time, attract the support of a population that was often religiously moderate. A nonideological wing and a hardcore religious wing came together in MUJAO, recalling what had occurred in Iraq with the Islamic State, where religious zealots joined with aggrieved Arab Sunnis, including officers from Saddam Hussein’s secular army.
The importance of radical ideology in the Sahel stems from its instrumental value and normative commitments. For rebel leaders, radical ideology helps their groups recruit and stand out from the rest of the pack. For aggrieved communities, there are situational incentives in joining a winning coalition. It is not the presumed religious radicalism of young men that determines alignment choices. Rather, it is the strategic gains to which leaders and their followers aspire that determine which are the armed groups that individuals or communities choose to join or support.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
The Yemeni province of Mahra, on the border with Oman, has not been reached by the war so far. However, Saudi Arabia – as Oman used to do to defend its influence – has started to support a large number of Mahari tribes. This has led to large community divisions in local tribal society, for the first time in the history of this eastern province. This support is not limited to the financial domain but also extends to the military. The spread of armed tribal groups has become a new feature in Mahra in light of the indirect Saudi-Emirati-Omani competition for regional leverage.
In 2015, Yemen’s president, Abdurabo Mansour Hadi, fled to the Yemen-Oman border when the Houthis, along with their former ally Ali Abdullah Saleh, decided to invade Aden to arrest him. The president traveled to the remote provinces of the desert until he arrived in Mahra, through which he crossed the border into Oman. In the meantime, the Saudi-led coalition began its military operations to restore the legitimacy that the Houthis had gained.
The border strip between Mahra and the Omani province of Dhofar is 288 kilometers long, starting from the coast of Haof district and ending in the heart of the desert at the border triangle between Yemen, Oman and Saudi Arabia: beyond the desert, there are few agricultural zones and the population lives along the border strip. Although the border area is divided between the two countries, the frontier communities in Mahra and Dhofar appear to be an ecosystem: tribes descend from a single tribe and share many historical, social and cultural constituents. In addition, they speak another language beside Arabic, namely “Mahriya” or “Jabali”, which is a Semitic language not spoken by the rest of Yemenis.
This social cohesion in border areas has led Oman to deal with this ecosystem as a first line of defense to protect its security from any break-in. To this end, Oman has strengthened its relationships with Mahra society and provided Omani citizenship for many personalities in the area, especially after signing the border agreement with Yemen in 1992. It has also made it easier for those who do not have Omani citizenship to move to Oman. Despite Yemen’s upheavals since 2011, Mahra province has not been affected economically because it relied on Omani markets to obtain fuel and food, depending especially on a major shared market, the Al-Mazyounah, which is a few kilometers from Yemen’s Shihen border-crossing. This explains why Mahra province managed to remain economically autonomous from the other provinces. At the same time, this contributed to protecting the Omani border from any security breakthrough by extremist groups: most tribes are also grateful to the Omani state for this status quo. This does not mean that illegal activities are absent from this area: the smuggling of goods and vehicles is widespread and recently many human trafficking cases in Dhofar were also recorded, but all the people involved in such activities are Mahris.
However, the consequences of the war have extended to the border of Mahra province since mid-2015. The Houthis reduced the financial allowances of Mahra employees to a quarter of the amount required for the province, causing non-payment of salaries for many civil and military employees: many of them, especially non-Mahris, had to leave and return to their areas. This provoked a severe shortage of employees in security and service institutions: as a result, the then governor of Mahra handed out Mahra crossings to the tribes, surrounding the areas to take over the management of ports at a governorate level and transfer customs fees to the province’s account. Moreover, Oman provided the necessary fuel for the service facilities and distributed regular food aid to the population. In 2017, the tribes of Zabanout and Ra’feet began to quarrel over control of the Shihen crossing, each tribe claiming the port as part of its tribal area.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) began to be present in the province of Mahra a few months later at the beginning of the military intervention in Yemen. In 2015 the UAE trained about 2,500 new recruits from among Mahra inhabitants, although they reportedly did not create an elite force due to tribal refusal, while providing a lot of assistance to rebuild the local police and existing security services. It also distributed food baskets and humanitarian aid to the residents of Mahra districts through the UAE Red Crescent Society.
