Using local approaches to respond to climate change in Asia’s conflict-affected borderlands
Climate change is increasingly listed as a major risk in future security considerations. This blog explores the particular ways in which communities living in border regions experience the intersection of climate change and insecurity, through several examples observed in Asia. As many of the world’s most climate vulnerable countries are also those experiencing the highest levels of conflict, it is important to understand how this intersection plays out, particularly for people who are marginalised from political decision-making and development responses, as those living in border regions often are.
Rising temperatures, more frequent extreme weather events, and growing populations in Asia, are putting pressure on existing ways of accessing and managing water, energy, and food, affecting all sectors of the economy and society. Government actors are largely focusing their responses around the impacts on economic development and livelihoods. Volatile weather patterns and environmental degradation over time pose risks to traditional income-generating activities, particularly around agriculture and livestock. Vulnerable populations in conflict areas may miss out on organized assistance and face increased risks of violence around access to these resources. A major coping mechanism for people who have lost land, stable incomes, or a safe living environment is to move to ‘safer’ environments which may be in urban centres or across borders.
Often considered as the outer limits of a state system, border regions and the communities who live in them may be perceived as peripheral and perhaps less connected to the social, political and economic activity taking place in capitals. These areas often experience first-hand the impacts of the ebbs and flows of bilateral relationships between bordering nations. Where there are tensions along borders over land, shared resources, or waterways, local communities face high risks of violence. In unstable border regions, governments may struggle to safeguard against or respond to climate-related disasters. Policymakers and development actors working in fragile and conflict-affected regions need to consider how climate change increases and multiplies risks to human security, and what appropriate responses look like.
Where climate interruptions and conflict overlap, responses are challenging
In Myanmar, climate change manifests within a context of sustained civil conflict which has severely impacted the country’s agricultural sector. Functioning state systems are mostly absent across the border regions where anti-junta resistance has been fiercest since the 2021 coup. At the same time, the withdrawal of much development and humanitarian infrastructure due to the widespread instability may leave food-insecure communities without support. Regular approaches to adaptation or mitigation seem impossible to imagine, as local communities struggle with day to day safety concerns, authorities accelerate the exploitation of natural resources to supplement their decreasing income, and civil society activism risks reprisals.
Pakistan is also highly vulnerable, experiencing increasingly extreme weather events like floods and heatwaves. Their economic impacts are significant, with agricultural output reduced, exacerbating food insecurity and increasing the risk of conflict over scarce resources. Responses from authorities have been limited and are likely to face implementation challenges in the highly securitised border regions, such as the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Effective local action may be diminished by a volatile political landscape.
Migration is a major coping mechanism for climate-affected populations. The World Bank forecasts that climate change will cause 143 million individuals to move in and from Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America by 2050. If not properly managed, these patterns could cause significant demographic shifts and risk social unrest. Urban areas, often the primary destination for people immediately impacted by climate events, may not be prepared to receive the new arrivals, leaving them to live in precarious or illegal settlements, often unsafe and outside formal welfare systems.
Local solutions for local impacts
Positive developments in supporting climate responses in fragile or conflict-affected regions include greater multilateral engagement on the topic and efforts to increase accessibility of climate financing. The 2024 Conference of Parties (COP) meeting in Azerbaijan culminated with a call to recognise climate change as “a catalyst for conflict and instability,” that has “disproportionate impacts on the most vulnerable”. Action also needs to move from the general to the local so that solutions are contextually relevant and practical. This point is particularly salient for communities in border regions, where policymakers must recognise unique geographical and political contexts, and not apply uniform climate change mitigation or adaptation strategies from a state-centric perspective.
To understand regional nuances better, and design locally effective solutions, more research that prioritises local experiences and perspectives in climate change-affected fragile border areas is needed. The Centre for Peace and Justice at BRAC University, with support from XCEPT, is working in some of Bangladesh’s most climate-vulnerable communities adjacent to the southwestern border with India. New research explores how communities already experiencing political and economic dispossession and structural violence due to their peripheral location navigate successive climate crises. The report includes suggestions for local action to support communities in mitigating and recovering from disasters which are easily implemented and scalable,
As the effects of climate change become more pronounced, and pressure on resources and livelihoods increases, contextually relevant and cost-effective solutions are needed more than ever. Fragile border areas face intersecting security risks that can be multiplied by climate change. Responses should be multi-faceted, encouraging greater community resilience, equitable access to resources, and better cooperation between bordering nations.
In January, the Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF), a Saudi-backed Salafi force under the command of the president of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad al-Alimi, deployed several units to the eastern Yemeni governorate of Mahra. The deployment, and the opposition if provoked from the Peaceful Protest Committee in Mahra Governorate (PPCMG), a social movement opposed to growing roles in Mahra by countries other than Oman, reflected a revival of the Saudi-Omani rivalry there. This threatens to undermine the governorate’s stability and deepen political fragmentation among Mahris themselves.
Prior to the deployment, Sheikh Ahmad Belhaf, the former chief of external relations in the PPCMG, welcomed the NSF forces and announced his defection from the protest committee over the alleged “spread of a Houthi agenda.” He also established a splinter group known as the Corrective Path of the PPCMG. At the same time, Sheikh Ali Salem al-Huraizi, a prominent Omani-backed tribal figure who chairs the PPCMG and has good relations with Ansar Allah, called for public mobilization against the Salafi presence and Saudi influence.
As in neighboring Hadhramawt, the NSF in Mahra has sought to expand its presence through local recruitment—including among non-Salafis—to secure buy-in. It has also reportedly made a commitment to avoiding any acts that would be unwelcome to the local community. This recruitment will extend a source of livelihood to a few thousand Mahris, deepening their engagement in security provision in their governorate. However, it also serves the purpose of counterbalancing the influence of Huraizi’s tribal forces, who have received monthly salaries of up to 200 Omani riyals from Muscat (the equivalent of around $530), according to a local tribal figure. In late February, key tribal figures, security and military personnel, local officials, and civil society activists attended a public meeting in Mahra’s Qishn district with the head of the NSF, demonstrating a degree of local acceptance.
By expanding the NSF’s operational control into Mahra, Saudi Arabia endeavors to increase its influence near the governorate’s eastern border. Its objective is to strengthen border security and prevent the transfer of weapons through Oman to Ansar Allah, particularly equipment for the assembly of drones and missiles. Last December, the security authorities in Mahra announced the interception of fiber optic cables at the Sarfayt crossing between Yemen and Oman bound for Ansar Allah. Such cables are often used to enhance the stealth, range, and anti-jamming capabilities of drones.
To this end, Saudi Arabia and the local authorities in Mahra look to improve stabilization efforts in the governorate, while countering the influence of Ansar Allah and the PPCMG. For instance, the Saudi Program for the Development and Reconstruction of Yemen has established the King Salman Medical and Educational City, as well as a dialysis center, in Mahra to enhance health services. Additionally, the Saudis aim to curtail the expansion into Mahra of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which seeks secession from Yemen. The STC has already expanded its presence in the neighboring governorate of Hadhramawt. An additional Saudi objective is to limit the influence in Mahra of the STC’s regional backer, the United Arab Emirates, which has gained influence along the Hadhramawt coast.
