Content warning: This article contains discussion of sexual violence, including direct quotes from survivors.
“I came to South Sudan in June 2024. The cause of my journey was the conflict in Sudan. When we reached the bush, our vehicle was stopped [and] some women were asked to come down; they were sexually harassed. Young girls, under 18 years old, were abducted – two of them were from my husband’s family. On the border of South Sudan, people were well-treated. However, the challenges facing women and girls in the camp is lack of shelter, sanitary facilities, food, schools, and health facilities. I think coming to South Sudan harmed me more because I don’t have anything to eat, no household, and my husband went back to look for those abducted girls. He has now stayed for three months without communication to me. I wonder whether he is alive.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024
War erupted in Sudan in April 2023, leading to widespread forced displacement, extreme rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), destruction of homes and property, and mass killings. To date, approximately 1 million people have crossed the Sudanese border into South Sudan in search of safety. Many of these are ‘returnees’, people who originally migrated to Sudan due to the South Sudanese war (2013-2020). Now, having been repeatedly displaced in both directions across the border between Sudan and South Sudan, returnees and refugees alike are struggling to survive in highly constrained and challenging conditions, while the repeated physical and mental trauma they endured in both South Sudan and Sudan remains unaddressed.
UNHCR map of displaced persons in South Sudan
In July 2024, our team launched a research project aiming to understand the experiences of those forcibly displaced from Sudan to South Sudan. We were especially concerned with the high rates of SGBV reported, the role that SGBV played in displacement, experiences of SGBV during flight, and risks of gendered violence in the South Sudanese settlements. Using ‘sensemaking’ methodology, the STEWARDWOMEN team worked on the border of Aweil North for two weeks, gathering stories and participants’ self-interpretation of these stories to better understand links between SGBV and forced displacement, and to uncover the most pressing needs of those living in precarity along the border.
This post is based on 695 shared narratives shared by displaced people in Aweil North, South Sudan. It centres the observations and analyses of STEWARDWOMEN researchers, who put their own comfort, well-being, and safety on the line to bring forward the voices of those whose most pressing survival needs are not being met and who have had few opportunities to share their stories.
Sexual and gender-based violence during forced displacement
It was when life became difficult and threatening in Sudan day and night that we decided to leave for South Sudan. (displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024)
Rampant violence was what led most participants to leave Sudan and make the journey to South Sudan. This included SGBV, which over half of participants said was a big factor in their decision to journey across the border. Participants described rape, gang rape, abduction for forced marriage and sexual slavery, along with beatings and killings, as threats to their well-being and safety. It was not uncommon for women to describe extreme sexual violence that upended social norms. One STEWARDWOMEN researcher was told of a situation in which a very old woman, a grandmother, was gang-raped by youth who looked to be the same age as her grandsons. The rape itself was traumatic enough, but the young age of the perpetrators also signalled a breakdown in age-related social norms that shook this woman deeply. She was not the only woman to share similar experiences:
“As I started my journey, I was in the bus with women and other men. Towards the border line we were stopped by a group of other men and were told to get out of the bus. Women were taken to the bush and I was left aside. A young boy forcefully put a gun on my head and told me to undress, A boy I can call my grandchild did that to me at my age of 65 …if I think of it, I can’t even eat food.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
“On the way [to South Sudan], I witnessed a lot of bad things which happened to women/girls. We travelled in a convoy of 5 vehicles with many people – women, children, men and youths. The vehicles were ambushed, drivers were put under gun points and all the passengers were ordered to come down. After all people were forced down, the rebels started to sort people girls from 12 yrs and above and women of 20 – 45 yrs were abducted. The youth of 10 yrs and above were also abducted for recruitment into the army.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
Many participants described how their families were torn apart during the journey from Sudan to South Sudan, and stated they did not know where their loved ones were:
“We started our journey walking on foot, it was me, my daughter and my husband. They grabbed my daughter and took her to the forest and they started raping her so my husband decided to go and rescue her and he and my daughter didn’t return from the forest. I waited for them and when I wanted to follow them I was stopped by other women because they said it is not safe. I cannot sleep at night because I don’t know if they are safe or dead.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
“When we were travelling on the way, we entered an ambush of militia who abducted my 14 years old sister…. I was seriously crying but it never helped.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
Life in the South Sudanese temporary settlements
In the Aweil North temporary settlement, the STEWARDWOMEN team found conditions that could only be described as shocking. Refugees and returnees are meant to stay in this area for only a short time until they are resettled by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), but many people had been there for three months or longer. Some had been registered as refugees or returnees, others had not. All were struggling to survive without adequate food or shelter, and with no access to desperately needed healthcare. Because of looting and robbery on the road, many arrived without any food, clothing, or supplies. At the time the STEWARDWOMEN team met them, they had been left for months with almost no support.
A makeshift reed and tarpaulin shelter in a transit settlement. Credit: STEWARDWOMEN.
The team visited the area during the rainy season; much of the area was flooded and people were wading through water. Without access to toilets or sanitary facilities, people’s dignity had been further eroded, and the risk of disease was extremely high.
“Women and girls living in Kirradem boarder entry point settlement area are at risk of diseases as they live in a water flooded settlement. There is no safety and healthcare services for women and girls in the area. They lack dignity kits and personal hygiene is a big concern. As women leaders in the settlement camp, we don’t see support coming for women and girls. They are sleeping in flooded shelters and many children have died of measles and malaria. There is no safety for women and girls in the settlement.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
The closest comprehensive health facility is well over 100 km away in Aweil Centre. This is where SGBV survivors must go to access most healthcare services, including sexual and reproductive healthcare, yet many people living in this area have suffered injuries that make this trek impossible. STEWARDWOMEN put out calls to open up referral pathways to find support, but with extremely limited services available in the region, few safe or maintained roads, and resources diverted elsewhere, there were no viable options to secure support for those sheltering in this area.
Along the newest border in the world, important distinctions are being made between ‘returnees’ and ‘refugees’, with vulnerabilities identified for both groups. Returnees face discrimination by the community, often being told that they “chose to go to Sudan, why are you coming back here?” Refugees feel unsafe and vulnerable, related in large part to long-established regional and ethnic tensions that fueled the split of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. Women and girls who have been raped face further stigma, often labelled “wives of rebels of Sudan”. With registration and resettlement sporadic, refugees and returnees alike live in a liminal state, without community or support in South Sudan and unable to go back to Sudan.