In the eyes of the sultanate, the UAE presence at its Yemeni border is perceived as unjustified: the two countries have disputes on several issues, most notably the border, especially after Oman accused Abu Dhabi of planning a coup in 2011 to overthrow Sultan Qaboos, which the UAE denied.
The collapse of Yemeni state institutions and the military intervention of the Saudi-led coalition stunned Muscat, which found itself having to cope with new dynamics and a no more effective border strategy: these concerns have turned into reality. In January 2016 the Omani authorities closed the ports in the Shihen and Surfeet areas, and a few months later al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized control of the city of Mukalla, the capital of Mahra’s neighboring region of Hadramout. The stated rationale for Oman’s move was to protect its border security from any breakthrough of extremist groups. It is here worth noting that AQAP has never been close to Mahra or its border areas, due to local society, strongly attached to traditional Sufism, which has never accepted al-Qaeda’s ideology. In late 2017, when a group of Saudi-backed Salafists tried to establish a religious education center in Mahra’s Qashan, protests were held against them because locals reject this type of religious belief.
However, observers believe that the real reason for the temporary closure of the ports was the result of political choices made by president Hadi and Khaled Bah’hah, the prime minister at the time: leaders of security and military services in Mahra were replaced by new leaders and the sultanate was uncertain regarding the future political direction of these appointments. It should be noted that, over the past few years, tensions have arisen between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Oman on the other, because the sultanate adopted political attitudes not aligned with the Saudi-UAE politics in the region, especially in relation to Qatar and Iran.
Oman was also accused by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi of providing access to arms and communications devices to be delivered to the Houthis. In August 2015 Marib province authorities seized a shipment of arms and ammunition for the Houthis at one of its checkpoints. In October 2015, the governor of Marib declared that military forces took possession of Iranian military equipment (including advanced communications equipment) in the province: according to their statement, this shipment was coming by land from the Sultanate of Oman. In November 2015, the Yemeni army dismantled an informal network involved in the smuggling of arms and explosives, as well as of military communications equipment, which entered through Mahra ports, said the army. In October 2016, Western and Iranian officials stated that Iran had stepped up arms transfer to the Houthis, and most of the smuggling crossed Oman and its Yemeni frontier, including by land routes. This was denied by the Sultanate of Oman in a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arguing that “the news of arms smuggling through Oman is baseless and no arms are passing through the lands of Sultanate”.
Despite these allegations, there are smuggling routes towards Yemen that seem easier than passing through the sultanate’s borders. The Yemeni coastal strip on the Arabian Sea extends over 1,000 kilometers: this is a security vacuum area and is closer in terms of distance to the Houthis’ strongholds. In any case, smuggled arms or goods cannot reach the Houthis in northern Yemen without the help of smuggling networks operating in areas controlled by the legitimate government forces.
In October 2017 the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed faction of the Southern Movement seeking independence for southern Yemen, tried to convince the former governor, Abdullah Kedda, to join the council, but he refused, asserting that he supports the authority of the legitimate government led by president Hadi. This disappointed the Saudi-led coalition, especially the UAE, which intends to promote the STC as the only entity representing the Southern Movement: the STC embraced the UAE’s agenda in the south.
The Omani influence on the tribes of Mahra was a major motivation for Saudi Arabia’s military reinforcement in the region. In November 2017 Saudi forces entered the province and took over its vital facilities, including al-Ghaidha airport, Nashton port and the ports of Srfeet and Shihen on the border with Oman. The Saudis also deployed their forces in more than 12 locations along the coast of Mahra, and dismissed the airport employees.