The deployment of the NSF in Mahra has intensified threat perceptions in Oman, which views the governorate from the national security and domestic stability angles. The sultanate fears the expansion of Salafi ideology into Oman’s western regions, given their predominantly Sunni makeup and the implications for civil peace in Dhofar. Additionally, Oman does not want to see the Saudi sphere of influence expand to its borders. Between 2015 and 2021, Muscat opposed the growing military presence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Mahra, and it used the PPCMG and the tribal networks it supports to do so, given the historical ties that Oman enjoys with the governorate. Indeed, Oman has sought to counterbalance rising external interference in Mahra, fearing that this could lead to the greater sway of other Gulf states in an area the Omanis have long regarded as being part of their sphere of influence.
Since December 2024, the PPCMG had rallied the public against the NSF presence and growing Saudi influence in Mahra. In early January, Huraizi announced a new phase of peaceful resistance to “interference and a sectarian agenda,” and accused Saudi Arabia of “destabilizing” the governorate. He staged protests against the NSF, including in Ghaidha, Mahra’s capital. In mid-February, there were reports of skirmishes between anti-NSF tribal militias and forces that appeared to have been mistaken for the NSF. Despite the apparent error in identification, the incident demonstrated the potential for armed confrontation. Signs of discontent are unlikely to fade, as there have been similar actions for over a decade in the governorate.
Nevertheless, full confrontation between the Saudi-backed NSF and the Omani-backed PPCMG remains unlikely for several reasons. First, the muhafiz, or governor, of Mahra, Sheikh Mohammed Ali Yasser, has focused on the containment of potential escalation by adhering to the Mahri tribal code of conduct and reactivating dialogue channels, while boosting the vigilance of local security forces. Second, Riyadh has adopted a long-game approach in Mahra by improving bilateral cooperation with Oman, including through economic support, in a way that also reduces tension.
Manifestations of such tension will likely continue to be expressed by local proxies, probably through sporadic protests, limited attacks, and antagonistic political rhetoric. However, Saudi Arabia and Oman should participate in talks to preserve stability and prevent a deterioration of the situation. Mahra’s muhafiz will also have to pursue more proactive engagement and initiate a dialogue with Huraizi to reduce political polarization and contain any further acts of instability.
Read the full article.
Mohanad Hage Ali is the deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where his work focuses on the shifting geopolitics and Islamist groups after the Arab uprisings. He has just published a paper at Carnegie, titled “Double Dealers: Lebanon and the Risks of Captagon Trafficking,” and Diwan interviewed him in late March to discuss the topic of his paper and the nature of drug production in Lebanon, notably of Captagon, a codrug of amphetamine and theophylline.
Michael Young: You have just published a paper on Lebanon and the risks of Captagon trafficking. What is the main argument you make, and what are the consequences of such trafficking?
Mohanad Hage Ali: My central argument is that Captagon trafficking poses a threat that extends beyond drugs and law enforcement, presenting deeper challenges to Lebanon’s political system and its ability to recover during this transitional phase. This is due to two key factors. First, the structure of the Captagon network has concentrated wealth in the hands of a select group of drug barons, strengthening their influence. Second, Lebanon’s ongoing financial and economic crises have severely weakened state institutions. With the Lebanese currency, the pound, having lost over 98 percent of its value in the past four years, Lebanon’s security forces and state capacity to combat the drug threat have been significantly eroded. The prevailing assumption today is that in Lebanon and Syria new political orders are emerging on the ruins of the old, given the changes in both countries in the past year. However, the illicit networks may not only survive this transition, they may come to play a central role in shaping the new reality.
MY: In your paper, you highlight the difference between a new breed of Captagon traffickers and more traditional tribal clan-based traffickers, who mainly produce hashish, or cannabis, as well as opium. What are the major differences between the two?
MHA: Clan-based hashish networks operate in a more decentralized manner, with a structure that includes working with peasant cultivators, traders, and independent transnational smuggling networks. This disperses profits among different actors, limiting the concentration of financial power and, consequently, the ability to secure political influence. While some clan-based traffickers may have been elected to Lebanon’s parliament, or can be in the future, their focus tends to be on personal prestige and community representation rather than advancing their illicit trade.
In contrast, Captagon traffickers are deeply embedded in every stage of their business—production, smuggling, and international distribution—allowing them to accumulate significant capital. This financial power translates into direct political leverage, enabling them to influence state institutions primarily to serve their business interests. Unlike clan-based traffickers, whose tribal affiliations and local obligations often restrict their capacity for broader political control, Captagon networks strategically infiltrate political and security structures to facilitate and protect their operations.
Captagon traffickers have a far more expansive international footprint. Many of the key figures hail from the Lebanese-Syrian border region, maintaining strong cross-border connections and, in some cases, holding dual nationality. Their direct ties to the demand markets grant them a global reach that clan-based hashish networks lack. While hashish trafficking in Lebanon has traditionally been a localized challenge for authorities, the Captagon trade operates on a scale that poses a systemic threat to state institutions, security agencies, and the country’s political center itself.
MY: How extensive has been the involvement of Lebanon’s political parties, or specific politicians, in drug trafficking? How about state institutions?
MHA: The first level of involvement is through local networks, which often receive protection in exchange for loyalty and support from politicians or parties. Such dynamics have historically been a cross-sectarian phenomenon in the Beqaa Valley. Unlike traditional trafficking groups tied to specific factions, Captagon barons have not been affiliated with a single political party. Instead, they have cultivated a broad spectrum of connections across the political system, granting them greater flexibility and freedom of movement.
The second level of involvement is direct facilitation, as seen in the case of Hezbollah in Syria. As an ally of the former Syrian regime, Hezbollah maintained a military presence throughout the country, and its name has surfaced in multiple investigations as a facilitator of the Captagon trade. Given the industrial-scale involvement in Captagon trafficking of the Syrian Army’s Fourth Armored Division, which was controlled by Maher al-Assad, the brother of Bashar al-Assad, and given that the unit was a key Hezbollah ally, it is hard to believe that the party remained detached from Syria’s booming drug trade. The same logic applies on the Lebanese side of the border with respect to Hezbollah, where individual links and territorial control would have made the party’s complete disengagement from trafficking nearly impossible.
MY: With Lebanon facing a new political reality since the war with Israel—by which I mean Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—how has this affected Captagon trafficking?
MHA: With the Syrian regime at the center of Captagon production, its downfall in December dealt a significant blow to the drug trade. Whether it will recover, even partially, depends on two key factors. The first is production capacity, as demand for Captagon remains strong in the Gulf states and beyond. Despite the setback, production continues in opposition-held areas of Syria, including northern parts of the country controlled by the so-called Syrian National Army, as well as in southern Syria, making it possible to satisfy this demand, at least partly. A similar situation applies to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley, though current production levels remain relatively low.