What needs to be done
“Unless we receive support from the government and NGOs, many of the women and girls will opt to return to Sudan.”
Displaced woman in South Sudan, interviewed August 2024.
Increased aid and humanitarian support are urgently needed in Aweil North. The STEWARDWOMEN team encountered many graves in and around the settlement, including the graves of children who had died from illness, injury, or malnutrition. The situation in the settlement is dire, with many displaced people sleeping under trees and in makeshift shelters, without even a carpet or a tent. Humanitarian agencies and the South Sudanese government must spread efforts out along the entire border region: wherever people cross, humanitarian needs are high.
Resettlement efforts must be increased and people moved out of the transit centres quickly. Transit centres should also be moved to areas less prone to flooding, and, at a minimum, temporary and emergency health facilities should be built and staffed. Virtually all respondents had suffered physical and emotional trauma; therefore, medical care and psychosocial support are critical needs.
Following rape, witnessing loved ones killed, losing homes and possessions, those displaced from Sudan now endure dire living conditions and a near total absence of support. The displaced persons showed generosity and courage in telling us what they have endured. Their suffering is a call to action—it is our collective responsibility to respond, with urgency and compassion.
In 2018, The Asia Foundation, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, the Rift Valley Institute, and their local research partners came together to establish the X-Border Local Research Network. The goal was to deepen global understanding of the political, economic, and social dynamics shaping conflict-affected borderlands.
This podcast episode examines the network’s lasting impact, highlighting its contributions to locally-led research in conflict and peacebuilding. It explores key lessons learned and provides insights into how donors and organizations can support and sustain community-driven research. Through discussions, the program team underscores the importance of fostering inclusive, long-term research networks that empower local voices, ensuring that knowledge remains relevant, contextual, and impactful in addressing complex challenges.
Disclaimer: The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the partner organizations or the UK government.
1 February 2025 marked the fourth anniversary of the 2021 military coup d’état in Myanmar, which energized pre-existing conflicts in the country and led to new unarmed and armed opposition movements against the junta. The military junta’s violent and indiscriminate response to the anti-coup opposition has come at a great human cost and has also led to the displacement of millions of Myanmar civilians both within and across the country’s borders to Thailand, India, and Malaysia. In the latter case, the new arrivals often join Myanmar diaspora communities of both migrant labourers and refugees fleeing previous waves of war and repression.
On 20 January 2025, nearly coinciding with the anniversary of the coup, dozens of civil society organisations supporting the Myanmar refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border were informed by USAID of an immediate suspension of critical aid. Some six weeks later, this suspension became a permanent termination. The USAID cuts are a major setback and are not the only aid reductions undercutting programmes critical to supporting Myanmar refugees abroad. Other donors have or are planning to reduce their overall aid budgets, including the UK Government. Moreover, the US has withdrawn funding from key humanitarian agencies, such as the World Food Program. Simultaneously, the political environment in countries hosting Myanmar refugees has become increasingly hostile to refugees, and hundreds of Myanmar citizens have been repatriated – which for many, both women and men, has meant an immediate forced conscription by the junta into its war against the opposition forces.
Prior to these developments, our team had conducted XCEPT-supported research in Thailand and in Mizoram State in northeastern India from March – May 2024, which focused on the different displacement experiences of Myanmar refugee women. Even before the complications brought on by aid cuts and increasingly hostile political environments in the host countries, almost all refugee women struggled to survive economically, had minimal access to services, feared deportation and forced conscription, and struggled to connect with Thai and Mizoram host communities due to language barriers and a lack of proper documentation. However, different women and gender diverse persons were exposed to these burdens, risks, and challenges differently. Unsurprisingly, the more access to social and financial capital one has, the more one is buffered from some of these risks and the more services one can access. Those with less (or without) capital, clout, and connections struggled more. Women heads of households and widows, who were often the sole providers for their families, struggled to cope with the financial burden, and often highlighted their fatigue and depletion in the interviews. This was even truer for women who had disabilities or chronic illnesses, and/or who had care responsibilities for family members with disabilities. For elderly women refugees, old age loneliness was an issue, especially in urban centres, where they lacked contacts to the host communities and their younger family members were busy at work.
Most of our interviewees strongly felt that the anti-junta uprising had indeed increased women’s political and social participation and, to a lesser degree, led to more openness on LGBTIQ+ rights. However, the struggle for economic survival and the double burdening of women, who were juggling with both domestic care responsibilities and paid labour, left little time for participation. Moreover, deeply entrenched heteronormativity and patriarchy, including amongst male leaders of the opposition, has kept decision-making power in the hands of (older) men.
The recent combined development of the aid cuts with the increasingly restrictive policies of host countries have created new pressures on a scale that the refugee communities have not faced before. The aid cuts will mean that refugees will have to rely even more on the informal support networks which they have established themselves instead. However, these informal support networks, as well as wider political participation for minority groups, will be harder to maintain as even more time will now go towards ensuring economic survival as a direct consequence of the aid cuts. Meanwhile, given increasing political hostility toward refugees in host countries, we anticipate that the refugees will attempt to make themselves less visible and less likely to advocate for assistance or participate in activism, due to fears of deportation and subsequently forced conscription.
Though we have no doubt that the women’s and LGBTIQ+ rights activists amongst the refugees will continue to work for a more equitable Myanmar, the preexisting struggles they face have become even more fraught due to the external forces coalescing around Myanmar refugees.
Chatham House’s XCEPT research explores transnational conflict across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. By tracing the movement of people, goods, and capital across borders, the programme examines how conflict extends beyond national boundaries and what this means for effective policy and programming. In the below short videos, Chatham House researchers discuss their research projects for the XCEPT programme.
Tim Eaton, Senior Research Fellow, MENA programme, discusses the business of migrant smuggling in and through Libya, which has, since 2011, become the primary corridor for irregular migration to Europe from sub-Saharan Africa.