These developments worried Mahra inhabitants, pushing thousands into the streets in April 2018: they staged an open protest in the city of Ghaidha, demanding that Saudi forces to leave the facilities and institutions, handing them over to local authorities. Even famous Mahris such as Shiekh Ali Harizi, Shikh Al Afrar and Ahmed Qahtant, described the Saudis as an “occupation power” seeking to seize the resources of the province.
Therefore, the war in Yemen has opened a subtle but acute season of popular discontent and regional rivalry in Mahra, stuck in a three-players game among Saudis, Emiratis and Omanis.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
Despite the catastrophic situation in Yemen, the flow of African migrants to the country fleeing violence or economic hardship at home continues. The number has been on the rise since the war began in 2015, and is higher than during the prewar years. Most of the migrants come from the Horn of Africa, and in 2018 alone their numbers jumped to 150,000, from 100,000 migrants in 2017.
Networks of traffickers have taken advantage of the lack of security measures along Yemen’s maritime borders to increase the transport of illegal migrants. The traffickers have become more organized on both the African and Yemeni sides, and dozens of migrants arrive in Yemen on a daily basis. The journey takes around eighteen to 24 hours depending on weather conditions and the state of the vessels. Due to competition among traffickers, the fees are very cheap. It costs between $170 and $200 to be taken to Yemen from Africa, and migrants can pay upon arrival. However, they are not allowed to go free until they pay the full amount due, otherwise they may be imprisoned in detention centers managed by the traffickers.
Lower prices may be a key reason for why migrants choose to go to Yemen, as paying to migrate to Europe costs a great deal more money. The journey of most migrants begins in Somalia’s port city of Bosaso and carries them to Yemeni coastal areas mostly in Hadhramawt, Abyan, or Shabwa Governorates, most of which are tribal areas. Before the conflict there was another route, toward Yemen’s Mocha. But when the Yemeni conflict extended to western coastal areas, the traffickers had to reroute their ships because the western costal zones fell under the control of armed groups allied with the Saudi-led coalition. These groups sought to combat illegal migration and prevent migrants from moving toward the border with Saudi Arabia.
Although traveling through sparsely inhabited tribal zones is difficult, as most of the journey takes place in the desert, migrants benefit in unexpected ways from this route. The tribes of Hadhramawt, Abyan, or Shabwa have traditions obliging them to offer food and accommodations to people passing through their areas. Furthermore, the road through these governorates is relatively safer than the one through more northerly areas where fighting is taking place.
Upon arrival in Yemen, most migrants do not immediately continue to their final destination. Instead, they often spend some time in the country to learn more about the trafficking routes. At the same time, they start working to earn more money to be able to pay for the rest of their passage inland, toward such places as Saudi Arabia or Oman. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 99.9, percent of migrants tracked in Yemen in 2017 intended to go to Saudi Arabia. Although it is difficult for one to find work in Yemen, many of the migrants work for very low wages in farming or construction, where they can earn around $5 a day.
Crossing the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border is the most difficult part in the migrants’ journey. The 1,400-kilometer border strip has been militarized since the Yemen war began in 2015, and Saudi Arabia has reinforced border security by sending thousands of soldiers to the area. Moreover, the Saudi authorities are working with border communities to prevent migrants from entering the kingdom. Despite such security measures, however, traffickers continue to find ways to circumvent the restrictions.
The numbers of Somali migrants have declined in the last four years, given that their primary destination remains Europe. Many have relatives who have made it to the continent, and therefore prefer to take routes through the Mediterranean. In contrast, the number of illegal Ethiopian migrants to Yemen has increased and represents a majority today. According to the IOM, 92 percent of African migrants to Yemen are Ethiopian, with Somalis coming second.