The second factor is whether the new leaderships in Lebanon and Syria can provide viable economic alternatives to drug production. However, given ongoing sanctions on Syria and security challenges in both countries, achieving this in the short term is unlikely. International and regional actors seeking to curb drug trafficking must take this into account and act swiftly, whether by reconsidering sanctions or supporting economic recovery efforts. The collapse of state institutions remains a central driver of the Captagon trade, making sustainable economic solutions all the more urgent.
MY: What do you propose is the best way to wean clan-based Lebanese traffickers away from growing and selling hashish? Do you think this is realistic?
MHA: The state should take steps to legalize hashish for certain medical purposes, thereby separating the farming of hashish from trafficking. This would reduce drug-related crimes, weaken smuggling networks, and ensure that farmers benefit directly from the industry. It is also the core principle behind a 2020 law passed in Lebanon, which was not implemented due to the country’s governance crisis at the time. The government must follow through with its implementation, drawing lessons from Morocco, which has made significant progress in this area, generating substantial state revenues. So far, planting alternative crops to replace hashish and other narcotics has failed, which makes the legalization of hashish a critical opportunity to regulate the sector effectively.
This publication was produced with support from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
Read the full text here.
Yemen’s Ansar Allah, better known as the Houthis, has expanded cross-border collaboration with non-state actors in Somalia, namely the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), which is associated with the Islamic State group that emerged in Iraq and Syria in 2014. While these groups diverge in ideology, ambition, and regional focus, they are united in their hostility to the United States and Israel, their pursuit of asymmetrical warfare, and their reliance on illicit economies. Such collaboration aims to strengthen and diversify supply chains, securing access to more sophisticated weaponry, improve the groups’ domestic standing, and increase the latitude of Ansar Allah and its main regional backer, Iran, to affect maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab Strait to their advantage. This situation has heightened the sources of instability in the broader region.
Much of the African Horn, especially the Red Sea littoral states, is integral to Yemen’s strategic depth due to its geographical proximity and long coastline. These factors have shaped historical patterns of migration, trade exchanges, cultural influence, and religious and social interactions. Yemen’s establishment of the Sanaa Cooperation Forum in 2003, which among other things addressed peace in Somalia, its mediation in the Somali crisis of 2006–2007, and its hosting of large numbers of displaced Somalis have underscored Yemeni preoccupation with the African country. Yemen has also been the African Horn’s gateway to the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, including during periods of instability and conflict. The International Organization for Migration reported that 96,670 people crossed the Gulf of Aden into Yemen in 2023 thanks to human trafficking networks, especially from Somalia’s Bari and Woqooyi Galbeed regions.
The arms trade in the Red Sea has been a leading factor in Ansar Allah’s ties with Somalia. Despite a United Nations arms embargo on Yemen, Iran has supplied weapons surreptitiously to Ansar Allah. Between September 2015 and January 2023, warships from the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, and Australia intercepted sixteen vessels, carrying approximately 29,000 small arms and light weapons, 365 anti-tank guided missiles, and 2.38 million rounds of ammunition bound for Ansar Allah. Most of the consignments were transported on dhows used for coastal trade and fishing. In 2020, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime concluded that a portion of Iranian-supplied arms to Ansar Allah ended up in Somalia.
While Iran’s dealings with African Horn countries have been characterized by ups and downs, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) prioritized the region after 1989, later intensifying its efforts in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In 1989, Iran backed Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir’s rise; in 2006, it transferred weapons to the Islamic Courts Union so it could fight Somalia’s government; and in 2008 it sought a military presence in Eritrea, allowing it to use the Dahlak islands to send arms to Ansar Allah. In this way Tehran tried to break its international isolation, expand regional partnerships, and introduce supply mechanisms for its proxies, expanding its strategic reach.
Ansar Allah’s relationship with Somali nonstate actors, all of them under arms embargo, has evolved over the past decade through arms traffickers or brokers. This became increasingly important starting in 2016, when Ansar Allah realized it could strengthen its position by having a capacity to act in Yemen’s maritime space, whether by attacking vessels or engaging in smuggling—a lesson it applied during the Red Sea crisis over Gaza that began in October 2023. Ansar Allah’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, again expressed this view in January 2025, when he cited the group’s maritime operations on Gaza’s behalf, while supporting developments in “several African countries … against American and European hegemony, and American imperialism and occupation [there].” This signaled his interest in broadening Ansar Allah’s activities into Africa.
In June 2024, the United States reported on collaboration between al-Shabab and Ansar Allah. A United Nations report from February 2025 revealed that representatives of the two groups had met at least twice in July and September 2024 in Somalia, underscoring Ansar Allah’s commitment to deepening ties during the Red Sea crisis. Under the reported deal, Ansar Allah would provide al-Shabab with arms and technical expertise in exchange for ramping up piracy attacks and collecting ransoms in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia’s coast.1 Considering al-Shabab’s cooperation with Somali pirates, in which the former reportedly receives a 20 percent share of ransoms, the Ansar Allah–al-Shabab partnership likely involved using pirates to maximize maritime disruptions.2 The United States’ fear is that Ansar Allah’s weapons deliveries could provide it with a new financing stream, while giving al-Shabab access to more sophisticated arms.
Iran also has longstanding contacts with al-Shabab. In 2017, the IRGC’s Quds Force allowed the group to circumvent United Nations sanctions by using Iranian ports as transshipment points to reexport charcoal, generating revenues. Iran has also reportedly armed and funded al-Shabab to target U.S. interests in the African Horn, including Kenya. While tangible evidence that Iran has played a role in facilitating Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab is required, U.S. intelligence officials are investigating such a possibility. Guled Ahmed, a Somali scholar at the Middle East Institute, is more affirmative, saying, “Iran is at the epicenter of all of this.”3 Moreover, al-Qaeda’s de facto leader Seif al-Adl is allegedly being hosted by Tehran and views convergence between Sunni and Shia militants as necessary to focus on fighting Western countries.
Ansar Allah’s relationship with ISS, in turn, has evolved since at least 2021.4 The relationship initially focused on the transfer of small arms. Between 2015 and 2022, U.S.-designated ISS members Abdirahman Mohamed Omar and Isse Mohamoud Yusuf smuggled arms from Yemen, suggesting preexisting connections with Ansar Allah. This was driven both by the domestic needs of ISS, which operates in Somalia’s Puntland region, and Ansar Allah’s desire to bolster its revenues, especially after the lull in the Yemen conflict starting in April 2022. When the Gaza war began in October 2023, Ansar Allah sought to increase international pressure for a ceasefire by interdicting maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. Between November 2023 and May 2024, it reportedly sent representatives to northeastern Somalia to coordinate intelligence gathering and the geolocation of ships in the Gulf of Aden, filling blind spots in its radar coverage, in exchange for short-range suicide drones and technical training.5 The Somali Puntland Security Force (PSF) seized five such drones dispatched by Ansar Allah in August 2024, arrested seven individuals suspected of having links to ISS and al-Shabab, and in January of this year ISS claimed two drone attacks against the PSF. Ansar Allah’s relationship with ISS and the latter’s access to arms smuggling networks follow on from Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab and the fact that in 2015, ISS leader Abdul Qadir Mumin formed ISS with defectors from al-Shabab, which he opposes.