Read Tim’s paper, coauthored with Lubna Yousef, here. Other recent XCEPT-Chatham House research papers examining the political economies of migration from Africa to Europe include “Tracing the ‘continuum of violence’ between Nigeria and Libya” by Leah de Haan, Iro Aghedo, and Tim Eaton; and “Tackling the Niger–Libya migration route” by Peter Tinti.
The Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance’ suffered significant setbacks in 2024, amid conflict with Israel and other political turbulence, leading some observers to conclude that it has been seriously weakened or is even on the verge of defeat. However, the axis has historically proven highly resilient. Chatham House Senior Research Fellow Renad Mansour discusses how Iran and its networks adapt to external pressures.
Read “The shape-shifting ‘axis of resistance’”, by Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid.
Local conflicts, such as those in Sudan and Ethiopia, have wider transnational impacts — showing how violence and competition over resources quickly spill across borders, shaping broader political and economic dynamics. Chatham House Africa Programme Senior Research Fellow Ahmed Soliman discusses the regional economic effects of these conflicts.
Read “Gold and the war in Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, and “The ‘conflict economy’ of sesame in Ethiopia and Sudan” by Ahmed Soliman and Abel Abate Demissie.
War leaves scars – physical and mental. Refugees fleeing conflict do not simply leave their experience of war behind them when they cross a border towards safety. For instance, even as the war in Syria drove millions of people from their homes and their country—making Syrians one of the largest refugee populations in the world, with Jordan hosting over 619,000 Syrian refugees within and outside camps in urban communities—their experiences of the war back home continue to shape their lives in Jordan, affecting their mental health, social trust, and ability to rebuild support networks.
Exposure to conflict before displacement continues to influence the social well-being of refugees many years later. We find that not only do refugees face substantial barriers to establishing stable lives and livelihoods, but that integration outcomes vary widely based on location, with those in urban settings facing different opportunities and challenges compared to those in refugee camps. In addition, the variation in refugees’ places of origin in Syria and their arrival dates in Jordan means they carry diverse pre-displacement experiences, which continue to shape their adaptation and social well-being in their new environment.
Social well-being is an important factor in evaluating whether an individual lives a fulfilling life. We include three key aspects:
These dimensions of social well-being influence not only a refugee’s ability to cope with hardship but also their prospects for integration and long-term stability.
We show that not all conflict experiences have the same impact on social well-being. Having been close to conflict events does not necessarily lead to long-term suffering. Instead, we find that the severity of the violent conflict—particularly exposure to fatalities—has profound and lasting effects. Refugees who experienced many fatalities in Syria report lower life satisfaction and have weaker social safety nets. The experience of past violent conflict events can continue to shape lives, even years later.
Mental health shapes how the experience of violent conflict shapes long-term social well-being. We find that depression is a key mechanism through which past trauma continues to affect refugees today. Those who were exposed to severe conflict are more likely to suffer from depressive symptoms, which in turn reduces their trust in others and weakens their social ties. Women, in particular, report higher levels of depressive symptoms when they had experienced intense conflict before displacement. Without proper mental health support, these emotional wounds persist, making it harder for refugees to rebuild their lives.
Refugees often face multiple challenges at once, creating what is known as a ‘polycrisis’. In our forthcoming study, we find that experiencing environmental stressors—such as drought—before displacement exacerbates the difficulties faced by displaced populations today. Syrian refugees who experienced both severe conflict and environmental hardship suffer even greater social isolation. These overlapping crises make it harder for refugees to establish stable support systems, further deepening their vulnerabilities.
Not all refugees experience displacement in the same way. Household structure plays a crucial role in shaping social well-being. Individuals in female-majority households suffer greater declines in life satisfaction after experiencing conflict, while individuals in male-majority households experience a steeper decline in social support networks. These findings suggest that gender dynamics influence how families cope with displacement and trauma.
Another important insight concerns the difference between refugees living in camps versus those living in host communities. We find that the lasting adverse legacies of conflict exposure on social well-being are concentrated among refugees in camps. This difference suggests that while camps may provide basic necessities for survival, they may also isolate refugees more from broader society.
Five key takeaways from our research can guide policies and programs to better support refugee communities:
The legacies of war do not end when refugees cross a border. Past trauma continues to shape the social well-being of refugees for years to come. By acknowledging these realities and implementing evidence-based policies, host countries and international organizations can better support refugees in rebuilding their lives. Understanding the long-term impacts of conflict is a crucial step toward creating programs and systems that support the most vulnerable and alleviate suffering around the world.
We thank the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for data access and support.
Duncan Green used a great metaphor in his recent blog when he called the recent mega-cuts in global aid budgets a tsunami. We are witnessing the sudden transformation of the aid sector that is losing life and diversity at a dizzying rate, like a coral reef weakened by rising sea temperatures and then battered by a mighty wave. And the good is being swept away with the bad.
Over the past year I’ve been giving methodological backup to a local partner on the Somali-Kenya border to work in a new way with ten rural communities. We’ve been supporting all kinds of different people there to reflect on their reality through storytelling and action. It has brought us into contact not only with remarkable people in the borderland, but also with people working in the humanitarian sector in the two countries, from local NGOs, to contractors, to donors, to UN. Everyone I’ve spoken to in the last few weeks has been in some kind of shock about the changing system. Some still don’t quite believe it’s happening, as programmes close, budgets evaporate, and collaborations dissolve.
For many it’s a question of how to save core operations. But for some of us, especially those of my peers working in insecure and damaged places, it’s a question of how to get back to the basics of who humanitarianism is for and what it’s for. It’s these actors that I’m most interested to watch and support as they pivot to make good out of the meltdown.
On the ground on the Somalia-Kenya border the effects of the tsunami are more muted. There never was much effective aid to these ten villages, even though they have been battered by 30 years of civil war and 15 years of efforts to counter the growing al-Shabaab insurgency. Local people work with each other to navigate indiscriminate violence, going about their lives as pastoralists, shop owners, mothers, traders, educators and the like. They rely on tradition for order, as elders and religious leaders solve disputes and pronounce on customary law, but importantly they are also innovating in fertile social networks that bring new ways of thinking and acting in society.