Circumstances have forced Ethiopians to rely more on traffickers to get into Yemen. That is because in 2013 Saudi Arabia officially stopped accepting Ethiopian laborers following clashes between the Saudi security forces and Ethiopian workers in Jeddah and Riyadh. Ethiopians can easily find jobs as domestic workers in the kingdom, as there has been an acute shortage since those clashes. Moreover, the fact that Saudis spend around $13.7 billion on domestic workers per year, according to official Saudi statistics, encourages migrants.
While waiting for the proper circumstances to cross into Saudi Arabia, many migrants end up relying on humanitarian assistance provided by international nongovernmental organizations in refugee camps in Yemen. These camps lack basic services to receive large numbers of people, and humanitarian workers are facing difficulties in delivering food supplies to them.
The human rights of illegal migrants have also been frequently violated by the parties on the ground. In April 2018, dozens of migrants were tortured and raped by government officials after being put in detention camps in Aden. Elsewhere, armed groups have forced migrants to pay money in order to pass through their checkpoints. Such abuses have pushed many migrants to earn money by fighting as mercenaries in the Yemeni conflict. For example, in recent years the Houthis announced the death of several African fighters who had fought with them in the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border region. According to local sources, some migrants have disappeared in the mountainous areas of Shabwa, Abyan, and Bayda and are believed to have been recruited by Al-Qa‘eda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Despite the hardships and abuses illegal migrants face, they continue to arrive in Yemen looking for a better life that can help extricate them from poverty and deprivation. Here is an unhappy case of people leaping from the frying pan into the fire, but all the signs are that such migration will continue, whatever the cost.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
The continuing threat of a resurgence by the Islamic State group, and its efforts to exert influence in Syria and Iraq, has played out most noticeably along the Syrian-Iraqi border. Yet that border, extending all the way up to the frontier with Turkey, is about more than the Islamic State. It has emerged as a main point of confrontation among regional and international powers.
Over 600 kilometers of the border formerly controlled by the Islamic State are currently held by a patchwork of political actors. On the Iraqi side, the major forces are Iraq’s regular army, Arab Sunni tribes, as well as Shi‘a and Yezidi militias tied to Iran, which also share a connection with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) operating in western Sinjar. On the Syrian side, the U.S.-backed Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controls large parts of the border. The Syrian regime, allied with local partners, holds other areas, while the Islamic State rules over a small pocket of territory.
This complex mix of forces is reshaping the border area, even as the border itself is reshaping how the different parties are interacting with one another as they compete for spheres of influence. Cross-border interaction and a mutual need to prevent a return of the Islamic State have also brought Damascus and Baghdad closer together, which ultimately works to the benefit of Iran. Indeed, today Iran is the only actor that has a significant presence, and influence, on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border.
In 2014, during the phase of expansion by the Islamic State and the initial fight to oppose it, Iraqi Kurdish forces counterattacked and took some 30 kilometers of territory beyond their former area of control, almost reaching Sinjar. Following the failed referendum on Kurdish independence in 2017, the Iraqi government recaptured nearly all of those areas and stationed government troops and units of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)—quasi-official militias composed primarily of Iraqi Shi‘a—on the border. The dilemma for the Iraqi government today is that those forces require food and fuel, creating a major drain on the national budget. If these funds are cut, as is possible, it might allow the Islamic State to regain territory and reignite conflict in the border region.
On the Syrian side, the regime of President Bashar al-Assad does not have the same problem. After retaking the highly strategic Al-Bukamal border crossing in November 2017, the regime employed a model that involves collaboration between the Republican Guard’s 104th Brigade and local tribal elements in Deir Ezzor. Because the system is more financially sustainable, it allows the regime to maintain a strong presence on the border.
Geopolitical rivalries on the Syrian-Iraqi border have only intensified as a result of mounting tensions between the United States and Iran. Complicating matters in the broader border area that stretches northward toward Turkey are the conflict between Turkey and U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish groups and the rivalry between the United States and Russia. The United States has also possibly intervened militarily against the PMF, which has crossed the Iraqi border into Syria to conduct operations against the Islamic State. Washington considers them to be an extension of Iran and in June 2018 U.S. aircraft reportedly bombed PMF forces between Al-Bukamal and the Tanf crossing, which the Americans control, on the Syrian side of the border. However, the U.S. denied that it was involved.