While Ansar Allah is a Jarudi Zaydi Shiite group, it has behaved pragmatically in dealing with Sunni jihadi groups, as shown by its collaboration with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This relationship has involved the transfer of weapons to AQAP, the mutual provision of havens for each other’s members, and exchanges of prisoners, demonstrating that connections with al-Shabab and ISS are equally possible.
The ramifications of Ansar Allah’s deepening collaboration with al-Shabab and ISS are multifaceted and critical to global maritime trade, peace, and security. The parties have common interests, all of which are reshaping security dynamics in the African Horn, the southern Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, adding to the potential theaters of instability and complicating arms interdiction efforts. These dynamics have also increased Ansar Allah’s geopolitical footprint, from which Iran has benefited, giving both parties leverage over a major international sea-lane.
A primary interest of Ansar Allah, al-Shabab, and ISS is their exploitation of illicit networks, particularly arms and fuel trafficking networks from Iran. Iran, in turn, sees these groups as helping it to diversify access to financing channels, smuggling routes, and offshore support bases. Such activities have increased the three groups’ sources of revenues and operational capabilities.6 Specifically, Ansar Allah’s collaboration with Somali non-state actors has facilitated the flow of Iranian weapons and resources to and from Yemen, circumventing the United Nations arms embargo. Weapons transfers often follow a roundabout route. Larger ocean-faring ships leave Iran and travel into Kenyan or Tanzanian waters to avoid detection by international naval forces near the Gulf of Aden, before heading toward Somalia. Then, smaller boats departing from Somalia, using falsified documents, smuggle arms into Yemen, particularly through Ras al-Aara in Lahj Governorate.7 Arms dealers and brokers have also sought to transfer surface-to-air missile systems from Eastern Europe to Ansar Allah via Somalia.8
Somali non-state actors view Ansar Allah’s possession of disruptive conventional weapons and drone capabilities as an encouraging game-changing development.9 For Ansar Allah, in turn, the transfer of weaponry and training is part of a package that has increased the group’s revenues, expanded its influence, secured logistical assistance, and allowed Ansar Allah’s elevation in the Axis of Resistance. The IRGC, which is keen to undercut Western interests, seeks to counterbalance rivals such as the United States, the Gulf states, and Türkiye, and expand its reach into the African Horn. It “oversees the strategic direction of this transactional cooperation, with Ansar Allah acting as a sub-regional coordinator given its operational resilience during the Red Sea crisis and geographical proximity,” according to Yazeed al-Jeddawy of the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies.10 The Quds Force, a member of which sits on Ansar Allah’s Jihad Council, the group’s highest executive body, supervises the weapons transfers.
For Ansar Allah, Somalia’s porous coastlines have become critical to ensuring that the group has access to Iranian supplies and Chinese equipment necessary for the growth of its Iranian-supported drone and missile program.11 Much equipment to Ansar Allah enters through Somalia and Djibouti. Smuggling routes to Yemen include the coastline around the ports of Hodeida, Salif, Ras Issa, and Mocha in Taiz Governorate, al-Shihr and Mukalla in Hadramawt Governorate, Balhalf and Bir Ali in Shabwa Governorate, Nashtun and Sayhut in Mahra Governorate, and, on the Somali side, the Bosaso port in Puntland and the coasts of Burua, Hobyo, Baraawe, Merca, and Qandala, as well as the Barbera port in Somaliland. To supply Ansar Allah, the IRGC relies on Somali piracy networks, al-Shabab, and arms dealers in Yemen and Somalia. Among those coordinating Ansar Allah’s operations in Somalia are Abu Mohammed al-Murtadha and Abu Ibrahim al-Hadi, who not only oversee trafficking deals but also the expansion of cooperation with the Quds Force.12
Second, Ansar Allah’s collaboration with al-Shabab and ISS has indirectly given Iran an opportunity to develop its strategic depth in Somalia and the African Horn and widen its latitude to shape the maritime security architecture in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab Strait. During the Gaza conflict, this gave Iran significant leverage over the transportation of hydrocarbons and other goods into the Mediterranean and Europe. An October 2024 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen indicated that Ansar Allah was “evaluating options to carry out attacks at sea from the Somali coast,” having transferred drones and missiles to Somalia. These attacks did not materialize, chiefly because Iran suffered setbacks in its conflict with Israel between July and December 2024, and feared this would lead to more sustained attacks against Iranian territory.
Ansar Allah’s ties with al-Shabab and ISS have also allowed the parties to diversify their tools of access to Somalia’s maritime areas, while creating deniability for their partners. For example, in November 2023, Ansar Allah’s Abdul-Malek al-Aajri claimed that his group had seized a vessel, the Central Park, when in fact it was Somali pirates who had done so in coordination with Ansar Allah, demonstrating their joint influence. Therefore, maritime attacks are increasingly involving multiple actors across the Gulf of Aden, giving Iran and Ansar Allah the means to disrupt Red Sea trade when advantageous.
Ansar Allah’s connections with groups in Somalia have also allowed it to receive information from the other side of the Gulf of Aden in order to strike ships. During the Gaza conflict, Ansar Allah persuaded al-Shabab, ISS, and Somali pirates to attack vessels and block their passage into the Red Sea in solidarity with the Palestinians. An October 2024 UN Panel of Experts on Yemen report concluded that a third of Ansar Allah’s attacks occurred in areas of the Gulf of Aden outside the group’s radar coverage, “suggesting that the Houthis received external assistance in identifying, locating and targeting the vessels.” Such information was probably provided by the IRGC’s spy ship MV Behshad, Russia, al-Shabab, ISS, pirates, or other Somali groups.
In March 2024, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi confidently expressed his intention to expand maritime operations toward the Indian Ocean and Cape of Good Hope, tacitly indicating the possibility of using other countries’ territory to organize direct or proxy attacks. The uptick in Somali piracy during Israel’s offensive in Gaza, alongside Ansar Allah’s disruption of Red Sea maritime traffic, was probably no coincidence, corroborating reports of a partnership between Ansar Allah and al-Shabab.
A third factor behind the collaboration of Ansar Allah, al-Shabab, and ISS, is their shared desire to broaden the front against the United States, Israel, and those African countries supporting the Americans, which they regard as rivals or enemies. The transfer of drones and surface-to-air missiles to al-Shabab, and suicide drones to ISS, has improved the asymmetrical warfare capacity of both groups. This has increased threat perceptions in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya (whose border region with Somalia is unstable), while increasing the groups’ ability to target regional security forces, including those from the Somali National Army, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, and U.S. Africa Command. The proliferation of drones has also created an environment in which Western resources may have to be reallocated elsewhere, with Ansar Allah likely hoping this may ease pressure on the group.
There are also domestic motivations for why Ansar Allah has deepened its relations with al-Shabab and ISS, posing potential risks for regional stability. Ansar Allah hopes to see its improved capabilities, networks, and resources in Somalia reflect positively on the trajectories of AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen against Ansar Allah’s adversaries. Its goal is to increase Sunni jihadi actions in Yemen, which would fuel instability in government-held areas, discrediting the Yemeni government both internally and internationally and deepening mistrust within the government camp.