We heard examples of local people managing water systems, hiring their own teachers, and running generators to provide electricity to whole settlements. We heard how young people get businesses going, women negotiate better treatment by authorities, and how traders and pastoralists move where they need to, largely unmolested by the armed actors. They are paying taxes to both insurgents and at government checkpoints, negotiating the sums down as low as they can, and arguing for armed actors to leave their villages and livestock camps out of the firing line.
Summing it up, one of the community members explained that their way of life is a ‘middle way’ along which they navigate their survival, negotiate how they are treated and innovate in a changing society.
What can we learn from all of this? It’s not about what they need and don’t need in the way of material aid. It’s about how things bloom or how they get stuck in communities, wherever they are. Local experience of aid has been that its logo emblazoned staff come, when they do appear at all, with announcements and interventions, or with workshops and new languages of how community should comport itself. They don’t ask how the community already blooms and where it gets stuck.
What could the middle way mean for us as we navigate the new normal? I think that the way these ten communities are managing local governance (away from government and aid agencies) gives us pointers as to how to work better in their support. It’s not a new idea, rather it’s one that for me started with Robert Chambers’ question ‘whose reality counts?’ Community reality is changing rapidly, and if we want to align with it, we need to understand it and engage with it.
Participatory activists and innovative philanthropists all over the world already know this. They already have a myriad of wonderful ways of aligning. Last year Niranjan Nampoothiri and I did a small project for Citizen University in Seattle. We had the luxury of spending quality time with seven amazing participatory activists in seven countries around the world, learning who they are and how they do things, and sharing that with participatory activists in the US. They showed us an elegant, simple and determined set of ways of working well for the common good.
Duncan Green suggests that people coming afresh to the aid sector in this tumultuous time should consider avoiding the most stressed agencies. He suggested that instead of approaching those who depend on massive funding and high overheads, they should offer their services to those resilient organisations that emphasise social enterprise, solidarity and innovation at low cost and to big effect.
If rather than using a deficit model based on filling southern needs with generous northern largesse, we rebuilt after the great aid tsunami using a surplus model by which groups, communities, and municipalities strengthen themselves (with a little help from their friends), I think the people of our ten small places on the Somalia-Kenya border might congratulate us for finally getting it right.
Since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, it is reported that the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In an effort to translate promises into action, the new authorities have ramped up security along the border with Lebanon, dismantled drug trafficking infrastructure, and intercepted arms shipments destined for Hezbollah.
While these measures have likely disrupted Hezbollah’s operations completely, eradicating smuggling remains an immense challenge. Hezbollah’s entrenched networks, the economic drivers of illicit trade, the transitional authorities’ limited security capacity, and the sheer scale of the porous border all make total elimination unlikely. Without a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy, cross-border smuggling will persist in post-Assad Syria.
Disrupting Hezbollah networks
Given its longstanding alliance with the Assad regime and direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has become a prime target for the country’s new leadership. Despite the group’s withdrawal following Assad’s fall, the transitional authorities have taken a firm stance against Hezbollah-linked smuggling. Since Assad’s defeat, they have reportedly intercepted 13 weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah and arrested individuals involved in arms smuggling. They have also seized large quantities of narcotics and shut down drug production facilities across central and southern Syria.
On 6 February 2025, the crackdown escalated with the launch of a large-scale security operation in Qusayr, a strategic Hezbollah stronghold near the porous Syrian–Lebanese border. The operation targeted over a dozen villages that had remained under Hezbollah’s control and are home to Lebanese Shia families with longstanding ties to the group.
Syria’s Ministry of Defence stated that the campaign aimed to sever key smuggling routes in this critical region, which, according to the Homs border security chief Major Nadim Madkhana, had served as ‘an economic lifeline for Hezbollah and traffickers of drugs and arms.’ In fierce battles lasting several days, security forces uncovered more than 15 drug production facilities, stockpiles of illicit materials, and a counterfeit currency printing press producing fake $100 bills.
Interwoven challenges
Despite the recent successes of the transitional authorities, Hezbollah-linked smuggling operations are unlikely to end soon. Several key factors ensure their persistence. The 330-kilometre Syrian–Lebanese border remains inherently difficult to monitor. Much of it is unmarked and winds through valleys and mountains – terrain long exploited by drug smugglers and arms traffickers.
Compounding this challenge, Hezbollah has spent over a decade entrenching its presence along the border, building an extensive network of covert paths and tunnels to facilitate illicit activities. This deeply rooted infrastructure makes it nearly impossible to eliminate smuggling routes through security operations alone. The group also maintains a firm grip on the Syrian side of the border, particularly in the Beqaa Valley.
Additionally, Hezbollah’s long-standing ties to local smuggling networks bolster its ability to sustain cross-border operations. These networks reportedly include whose members operate on both sides of the border and have deep affiliations with Hezbollah. Heavily armed and well-resourced, these families have been engaged in smuggling for generations and possess intimate knowledge of the terrain. By leveraging their expertise, resources, and adaptability, these local networks can quickly respond to security crackdowns, including by relocating to areas inside Lebanon when targeted by Syrian authorities and vice versa. In addition to identifying alternative routes when necessary, smugglers are strengthening their operations by employing more sophisticated evasion tactics, such as concealing illicit substances within legitimate goods.
Furthermore, Syria’s deepening economic crisis, widespread unemployment, skyrocketing living costs, and high demand for both legal and illicit smuggled goods make smuggling an increasingly essential lifeline for border communities.
The capacity problem
Syria’s fragile security situation and the limited capacity of its new authorities present significant challenges to achieving their stated objectives. Despite toppling the Assad regime in just 11 days, the new leadership – led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – lacks the military and security infrastructure needed to effectively govern and secure the vast territories left in the regime’s wake. While efforts are underway to strengthen their capabilities, this process will take time.
Militarily, the HTS-led coalition remains fragmented. Although HTS, as Syria’s de facto ruling force, has persuaded most armed factions to merge under the Ministry of Defence, this unity is largely superficial. Many factions continue to operate under their original command structures, limiting overall cohesion and effectiveness.
Security forces are even more constrained. The new authorities primarily rely on HTS-linked General Security, an understaffed and overstretched force that functions more like an armed crisis response unit than a fully operational security apparatus. As a result, it lacks the resources to effectively monitor the border with Lebanon or combat the operations run by various networks, including Hezbollah’s.