These clashing agendas underline that the Iraqi-Syrian border plays a far more intricate role than delineating the boundaries between two sovereign states. The presence of nonstate actors who are disputing state control over borders—or indeed who sometimes share border control with states—has produced new military relationships.
That is increasingly the case on the Iraqi side of the border, where Shi‘a militias and the Kurdish Peshmerga operate alongside Iraqi military forces. According to one its leaders, the PMF deployed along the Syrian-Iraqi border in coordination with the Iraqi government. Other reports estimate that 80 percent of the 140,000 PMF members are stationed in northern and western Iraq, close to Syria and far from areas where they were recruited. This figure has not been confirmed, but to some observers the deployment, if the numbers are corroborated, is part of an Iranian attempt to secure a corridor between Iran and Syria.
At the same time, the Turkish armed forces continue to carry out cross-border operations against the PKK in areas such as Sinjar. The Turkish intervention is affecting relations between Kurdish factions. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, which leads the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, is coordinating with Turkey to deny the PKK and its allies a safe haven in northern Iraq. However, this attitude is not shared by the other major Iraqi Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the city of Suleimaniyya and has a strong presence in Kirkuk. The PUK is a close ally of Iran and is believed to have developed a more sympathetic attitude toward the PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the Democratic Union Party.
The Islamic State’s priority has been to preserve its caliph minus a caliphate. It still controls a small strip of territory on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Iraqi border, which is at risk of imminently falling. Last December, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of the 2,000 American troops in Syria. Most of the units are stationed along the border and are scheduled to have completed their withdrawal by the end of April, except for around 200 troops.
If this new situation creates a vacuum, it could lead to military advances by Iran and its proxies, the Syrian government, Kurdish militias, Turkey, or Russia. That is why the Syrian-Iraqi border is likely to remain highly militarized, a consequence both of geopolitical rivalries and local crises.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
As the Yemeni conflict grinds on, much of the country’s population has been affected by the violence. A notable exception is Mahrah Governorate, located along Yemen’s border with Oman. There, a more low-key struggle is taking place. In November 2017, the Saudi-led coalition deployed military forces and took over the governorate’s facilities, amid ongoing tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on one side, and Oman on the other.
Before the Saudi military deployed to Mahrah, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a UAE-backed body made up of a faction of the Southern Movement, which seeks independence for south Yemen, tried to persuade the then-governor of Mahrah, ‘Abdullah Kedah, to join them. Kedah refused, saying he supported the authority of the legitimate government headed by President ‘Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. This displeased the coalition, particularly the UAE, which wants to promote the STC as the only entity representing the Southern Movement. The STC, in return, has embraced the UAE’s agenda in the south.
Saudi and Emirati tensions with Oman have increased in recent years, because Oman has adopted political positions not consistent with Saudi-UAE policies in the region, particularly relating to Qatar and Iran. Moreover, since its establishment in 1971 the UAE has had a disagreement with Oman over their common border. Bilateral ties suffered further in 2011 when Oman uncovered an Emirati spy network that allegedly was planning to overthrow the regime of Sultan Qaboos bin Sa‘id Al Sa‘id, though the UAE denied having any links to such a network. Recently, with the outbreak of the Yemen war, the Saudi-led coalition believed that Iranian arms were being smuggled through Oman, then Mahrah, to reinforce the Houthis.
The Saudi and Emirati rivalry with Oman is particularly sharp in Mahrah. In early November 2017, posters and billboards were posted in the streets of Al-Ghaydah, Mahrah’s capital, thanking Sultan Qaboos for the humanitarian assistance he had long provided to Mahrah. This campaign, the initiative of community leaders in the city, was directed primarily against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, implicitly warning them against intervening in Mahrah.