Ansar Allah appears to be succeeding in this strategy. The UN recently issued a report indicating that al-Shabab “reportedly sent over a dozen operatives to AQAP to acquire operational expertise and knowledge including in unmanned aerial vehicle technology,”13 underscoring the potential for spillover. Given such convergence, AQAP has been increasingly focused on targeting Western interests and forces aligned with Yemen’s government and the Southern Transitional Council, especially since 2021. This encompassed employing booby-trapped drones in 2023. Like al-Shabab and ISS, Ansar Allah and AQAP view the Yemeni government as “pro-Western,” and during the Gaza war AQAP’s resolve to deepen its collaboration with Ansar Allah only increased. As for Iran, the weakening of central governments in Yemen and Somalia has created a vacuum allowing it to expand its leeway to intervene and pursue Tehran’s interests across the Gulf of Aden. This was especially important after the Iran-dominated Axis of Resistance was substantially weakened in the conflict with Israel between October 2023 and December 2024, raising Ansar Allah’s value in the axis and in Iran’s calculations.
The expansion of Ansar Allah’s relationships with Somali non-state actors resonates with Iranian foreign policy objectives in the African Horn. Iran, whose Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nasser Kanani, has described Africa as a “continent of opportunities,” has been revising its African Horn strategy in recent years, restoring diplomatic ties with Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia in 2023–2024. Ansar Allah’s footprint in Somalia is a symptom of Iran’s engagement in the African Horn. Furthermore, Ansar Allah’s focus on regional smuggling networks is expected to increase now that the United States again designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization in February 2025 and imposed sanctions on seven of its leaders implicated in smuggling and arms procurement.
The IRGC, mindful of the strategic implications Ansar Allah’s actions have had on global maritime trade and security, has been reinforced in its belief in the importance of having sway in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and toward the Cape of Good Hope. As Iran aims to project power throughout the region and beyond, its aim is to be able to have an impact on maritime developments far from its shores. Polarization, conflict, poverty, fragmentation, and corruption will remain enabling conditions for such an ambition in the medium term. But whether the contrary ideological objectives of Sunni and Shiite jihadi groups will end up dividing the Iranians and Ansar Allah from al-Shabab and ISS, despite their shared anti-Western militancy, remains to be seen.
This publication was produced with support from the X-Border Local Research Network, a program funded by UK International Development from the UK government. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
Since the 2011 Libyan revolution, the country has endured waves of conflict. As an integral linkage between Africa and Europe, international media highlights a growing migrant crisis through Libya – attributed to a human smuggling and trafficking sector regulated by various local actors.
In this episode, Tim Eaton and Lubna Yousef discuss their latest research on how transnational human smuggling has fuelled conflict in Libya through a systems analysis of three key transit cities – Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya. Using this approach, their research examines the roles played by conflict and social dynamics in the expansion of human smuggling and trafficking – thus helping uncover critical gaps in policies aimed at addressing the rapid rise of migration.
This episode is available on Soundcloud, Apple Podcasts and Spotify.
Kheder Khaddour is a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. His research is focused on civil military relations and local identities in the Levant, with a concentration on Syria. Most recently, he co-authored a major paper on Syria’s borders with Armenak Tokmajyan, titled, “Borders Without a Nation: Syria, Outside Powers, and Open-Ended Instability.” Diwan interviewed him in early February to get his perspective on the Syrian-Lebanese border, which has been the site of cross-border conflict in recent weeks.
Michael Young: How has the downfall of the Assad regime in Syria affected the situation along the Syria-Lebanon border?
Kheder Khaddour: In the months leading up to the fall of the Syrian regime, Israeli airstrikes intensified along the border, including those targeting official border crossings. These attacks weakened Hezbollah’s capabilities. The regime’s collapse created a new security reality. Groups operating under the supervision of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham took control of the official border crossings and their combatants spread across all the border areas, replacing Hezbollah militants and the former Syrian army and security forces. This created an extremely fragile security situation on both sides of the border. On the one hand, the Lebanese state’s authority had always been weak in these areas, and on the other, the groups that took control of the Syrian side had a militia-based structure.
MY: Recently, there has been fighting in border areas. What has been the cause of this?
KK: The most recent round of fighting has been concentrated in the areas of Qusayr in Syria and the Hermel area of northeastern Lebanon. The most crucial factor here has been demographics. There is a mix of Shiite and Sunni villages in these areas. Hezbollah entered Syria through Qusayr in 2013, but the focus today is not on the city itself but primarily on the area west of the Orontes River. In this region, there are mainly Shiite villages populated by Lebanese, whose inhabitants have owned land on the Syrian side of the border for decades. The area, which served as a gateway into Syria during the Syrian conflict, is today the place of armed confrontation between members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Shiite families such as the Jaafar and Zeaiter clans. These conflicts reflect the ongoing sectarian tensions that have persisted since the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2012.
MY: Smuggling has long been a problem along the border, and recent reports indicate that it is continuing. What are the implications of this for the new Syrian government? Is it in a position to bring such activities to an end?
KK: Smuggling has been a main problem since the establishment of the border between Syria and Lebanon. There are two types of smuggling. First, smuggling involving essential goods, which has never stopped and is linked to price differentials between markets in the two countries. Currently, in the middle of a tense security situation, smuggling networks are transporting goods such as diesel fuel and poultry from Lebanon into Syria. Hundreds of families on both sides of the border depend on this trade for their livelihood. The second type of smuggling is political in nature, and includes weapons, drugs, and people. This has completely stopped in the last two months given the removal of the Assad regime and Hezbollah’s inability to engage in cross-border activities.
MY: What is Hezbollah’s status in the border area, given that at one time the party played a major role in controlling both sides of the border? Have we seen a retreat of Hezbollah on this front?
KK: Hezbollah is currently besieged, with the Lebanese army on one side of the border in Lebanon and members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and affiliated groups on the Syrian side. However, the party retains considerable influence in the Beqaa region and across all Shiite villages along the border. Hezbollah’s activities in the border area depend on two main factors: its position within the new political framework of the Lebanese state; and the security and sectarian tensions along the border, which could create a suitable ground for renewed Hezbollah activity. Another important factor is the ongoing Israeli attacks targeting Hezbollah’s activities and assets. Strikes against clans linked to the party will weaken its presence in the border area, while strengthening Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham on the Syrian side.
MY: One fear in Lebanon is that the new leadership in Damascus has Salafi jihadi origins, and that this may have a spillover effect on Lebanon. Do you consider this scenario realistic, and what do you see as the potential risks?