The situation is similarly dire in Lebanon, where security forces also struggle with capacity issues. Their presence in Hezbollah strongholds – especially in the Beqaa Valley – is minimal to non-existent.
A broader strategy is needed
Syria’s new authorities have shown clear determination to disrupt Hezbollah’s illicit smuggling networks, particularly those involving weapons and drugs. As the transitional government builds capacity, Hezbollah’s cross-border operations will face increasing risks. However, eliminating the group’s ability to use Syria as a smuggling corridor will remain a formidable challenge – at least through military means alone.
A lasting solution requires a comprehensive strategy rooted in strong coordination between Syrian, Lebanese, and international actors. Beyond bolstering border security, efforts must address the root causes of smuggling by curbing demand for both illicit and legal contraband while investing in economic development programmes that offer viable alternatives to those who rely on smuggling for survival. Without these measures, Hezbollah’s entrenched networks will continue to exploit Syria’s vulnerabilities, deepening instability within the country and threatening broader regional security.
This article originally appeared on Kalam, the website of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme.
In January, the Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF), a Saudi-backed Salafi force under the command of the president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, deployed several units to the eastern Yemeni governorate of Mahra. The deployment, and the opposition if provoked from the Peaceful Protest Committee in Mahra Governorate (PPCMG), a social movement opposed to growing roles in Mahra by countries other than Oman, reflected a revival of the Saudi-Omani rivalry there. This threatens to undermine the governorate’s stability and deepen political fragmentation among Mahris themselves.
Prior to the deployment, Sheikh Ahmad Belhaf, the former chief of external relations in the PPCMG, welcomed the NSF forces and announced his defection from the protest committee over the alleged “spread of a Houthi agenda.” He also established a splinter group known as the Corrective Path of the PPCMG. At the same time, Sheikh Ali Salem al-Huraizi, a prominent Omani-backed tribal figure who chairs the PPCMG and has good relations with Ansar Allah, called for public mobilization against the Salafi presence and Saudi influence.
As in neighboring Hadhramawt, the NSF in Mahra has sought to expand its presence through local recruitment—including among non-Salafis—to secure buy-in. It has also reportedly made a commitment to avoiding any acts that would be unwelcome to the local community. This recruitment will extend a source of livelihood to a few thousand Mahris, deepening their engagement in security provision in their governorate. However, it also serves the purpose of counterbalancing the influence of Huraizi’s tribal forces, who have received monthly salaries of up to 200 Omani riyals from Muscat (the equivalent of around $530), according to a local tribal figure. In late February, key tribal figures, security and military personnel, local officials, and civil society activists attended a public meeting in Mahra’s Qishn district with the head of the NSF, demonstrating a degree of local acceptance.
By expanding the NSF’s operational control into Mahra, Saudi Arabia endeavors to increase its influence near the governorate’s eastern border. Its objective is to strengthen border security and prevent the transfer of weapons through Oman to Ansar Allah, particularly equipment for the assembly of drones and missiles. Last December, the security authorities in Mahra announced the interception of fiber optic cables at the Sarfayt crossing between Yemen and Oman bound for Ansar Allah. Such cables are often used to enhance the stealth, range, and anti-jamming capabilities of drones.
To this end, Saudi Arabia and the local authorities in Mahra look to improve stabilization efforts in the governorate, while countering the influence of Ansar Allah and the PPCMG. For instance, the Saudi Program for the Development and Reconstruction of Yemen has established the King Salman Medical and Educational City, as well as a dialysis center, in Mahra to enhance health services. Additionally, the Saudis aim to curtail the expansion into Mahra of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks secession from Yemen. The STC has already expanded its presence in the neighboring governorate of Hadhramawt. An additional Saudi objective is to limit the influence in Mahra of the STC’s regional backer, the United Arab Emirates, which has gained influence along the Hadhramawt coast.
The deployment of the NSF in Mahra has intensified threat perceptions in Oman, which views the governorate from the national security and domestic stability angles. The sultanate fears the expansion of Salafi ideology into Oman’s western regions, given their predominantly Sunni makeup and the implications for civil peace in Dhofar. Additionally, Oman does not want to see the Saudi sphere of influence expand to its borders. Between 2015 and 2021, Muscat opposed the growing military presence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Mahra, and it used the PPCMG and the tribal networks it supports to do so, given the historical ties that Oman enjoys with the governorate. Indeed, Oman has sought to counterbalance rising external interference in Mahra, fearing that this could lead to the greater sway of other Gulf states in an area the Omanis have long regarded as being part of their sphere of influence.
Since December 2024, the PPCMG had rallied the public against the NSF presence and growing Saudi influence in Mahra. In early January, Huraizi announced a new phase of peaceful resistance to “interference and a sectarian agenda,” and accused Saudi Arabia of “destabilizing” the governorate. He staged protests against the NSF, including in Ghaidha, Mahra’s capital. In mid-February, there were reports of skirmishes between anti-NSF tribal militias and forces that appeared to have been mistaken for the NSF. Despite the apparent error in identification, the incident demonstrated the potential for armed confrontation. Signs of discontent are unlikely to fade, as there have been similar actions for over a decade in the governorate.
Nevertheless, full confrontation between the Saudi-backed NSF and the Omani-backed PPCMG remains unlikely for several reasons. First, the muhafiz, or governor, of Mahra, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Yasser, has focused on the containment of potential escalation by adhering to the Mahri tribal code of conduct and reactivating dialogue channels, while boosting the vigilance of local security forces. Second, Riyadh has adopted a long-game approach in Mahra by improving bilateral cooperation with Oman, including through economic support, in a way that also reduces tension.
Manifestations of such tension will likely continue to be expressed by local proxies, probably through sporadic protests, limited attacks, and antagonistic political rhetoric. However, Saudi Arabia and Oman should participate in talks to preserve stability and prevent a deterioration of the situation. Mahra’s muhafiz will also have to pursue more proactive engagement and initiate a dialogue with Huraizi to reduce political polarization and contain any further acts of instability.