Because of Oman’s shared traditions with Mahrah, the sultanate believes it is important to maintain strong ties with the governorate. Indeed, the relationship has the potential to affect Omani domestic politics, because Mahrah and the Omani governorate of Dhofar, where a rebellion took place against the Omani regime between 1965 and 1975, share many similarities. They are connected socially and economically and have a common language, namely Mahri or Jabliah. Moreover, there are many in Mahrah who hold Omani nationality, while the most prominent tribal leaders in the governorate, such as Sheikh ‘Abdullah Al Afrar, the head of the General Council of Mahrah and Socotra, live in Oman.
According to tribal sources in Mahrah, “The growing Omani impact on Mahrah’s tribes pushed the Saudi-led coalition to take action, and was one of the main reasons why Saudi Arabia sent military reinforcements to the area.”
Since Saudi forces entered Mahrah, they have taken control of the governorate’s vital facilities, including Al-Ghaydah’s airport, Nishtun port, and the Sarfit and Shehen crossings with Oman. They have also deployed to more than a dozen locations along the coast of the governorate, and dismissed airport personnel, telling them that their salaries would be paid on a regular basis regardless of their presence at work. Moreover, Hadi, who resides in Saudi Arabia, removed Kedah from his post, apparently because he opposed the Saudi presence. He appointed in his place Rajih Bakreet, who has strong relations with the UAE.
By February 2017, the demands on the inhabitants of Mahrah were becoming more onerous. Saudi forces prevented them from fishing in many coastal areas, while around 100 items were banned from entering Mahrah from Oman. These included solar panels, chemicals, and some basic necessities. In addition, in August 2018 customs duties were raised by an average of 80 percent on many imports and instructions were given not to accept customs documents issued in the Omani free-trade zone. Analysts interpreted such measures as being aimed at weakening the dependency of Yemen’s private sector on Oman, as Yemeni businessmen like to send their shipments through Oman’s Salalah port, after crossing at Shehen.
These developments have raised concerns among Mahrah’s population. In April 2018, thousands began an open protest in Al-Ghaydah, demanding that Saudi forces leave the governorate’s facilities and institutions and hand them over to the local authorities. Prominent figures even described the Saudis as an “occupying force” who were looking to take over the resources of the governorate.
The two-month sit-in ended in July with an agreement between the protesters and Yemeni government representatives that the Saudis would withdraw from Mahrah’s facilities and institutions in favor of local authorities. However, according to protest leaders the agreement was never implemented. Moreover, officials who sided with the protesters were later removed by Hadi and replaced by others loyal to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. At the same time there were also allegations that Oman supported the protesters, while also encouraging Mahrah tribes to resist the Saudis.
Leaks about Saudi intentions in Mahrah further contributed to the public discontent. In August 2018, a letter was published in several media outlets addressed to Mohammed al-Jaber, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen, from a Saudi company called Huta Marine. The company thanked Jaber for his trust as he had requested that it prepare a proposal for the construction of an oil port in the district of Nishtun. The facility would be the terminal of a Saudi pipeline that begins in the Saudi governorate of Kharkhir, in Najran.
There is also a plan to build a channel from the Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea through Mahrah. The objective is to create an alternative outlet for Saudi oil exports to the Strait of Hormuz, which is vulnerable to obstruction by Iran. For the inhabitants of Mahrah, such projects suggest that there is much more to the Saudi presence in the governorate than countering smuggling and terrorist activities, as coalition spokesman have insisted in the past.
The events in Mahrah are another chapter in the proxy conflicts taking place in Yemen. Oman is active in the governorate and will not accept that the Saudis and Emiratis remain on the Omani border with Yemen. On the other side, the Saudi-led coalition is trying to reduce Omani influence in Mahrah. Those paying the highest price for this rivalry are the inhabitants of Mahrah themselves.
This blog was originally published by the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.