KK: I think this issue will fundamentally reshape the relationship between Lebanon and Syria. There are three main points here: Syria’s new ideology; the defeat of the so-called Axis of Resistance in the region and the ensuing security vacuum; and the potential for sectarian conflict in Lebanon. The ideology of the forces on the ground in Syria today primarily defines itself through the “other.” That is, the Sunni ideology of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is a reaction to the Shiite political ideology that has dominated in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Today, the rulers in Damascus are shaping a new Syrian identity, one based on ideological foundations, which expresses itself through phrases such as the description of Syria as “the state of the Umayyads,” or phrases shared on social media such as, “Oh Iran, go crazy, the Sunnis are coming to rule us!” Even Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto president, has entered the fray, speaking of a “natural Syria,” by which he means a Sunni Syria, as opposed to a Shiite Syria.
The Axis of Resistance has left a large security vacuum in Syria after its defeat by Israel in the year after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack from Gaza. This vacuum has been filled by local jihadi groups, which could provide inspiration to Salafi networks inside Lebanon, enabling them to express themselves from Tripoli to Akkar and the Beqaa Valley. The Salafi movement in Lebanon feels empowered because of the developments in Syria, and its relationship with its Syrian counterparts is likely to strengthen over time. Such a development could create sectarian tensions in Lebanon, with local conflicts undermining civil peace and stability. For example, in the Zahleh region, there are two towns, Taalabaya, which includes Shiites, and Saadnayel, which is Sunni. Celebrations in Saadnayel over Assad’s downfall were characterized by schadenfreude directed against the Shiites of Taalabaya. Posters of Ahmad al-Sharaa on car windows and jihadi songs fill the streets every now and then. Such practices could escalate into armed confrontations across regions of Lebanon.
More generally, religion does not drive politics and what takes place on the ground. However, local identity is already politicized, and as long as the situation in Syria remains unstable, the general mood in Lebanon will be charged and susceptible to mobilization based on perceptions of the self and of the other. This is what we need to watch out for.
Read the full interview here.
Sierra Leone’s civil war (1991-2002) was brutal. Reports of ‘savagery’ were not simply displays of rhetoric.[i] Alongside an estimated 75,000 casualties, thousands were subjected to amputations, mutilations, and sexual violence.[ii] Atrocities were committed by all sides, but the amputations carried out by the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) became emblematic of the suffering inflicted on civilians.
In some cases, the violence of the war was so extreme it seemed to defy reason, but there was one explanation that captured the attention, and the imagination, of the international community: diamonds. A mindless lust for wealth could explain acts of ‘bewildering cruelty’, but a desire for diamonds could also be explained by a ‘rational’ need to finance the war.[iii] The popular link between diamonds and violence is neatly summed up in the 2006 film Blood Diamond, when Jennifer Connelly’s character says, ‘the people back home wouldn’t buy a ring if they knew it cost someone else their hand.’ The reality is, of course, more complex.
Greedy criminals
Given the seemingly inexplicable brutality of the conflict, a prominent school of thought sought to explain the violence by arguing that civil wars were a breakdown of the normal order. As the war began, social, moral, psychological, and political constraints were removed, and, in a ‘vortex of anarchy and lawlessness’, individuals used violence ‘in the service of gratifying their innate human lust for power and material wealth’.[iv] Perpetrators of extreme violence were written off as greedy criminals, who wanted only one thing: wealth. This argument has now been widely discredited. One issue is that it assumes that all those committing violence were inherently greedy, and, as Dr Yusuf Bangura observed, it is also ‘deeply flawed’ to assume ‘rational actions cannot be barbaric’.[v]
If a desire for diamonds motivated acts of atrocity, this could instead be explained by the argument that violence was used strategically as part of a wider campaign of terror to gain, and protect, access to the country’s diamond mining fields. Human Rights Watch reported numerous instances where civilians were abducted and subjected to forced labour in diamond mines, while accounts from the conflict tell of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) torturing civilians who impeded their access to diamonds.[vi]
Brutality beyond greed
But if greed or economic gain were the cause of the violence, then why were acts committed that went beyond achieving these goals? Some instances of violence were so shocking that it seems unlikely they were motivated solely by a desire to extract the stones.[vii] Even if these fed into a wider strategy of terror, it is hard to believe, as Dr Kieran Mitton argues in his book on the atrocities of the civil war, that this was the main cause of the brutality, rather than ‘the consummatory rewards of violence itself’.[viii]
Status and shame
Feelings of shame amongst the perpetrators could explain why some committed extreme violence. The origins of the civil war have been linked to grievances around uneven development, and a lack of access to education, employment, and resources. Many who joined the RUF, whether voluntarily or by force, were from communities who had been increasingly marginalised. A desire to reverse the status-quo could therefore explain acts of violence committed by teenage fighters against local ‘big men’ and those in positions of power.[ix] Status could also be gained in committing sexual violence; ex-combatants reported that ‘those who participated in rape … were seen to be more courageous, valiant, and brave than their peers’.[x]
Atrocities may also have helped to redress feelings of shame that rebel recruits experienced upon capture when they were subjected to violence and humiliation.[xi] Carrying out dehumanising and degrading acts against others could have been a way for rebels to transfer their own feelings onto their victims. One woman, for example, recounted an experience she and her son endured at the hands of rebels which seemed to serve no purpose other than to humiliate.[xii]
Professor David Keen also argues that extreme violence seems to have been used to eliminate ‘the threat of shame’ in any civilians seen to be embodying it.[xiii] For example, if victims begged for mercy, this could lead to feelings of shame and guilt in the perpetrators. When fighters were faced with pleas for compassion, therefore, this could explain why they responded with further violence, as if they wanted to extinguish the moral judgement they perceived in the cries of their victims. This argument would also explain times onlookers were forced to laugh and clap as atrocities were carried out, as if the perpetrators were compelling approval of their actions.[xiv]
Dehumanisation and disgust
Violence that aimed to reverse or remove feelings of shame could also have been shaped by the emotion of disgust. The RUF claimed from the outset that it was fighting to cleanse society of its ‘rotten’ and corrupt elements, and instances of brutality may have been provoked by a belief among the rebels that their enemies were disgusting and sub-human. Similarly, a belief among the RUF’s enemies that the rebels were beasts and bush devils in turn could explain the use of extreme violence against them.[xv]
But, in the eyes of the perpetrators, the use of gratuitous violence could not only be justified against those seen to be inhuman, it could also be used to render victims sub-human. Amputations and ‘messy’ mutilations, for example, turned victims into ‘the disgusting beings they were supposed to be’.[xvi] There is an argument in the psychology literature that dehumanisation plays more of a role in ‘instrumental’ violence, where the violence is a means to an end, and less in ‘moral’ violence, where the violence can be justified as punishment or retribution.[xvii] By denying victims their humanity, extreme violence was instrumental in two ways. The perpetrators could reinforce the need for violence, and so justify their cause. At the same time, they could also rid themselves of the shame associated with carrying out this violence. Disgust was both a driver and an outcome of atrocities.