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The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) plays a significant role in Iran’s Axis of Resistance, with its links to Iraq’s state security forces raising concerns about its influence and access to power. However, the IRI is not a unified organization; it consists of multiple armed factions, each with its own agendas and domestic interests, not all of which align with Iran’s objectives.
In this episode of the War Studies podcast, Dr. Craig Larkin speaks to Dr. Inna Rudolf and Dr. Renad Mansour, King’s College London XCEPT scholars, about their research into the IRI. They examine the domestic and transnational interests of IRI factions and discuss the extent to which the IRI can truly be considered an Iranian ‘proxy’.
Mohanad Hage Ali is the deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the shifting geopolitics and Islamist groups after the Arab uprisings. He has just published a paper at Carnegie, titled “Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking,” and Diwan interviewed him in late March to discuss the topic of his paper and the nature of drug production in Lebanon, notably of Captagon, a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline.
Michael Young: You have just published a paper on Lebanon and the risks of Captagon trafficking. What is the main argument you make, and what are the consequences of such trafficking?
Mohanad Hage Ali: My central argument is that Captagon trafficking poses a threat that extends beyond drugs and law enforcement, presenting deeper challenges to Lebanon’s political system and its ability to recover during this transitional phase. This is due to two key factors. First, the structure of the Captagon network has concentrated wealth in the hands of a select group of drug barons, strengthening their influence. Second, Lebanon’s ongoing financial and economic crises have severely weakened state institutions. With the Lebanese currency, the pound, having lost over 98 percent of its value in the past four years, Lebanon’s security forces and state capacity to combat the drug threat have been significantly eroded. The prevailing assumption today is that in Lebanon and Syria new political orders are emerging on the ruins of the old, given the changes in both countries in the past year. However, the illicit networks may not only survive this transition, they may come to play a central role in shaping the new reality.
MY: In your paper, you highlight the difference between a new breed of Captagon traffickers and more traditional tribal clan-based traffickers, who mainly produce hashish, or cannabis, as well as opium. What are the major differences between the two?
MHA: Clan-based hashish networks operate in a more decentralized manner, with a structure that includes working with peasant cultivators, traders, and independent transnational smuggling networks. This disperses profits among different actors, limiting the concentration of financial power and, consequently, the ability to secure political influence. While some clan-based traffickers may have been elected to Lebanon’s parliament, or can be in the future, their focus tends to be on personal prestige and community representation rather than advancing their illicit trade.
In contrast, Captagon traffickers are deeply embedded in every stage of their business—production, smuggling, and international distribution—allowing them to accumulate significant capital. This financial power translates into direct political leverage, enabling them to influence state institutions primarily to serve their business interests. Unlike clan-based traffickers, whose tribal affiliations and local obligations often restrict their capacity for broader political control, Captagon networks strategically infiltrate political and security structures to facilitate and protect their operations.
Captagon traffickers have a far more expansive international footprint. Many of the key figures hail from the Lebanese-Syrian border region, maintaining strong cross-border connections and, in some cases, holding dual nationality. Their direct ties to the demand markets grant them a global reach that clan-based hashish networks lack. While hashish trafficking in Lebanon has traditionally been a localized challenge for authorities, the Captagon trade operates on a scale that poses a systemic threat to state institutions, security agencies, and the country’s political center itself.
MY: How extensive has been the involvement of Lebanon’s political parties, or specific politicians, in drug trafficking? How about state institutions?
MHA: The first level of involvement is through local networks, which often receive protection in exchange for loyalty and support from politicians or parties. Such dynamics have historically been a cross-sectarian phenomenon in the Beqaa Valley. Unlike traditional trafficking groups tied to specific factions, Captagon barons have not been affiliated with a single political party. Instead, they have cultivated a broad spectrum of connections across the political system, granting them greater flexibility and freedom of movement.
The second level of involvement is direct facilitation, as seen in the case of Hezbollah in Syria. As an ally of the former Syrian regime, Hezbollah maintained a military presence throughout the country, and its name has surfaced in multiple investigations as a facilitator of the Captagon trade. Given the industrial-scale involvement in Captagon trafficking of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division, which was controlled by Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar al-Assad, and given that the unit was a key Hezbollah ally, it is hard to believe that the party remained detached from Syria’s booming drug trade. The same logic applies on the Lebanese side of the border with respect to Hezbollah, where individual links and territorial control would have made the party’s complete disengagement from trafficking nearly impossible.
MY: With Lebanon facing a new political reality since the war with Israel—by which I mean Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—how has this affected Captagon trafficking?
MHA: With the Syrian regime at the center of Captagon production, its downfall in December dealt a significant blow to the drug trade. Whether it will recover, even partially, depends on two key factors. The first is production capacity, as demand for Captagon remains strong in the Gulf states and beyond. Despite the setback, production continues in opposition-held areas of Syria, including northern parts of the country controlled by the so-called Syrian National Army, as well as in southern Syria, making it possible to satisfy this demand, at least partly. A similar situation applies to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, though current production levels remain relatively low.
The second factor is whether the new leaderships in Lebanon and Syria can provide viable economic alternatives to drug production. However, given ongoing sanctions on Syria and security challenges in both countries, achieving this in the short term is unlikely. International and regional actors seeking to curb drug trafficking must take this into account and act swiftly, whether by reconsidering sanctions or supporting economic recovery efforts. The collapse of state institutions remains a central driver of the Captagon trade, making sustainable economic solutions all the more urgent.
MY: What do you propose is the best way to wean clan-based Lebanese traffickers away from growing and selling hashish? Do you think this is realistic?
MHA: The state should take steps to legalize hashish for certain medical purposes, thereby separating the farming of hashish from trafficking. This would reduce drug-related crimes, weaken smuggling networks, and ensure that farmers benefit directly from the industry. It is also the core principle behind a 2020 law passed in Lebanon, which was not implemented due to the country’s governance crisis at the time. The government must follow through with its implementation, drawing lessons from Morocco, which has made significant progress in this area, generating substantial state revenues. So far, planting alternative crops to replace hashish and other narcotics has failed, which makes the legalization of hashish a critical opportunity to regulate the sector effectively.