Fear
Threading throughout motivations of shame and disgust is the presence of fear: fear of contamination, fear of shame, and fear of moral judgement. Given that so many RUF combatants were forcibly recruited, it is logical to assume fear could in some part explain the cause of atrocities. Testimonies from ex-combatants highlight the role this played in motivating acts of violence.[xviii] Although such accounts could have been given in an attempt to minimise personal responsibility, most RUF combatants did not join voluntarily, and, given the brutalisation process which the group subjected its recruits to, it is clear that violent behaviours were something that had to be taught and enforced.[xix] One boy who was abducted by the RUF aged 15 said ‘when you are captured, you have to change or you become a dead man’.[xx]
Despite the popular link, diamonds on their own do not give a clear-cut explanation for the extreme violence carried out during Sierra Leone’s civil war. Feelings of revenge, fear, disgust, shame, and pride all undoubtedly played a role, while other factors, such as drug use and brutalisation, also deserve attention. To try to explain the atrocities of the civil war is not to try to justify them, but, if we can increase our understanding of what drives people to commit extreme violence, practitioners and policymakers will be better equipped to prevent and address such acts in the future.
[i] Dowden, R. (1995, January 31). Sierra Leone savagery rips nation apart. The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/sierra-leone-savagery-rips-nation-apart-1570525.html
[ii] Hoffman, D. (2004). The Civilian Target in Sierra Leone and Liberia: Political Power, Military Strategy, and Humanitarian Intervention. African Affairs, 103(411), 211-226. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh025
[iii] Gberie, L. (2005). A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Hurst & Company.
[iv] Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[v] Bangura, Y. (2004). The Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richards. In I. Abdullah (Ed.), Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War (pp. 13-40). Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa.
[vi] Human Rights Watch. (2001). World Report 2001: Sierra Leone. Accessed at: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k1/africa/sierraleone.html; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone (TRC). (2004). Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Volume 3B). Accessed at: https://www.sierraleonetrc.org/
[vii] Human Rights Watch. (2003, January 16). “We’ll Kill You If You Cry”: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict. Human Rights Watch report 15(1) (A). https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/01/16/well-kill-you-if-you-cry/sexual-violence-sierra-leone-conflict
[viii] Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[ix] Keen, D. (1998). The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars (Special Issue). Adelphi Papers, 38(320), 1-89.
[x] Cohen, D. K. (2013). Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War. World Politics, 65(3), 383–415. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887113000105
[xi] Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[xii] Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone (TRC). (2004). Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Volume 3B). Accessed at: https://www.sierraleonetrc.org/
[xiii] Keen, D. (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. James Currey.
[xiv] Human Rights Watch. (1999, July). Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone. Human Rights Watch report 11(3) (A). https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/sierra/index.htm
[xv] Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[xvi] Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[xvii] Brudholm, T., & Lang, J. (2021). On hatred and dehumanization. In M. Kronfeldner (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of dehumanization (pp. 341–354). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429492464-chapter22
[xviii] Coulter, C. (2008). Female Fighters in the Sierra Leone War: Challenging the Assumptions? Feminist Review, 88(1), 54–73. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400385; Denov, M. S. (2010). Child soldiers: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front. Cambridge University Press; Gberie, L. (2005). A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone. Hurst & Company.
[xix] Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2004, July). What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-Combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003. Accessed at: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/Report1_BW.pdf; Mitton, K. (2015). Rebels in a Rotten State. Oxford University Press.
[xx] Keen, D. (2005). Conflict & Collusion in Sierra Leone. James Currey.
In Mosul, Iraq, efforts are underway to help the city move forward after decades of violent conflict and devastation under the rule of Saddam Hussein, the US occupation, and the brutal reign of Islamic State (IS).
One initiative which was created to support the city’s recovery was a community tree-planting project called Green Mosul. Green Mosul was developed by the Mosul Eye organisation with a dual objective to raise awareness of the climate crisis and to unite diverse communities after years of division and conflict.
The Green Mosul project was launched in 2022 with the goal of planting trees across the region, and Mosul Eye sought to involve the local population from the outset. If different parts of society could work together on the shared goal of making the city green, it was hoped that this would facilitate communication between divided communities, as well as offer them a chance to disconnect from the social and religious problems of the city.
The project made a concerted effort to choose religious and cultural sites to plant trees in. In this way, these places were turned into green public areas that could be enjoyed by all Mosulis, encouraging the pubic to see these heritage sites as shared spaces and not just for those from a particular community.
The planting of trees in cultural and religious sites also had another aim. Omar Mohammed, the founder of Mosul Eye, hoped that Mosulis would see that Mosul’s heritage was not just buildings, but the trees and the green spaces around them – and that this heritage needed to be protected too. When IS took control of Mosul, the city suffered an enormous amount of loss and devastation. The terrorist group might not come back but, if the climate crisis isn’t addressed, Mosul could face destruction of a different kind.
Mosul, historically known as the city of two springs due to its temperate autumn, is directly impacted by the climate crisis. The city now experiences longer and more intense heatwaves, reduced water flow, and an increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, such as droughts and floods. This not only risks the health of the city’s population, but has profound socio-economic implications. Agriculture in the region relies on predictable weather patterns. With changes in rainfall and temperature come rising food prices, higher poverty levels, and increased migration as people move away from rural areas to seek better living conditions.
On top of this, Mosul’s rich cultural heritage is at risk, as extreme weather events and changing environmental conditions can accelerate the deterioration of its many historic buildings and archaeological sites.
Mohammed believes that trees offered an ideal entry point for introducing environmental education to Mosul. Trees symbolise life and renewal, but they also play a key role in mitigating the climate crisis. To start the conversation on the climate crisis, Mohammed organised workshops and community meetings alongside the planting of trees, which encouraged locals to engage in discussions about trees, the climate crisis, and the effects of both on the local environment.
For Mohammed, it was important to make sure the impact of the climate crisis was discussed in a locally meaningful context. After years of conflict and destruction, the focus for most Mosulis was on restoring their livelihoods and rebuilding their lives, and Mohammed knew that many people wouldn’t engage with global narratives on the climate crisis while they had more immediate problems to deal with.
For example, when several neighbourhoods in the Al-Jadidae area of Mosul were experiencing water shortages, Green Mosul engaged the community in discussions about how the climate crisis impacts water availability and agricultural productivity and the need for sustainable water management practices.
In Mosul’s Old City, Green Mosul encouraged residents to consider the climate crisis and the importance of green spaces as they rebuilt their homes. The Old City had suffered immense destruction under IS’ reign, and the extensive use of heavy building machinery in reconstruction efforts was exacerbating the already-poor air quality. One resident, inspired by the project, transformed a narrow alley near his home in the Dakkah Barakah neighbourhood into a vibrant green space.
Green Mosul also arranged tree-planting events with local schools, businesses, and organisations in the hope this would foster collective action and introduce a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the environment. One participant, Anas, remarked that ‘planting these trees made me realise my role in combating the climate crisis. I am now more conscious of my daily actions and their environmental impact.’
As the city visibly turned greener, Green Mosul was able to attract the interest of both the public and the media, and to raise awareness of the need for sustainable practices and long-term strategies to safeguard the environment.
Through the planting of trees, Mosul Eye also found a language for the first time to speak to people about their areas without having to speak about sectarianism.
In Tel Skuf, 28km north of Mosul, the park in front of Mar Gorgis Church was transformed, thanks to Green Mosul, into a communal space that encouraged interaction and unity among different groups. In this instance, the need for more green areas became a bridge that allowed communities to engage across other divides and overcome tensions that had previously separated them.
In Bashiqa, another beneficiary of the Green Mosul project, farmers from different religious backgrounds came together to share knowledge about sustainable farming practices and crop rotation techniques, collaborating on a community garden project that utilised ancient irrigation methods to conserve water and increase crop yields. This practical co-operation resulted in improved agricultural output and strengthened inter-communal relationships.
In many places across the region, collaboration triumphed over division. In programme activities, conversations about Tal Afar no longer focused on Sunnis and Shia, but on the water springs and the green areas. When people spoke about Sinjar, they no longer talked about Muslims and Yezidis, but of the mountains and their importance. Discussions around the Nineveh Plains centred not on Christians and Muslims, but farming and green spaces.
The Green Mosul project ended in March 2023, but the universities and the local government have committed to continuing to plant trees, and Mosul Eye is still working to facilitate discussions on the climate crisis. The organisation knows that addressing the issue not only provides an opportunity to support post-conflict reconciliation in a divided city, but it also helps to protect the city’s future.
Mohammed has recently convinced the University of Mosul’s Central Library to create a section on the climate crisis, and he is currently working with schools to get the topic of the climate crisis included in the curriculum. Although this initiative may take time, it is a crucial step towards embedding the climate crisis education from an early age and instilling hope and optimism about the future.
The project has also empowered individuals to take steps of their own. Ahmed, a citizen of Mosul and a volunteer with Green Mosul, has initiated advocacy efforts within his community to promote recycling and revitalisation of green spaces in Mosul. Abdulrahman, an agricultural engineer hired by Mosul Eye to conduct a study on soil health in Mosul, was so shocked by the extent of the city’s environmental damage that he has taken it upon himself to increase awareness about this problem in the academic community. In response to these efforts, the University of Mosul has been more proactive in integrating studies focused on the climate crisis in Mosul into its curriculum.
Through Green Mosul, Mosul Eye also successfully arranged the first international conference on the climate crisis in Mosul. For the first time, amidst the city’s ruins, people engaged in discussions about the climate crisis. Mohammed hopes that Mosul will become part of the global discourse on the climate crisis because, if Mosulis see that someone around the world is talking about the climate crisis in their city, they might be inspired to take the initiative themselves. He also hopes that they will set an example to other activists: if the people of Mosul, in the midst of destruction, can still discuss and tackle the climate crisis, then it should be possible anywhere.
Find out more about Green Mosul in this interview with Dr Omar Mohammed, for the XCEPT research project at King’s College London.
Over the past decade, the number and intensity of both inter- and intrastate conflicts has been rising. In 2022, mostly due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war between the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the number of battle-related deaths from interstate conflicts reached its highest number since 1984.[i] According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), in the first month of 2024, one in six people around the world were estimated to have been exposed to conflict.[ii]
Human history, and our present, is rife with conflict, but researchers are still short of comprehensive theories that could explain the common ‘logic’ of conflicts across specific contexts. Why do people enter into conflict in situations when they could agree a peaceful settlement instead? The dynamics of conflict are incredibly complex and depend on countless, constantly evolving factors, from the environment to the unique individuals comprising the groups. This creates a serious challenge for predicting the emergence of conflict and its consequences. Models offer a means to consider various elements in parallel, untangling the complexity of conflict dynamics.
Models are sets of formulas developed by researchers to describe how different factors interact, integrating abstract theories to give a simplified, testable representation of real-life conflict. As the study of conflict is multidisciplinary, models provide a common language for researchers working in disparate fields, from political science to evolutionary biology. This is important as it allows for conflict analysis to integrate findings from different academic disciplines, and this can uncover new insights.
In one example, a model analysing strategic incentives for mass killings brought together several existing theories which yielded new, and somewhat unexpected, results: namely that constraints on the magnitude of mass killings, such as third-party intervention, may actually increase their probability under certain conditions.[iii] Models can also inspire further research by providing predictions that must then be tested against data collected from real conflicts.
A prototypical model of conflict is a simple ‘bargaining game’. In this model, two groups or individuals negotiate how to distribute something of value, which results in either a peaceful resolution or fighting. If fighting takes place, this item of value, be it a material or symbolic resource, is divided according to the outcomes of the conflict, but some of its value is destroyed, rendering aggression inefficient and collectively undesirable. Conflict dynamics are rarely that straightforward, and this model makes certain assumptions, such as theorising that groups are made up of members who have the same characteristics and who all act in the same way. Nevertheless, this still provides a useful base from which to generate testable hypotheses.
While models simplify various elements of conflict, they are beginning to take more detail into account. An example of this is the consideration of group heterogeneity. Groups in a conflict are not homogenous units, but are instead made up of individual agents with different motivations, identities, classes, behaviours, and more. Including these differences in models can significantly influence their predictions.
One facet of this heterogeneity is the difference in social classes within a population. A series of models by economists Esteban and Ray predicted that conflict was more likely to occur if religious or ethnic factions contained members from a mix of economic classes.[iv] An explanation for this is that conflict requires financing from the rich and fighting from the poor. Greater inequality also decreases the opportunity cost for both sides. It costs the rich less to fund the conflict, while, in the absence of other opportunities for income, fighting becomes the best option for potential gains for the poor.
Real-world data supported this prediction, finding that civil wars between groups with greater levels of internal economic inequality have been more severe in terms of death tolls and the length of the conflict.[v] This is just one example, but recent work has begun to make more nuanced predictions.[vi]
Models of conflict move us beyond stories to explanations. They allow us to consider how various elements interact side by side, and they help researchers from different fields to operate under a shared understanding. Work in this direction has already been generating increasingly complex models of conflict, and this will continue in the future as models take further nuances into account. Models offer an exciting avenue for exploring new ideas and will be instrumental in informing our understanding of conflict dynamics.
[i] Obermeier, A.M. & Rustad, S.A. (2023) Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022. PRIO Paper. Oslo: PRIO.
[ii] https://acleddata.com/conflict-index/
[iii] Esteban, J., Morelli, M., Rohner, D.: Strategic mass killings. Journal of Political Economy 123(5), 1087–1132 (2015) https://doi.org/10.1086/682584
[iv] Esteban, J., Ray, D.: Conflict and distribution. Journal of Economic Theory 87(2), 379–415 (1999) https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2549; Esteban, J., Ray, D.: On the salience of ethnic conflict. American Economic Review 98(5), 2185–2202 (2008) https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.5.2185; Esteban, J., Ray, D.: A model of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic Association 9(3), 496–521 (2011) https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774. 2010.01016.x; Esteban, J., Ray, D.: Linking conflict to inequality and polarization. American Economic Review 101(4), 1345–1374 (2011) https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1345.
[v] Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., Ray, D.: Ethnicity and conflict: An empirical study. American Economic Review 102(4), 1310–1342 (2012) https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1310
[vi] Rusch, H. (2023). The logic of human intergroup conflict: Knowns and known unknowns. Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics. GSBE Research Memoranda No. 014 https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2023014