This publication was produced with support from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
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I became involved in the Cross-border Conflict Evidence, Policy, and Trends (XCEPT) programme’s Local Research Network (LRN) at its inception in 2018. During the following years, the network introduced me to a wider community of researchers who share a similar interest in cross-border issues. This has led to extensive knowledge sharing and fruitful collaborations, particularly in terms of my personal focus on how agricultural transitions impact the experiences of women.
As well as helping me cultivate my networks within South Sudan, being part of the LRN has given me the opportunity to expand my horizons internationally. For example, I attended workshops in Bangkok, Addis Ababa and Nairobi, which opened my eyes to different research methodologies and provided me with guidance on writing policy papers. These skills have been further reinforced by online peer exchange events with the XCEPT programme’s international partners. I have also been able to establish lasting connections with employees of various UN agencies, NGOs, embassies and research institutions within and beyond South Sudan.
More generally, by fostering collaborative research projects with researchers from neighbouring countries, XCEPT enables comparative analysis and a more holistic understanding of cross-border dynamics. Just as importantly, the LRN facilitates direct access to local communities and their perspectives on cross-border issues, something I have found invaluable when it comes to unpacking the functioning of conflict and cooperation in borderlands. This approach has informed the various papers, blog posts and articles I have written or contributed to over recent years.
From a personal perspective, I can testify that my involvement in the project has vastly improved my data analysis and writing skills, bolstering my capacity to conduct impactful cross-borders research. In addition, I have put to practical use XCEPT capacity-building sessions on—among other subjects—conducting sensitive research in conflict zones.
Conducting fieldwork under XCEPT
I have had many extraordinary experiences during the fieldwork I conducted for XCEPT in South Sudan. In particular, I cherish my memories of women from different communities sharing their stories and experiences with me. As a South Sudanese woman who grew up in a cattle camp, I felt able to engage with my interviewees on an equal footing, providing me with insights an outsider may have struggled to glean.
Overall, my fieldwork has yielded a treasure trove of fascinating life stories. The passion for writing I have developed is in part driven by a desire to share these unique experiences with audiences around the world—something I consider to be a meaningful act of advocacy. In this respect, I am particularly proud of a briefing paper I wrote for XCEPT as part of the ‘Displaced Tastes’ research project, entitled ‘Migrating with Seeds: Women, agricultural knowledge and displacement in South Sudan’. Given the personal importance of this work, I go into further detail below, pulling out some key quotes.
Migrating with seeds
XCEPT’s focus on policy solutions means that the programme’s publications—from blog pieces to briefings to full-length reports—are tailored towards offering practical solutions to everyday challenges in conflict-affected border regions. The utility of this is demonstrated by the fact that South Sudan’s Ministry of Agriculture has acknowledged a number of important policy recommendations highlighted by the Displaced Tastes project. Moreover, ‘Migrating with Seeds’ was read by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and its partners, playing a role in the Rift Valley Institute (the managing organization for XCEPT) being given responsibility for the Participatory Impact Assessment of its seed provision interventions in South Sudan.
The basis for ‘Migrating with Seeds’ was the life story of my aunt, Mary Ajok Wetkwuot, born in 1961 in Rumbek East County, Lakes State. As I describe in my briefing, ‘I came to know her as a loving and kind-hearted person born into a family dominated by women’. Her story is a fascinating one:
Mary left Rumbek in the early 1980s because of aerial bombardments during the Second Sudanese Civil War and, after settling in Wau for two years, she crossed into northern Sudan. … When she first was displaced from Rumbek, she travelled with a small black bag containing her favourite sorghum and millet seeds, which she planted in every location she was displaced to.
Over time, my aunt experienced a shift from ‘a communal to a commercial system of agriculture’. Responding to this, she ‘tried hard to preserve the tastes and networks of the old system in the new one’, and ‘By travelling with seeds, often across borders, Mary allowed people living in displacement in Kassala to keep their grain traditions alive’. In doing so, she made a name for herself as a farmer of kech (a type of sorghum):
Over the past decades, Mary has continued to transmit this farming and cooking knowledge to her daughters, cousins and grandchildren, and with the harvest of the kech seeds with which she first departed from Rumbek in the 1980s, she has built a reputation that spans the Sudans.
When I came to interview her for the briefing:
She had claimed a small corner of the barracks where she was growing indigenous varieties of sorghum and millet. Although she had carved out a space for her agricultural activities, she expressed a longing to return to her vast ancestral land in Rumbek, to farm in the soil that she grew up in.
Not only is my aunt’s story deeply meaningful to me, I felt it could cast light on ‘the changing tastes for food in South Sudan in the context of the country’s economic transition and place in the regional, cross-border economy of grain’, as well as how local women deployed the ‘social and material capital of seeds … to manage the wider transitions experienced during South Sudan’s decades of war’. The positive reception the briefing received hopefully proves I succeeded in putting across these wider concerns, and is testament to XCEPT’s willingness to give priority to the knowledge produced by locally-based researchers.
The Author
Elizabeth Nyibol Malou is a researcher with the Rift Valley Institute in South Sudan, and is the author most recently of The Triple Burden: Women selling their labour in South Sudan. She was previously a lecturer at the Catholic University of South Sudan, in Juba.
I was first invited to join the Cross-border Conflict Evidence, Policy, and Trends (XCEPT) programme in 2019, having previously worked with the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) on research in South Sudan. This innovative project brought together international experts and early career researchers from across Africa and Asia under the umbrella of the Local Research Network (LRN). I was thrilled to be a part of it. The blog piece below offers my reflections on my time with the XCEPT programme, including what I personally gained from it and, conversely, what I was able to contribute towards it.
One of the LRN’s many strengths is that it enables early career researchers to work directly with more experienced experts when performing fieldwork. While some studies involve collaborative work between experts and locals, others are independently led by local researchers backed up by mentorship support from experts.
Not only has this approach enhanced the capacity and skills of many early career researchers—myself included—it has produced a wealth of locally grounded insights into the causes and impacts of borderland conflicts. These in turn have fed into a series of in-depth research reports aimed at national, regional and international policymakers.
The three phases of my involvement in XCEPT
My involvement in the XCEPT programme spanned six years (2019–2024) and can be broken down into three interconnected phases. During the first phase, I was invited to participate in several training workshops om methodologies and writing skills organized by XCEPT partners. More specifically, I attended a 2019 policy brief writing skill workshop in Beirut organized by Carnegie Middle East Centre (CMEC); a gender and generation workshop in Nairobi the same year; and ethics training at the Catholic University campus in Juba in early 2020—the latter two both organized by the RVI.
I had completed my undergraduate studies in South Sudan just a year before joining XCEPT, and at that point I could not paraphrase, cite or reference the work of others properly, let alone write a coherent full-length essay that put forward my own views. South Sudan’s education system is based on teaching students to read and memorize texts, with little emphasis placed on research and critical writing skills. This is compounded by poor educational facilities, such as a lack of modern libraries or access to digital resources.
By contrast, both the workshops themselves and the connections I forged with other research experts while attending them taught me a great deal about how research should be conducted. Looking back, my time spent at the workshops was fundamental in establishing my research career and an essential step in honing my writing skills.
The second phase—which to a degree overlapped with the first—revolved around collaborative research and mentorship support. Assuming the role of junior co-researcher, I collaborated with a more seasoned research expert on two major studies on the South Sudan–Sudan borderlands. Conducted over the course of 2019 and 2020, the research delved into centre–periphery relations, focusing on militarization, labour and migration.
As co-researcher, I participated in the entire research process, from design to publication and dissemination. This hands-on experience was invaluable, as was the mentorship and support provided by the senior researcher. In particular, their guidance was crucial when it came to putting the knowledge and skills I had gained from the training workshops into practice. During our two years of collaboration, I wrote a number of blog pieces on borderland dynamics, enhancing my writing skills and giving me the confidence to take the next step of conducting research independently.
So began the third phase of my involvement in XCEPT, made possible in part by the project’s underling principle of democratizing theory and practice. Not having to spend years familiarizing myself with complex, established theories gave me the opportunity to pursue independent research work at a much earlier stage than might otherwise have been the case.
The research I conducted during this time built on the previous collaborative work, exploring cross-border labour migration and conflicts on the South Sudan–Sudan border through a livelihood transition and conflict lens. The tangible outcome was two long reports (alongside numerous briefings) examining the impacts of war, migration and work on, firstly, South Sudan’s changing social relations, and, secondly, agricultural labour and cross-border migration.
How I benefited from XCEPT
My years spent at XCEPT have sparked a profound interest in cross-border migration, conflict and livelihood transitions, motivating me to continue exploring these themes in my future research. My ongoing PhD thesis, for instance, focuses on the bidirectional relationships between war economies and agrarian transitions in the South Sudan borderlands. Here, my aim is to build on the existing XCEPT research (as well as other sources) in order to better understand how such transitions reshape gendered patterns of accumulation, class structures and people’s economic livelihoods.
I have also benefited from further XCEPT workshops while transitioning into academia. For instance, two particularly useful workshops were held in 2014: one in Bangkok organized by the Asia Foundation and the other in Addis Ababa by RVI. While the former covered essential gender concepts, the latter elucidated key borderland theories. Not only did the workshops help inform my PhD research, they provided a pathway for the early career researchers in attendance to convert their XCEPT policy reports into peer-reviewed articles.
My involvement in XCEPT also allowed me to network with experts from across the globe, both early career researchers and long-serving professionals and academics. This threw up countless opportunities to learn from the work and experiences of others. Similarly, I met diplomats and officials from various international governments and NGOs at XCEPT engagements, expanding my sphere of acquaintances beyond the research community.
Finally, I learned many new things about places and people in the borderlands I had previously thought I knew everything about. Not only have the friendships I made and maintained with borderland residents enriched my life, they will be an essential element in my future research endeavours, providing easier access and useful contacts across the region.
What I contributed to XCEPT
Reflecting on my time with XCEPT, I like to think I not only benefited from the project, but was able to make a significant personal contribution to its work. I, along with my fellow early career researchers, produced numerous reports applying locally grounded knowledge and perspectives to relevant policy discussions. In addition, as part of the LRN, I disseminated research findings and recommendations to numerous international and national-level policymakers. Among the key events I participated in were gatherings at Chatham House and SOAS in London in 2019, and meetings at the UK embassy in Nairobi and the EU compound in Juba in 2021, not to mention several online events via digital platforms.
At the local level, I actively distributed copies of my reports, engaging local officials, traditional leaders, youth and women in informal discussions to ensure they had access to my findings. When doing so, I made sure to garner feedback on my work. At the other end of the scale, I attended engagements with officials and experts from international governments and agencies seeking to learn more about the South Sudan–Sudan borderlands.
As a member of the LRN, I also sought to build the capacity of others, participating in numerous XCEPT-organized courses and seminars held in Juba aimed at training new research assistants. Alongside these, RVI organized reflection workshops—led mostly by early career researchers, with support from experienced experts—in which we discussed challenges faced in the field and how we might mitigate them. The workshops provided an important peer exchange, learning and improvement platform for both the early career researchers and the newly trained research assistants.
In addition to leading the reflection and peer exchange workshops, I provided secondary mentorship support to the research assistants. In combination, these efforts provided many fresh undergraduates with the skills they needed to conduct qualitative research, enhancing RVI’s ability to cost-effectively reach hard-to-access areas in South Sudan.
Concluding thoughts
The impact of XCEPT on my research career extends far beyond capacity and skills development. Crucial as these elements are, their importance is matched and even exceed by the enduring connections I established with researchers and officials at LRN networking events.
Overall, my personal experience is testament to the critical role played by the LRN in the research journey of early career researchers. With many of these researchers now seeking to convert their XCEPT reports into peer-reviewed papers, ongoing support from experienced experts is a must. To ensure this happens, continued Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office funding for the LRN and its networking events is needed.
The Author
Joseph Majok is a PhD student in African Studies and a long-time national research consultant with the Rift Valley Institute (RVI) in South Sudan. He holds an MSc in Africa and International Development from the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Majok has been with the RVI since 2017 as a research assistant and later as part of the RVI national researchers’ team. He was involved in numerous projects and extensively in the FCDO’s XCEPT consortium project as a member of the Local Research Network. Through XCEPT, Majok has co-authored and independently written several reports, policy briefs and blogs on cross-border migrations and livelihood transitions.
