Dr Heidi Riley, Kings College London XCEPT consultant and gender and armed conflict specialist, shares some of the findings from the programme’s Impact of Trauma survey in South Sudan ahead of an upcoming publication. She reflects on the question ‘What does it take to be a ‘good man’?’
Much of the work on masculinity, insecurity and conflict focuses on violence. While expectations and stereotypes of masculinity feature as a driver of violence in XCEPT’s research, the relationship is not straightforward. Unpacking the complexity of this relationship is crucial in determining opportunities for change, whilst also recognising diversity in masculinity and men’s engagement as peacemakers.
In South Sudan, the majority of interethnic violence is carried out by men and is associated with cattle and livestock. In our analysis of our qualitative interviews with Nuer populations from Akobo, Jonglei State and Toposa populations in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria State, we found that the connection between masculinity and participation in violence can be understood in three different ways. Two of these are intertwined with notions of responsibility, respect and obligation, while the third is defined as irrational.
The association between male roles and being the provider is identified across multiple contexts. One of the questions the research team asked to both men and women interviewees was, ‘What makes a good man?’ Interview participants never described this as someone who engages in violence. Instead, the dominant response was centred around the ability to provide and protect one’s family, and second, as someone who is respectful to their family, community and neighbours. As one respondent explained, ‘Because he is the head of a family, a man should provide food and look after his family’s safety. This is a good man’.
Indeed, a good man was often described in interviews in distinctly anti-violent terms. For example, as someone who does not cause fights in the community, does not beat their children or wife and shows respect and level headedness. Although bravery and ability to fight were expressed as expectations of masculinity, they were not included in response to the question of what defines a good man.
However, in a context of food insecurity and competition over cattle ownership – which are central to pastoralist culture, representing a means of economic exchange, social status, cultural identity or means of subsistence – the picture becomes more blurred. In a context of extreme food insecurity due to protracted conflict and multiple climate shocks, it has become increasingly difficult to achieve the position of the good, respected, cattle-owning husband and father, without engaging in violent actions such as cattle raiding. As described by one respondent, “Many conflicts are caused by hunger because when you have nothing through which to support your children, you will decide to take someone’s cow or go anywhere to get food.”
Where a man cannot provide for his family, he is then exposed to experiencing shame through ridicule or mocking. One respondent told of how a man unable to provide will be considered:
This man will be named as a lazy. People will say if he would be a woman he would have gone mad. He will be insulted by his friends, and his age-mates [peer group] will say, “Why would you visit the home of a man who is lazy and cannot take care of his home?
This reveals a strange paradox, whereby men are expected to demonstrate the responsibility of provision and good fatherhood, defined in non-violent terms. Yet, in conditions of insecurity, fulfilling these expectations may require participation in violent raiding. This makes violence both a means of meeting responsibilities and avoiding shame, as well as a contradiction of the moral expectations associated with being a good man.
The second dimension of the relationship between violence with masculinity drawn from the research is centred around responsibility to community, and manifests in retaliatory or compensatory violence. As noted by one respondent a good man is ‘one who loves his community and compares them as one’. Therefore, as inferred throughout interviews, if harm – either in the form of cattle raiding or direct violence or killing – has been imposed on a community member by another group, the men of fighting age are obligated to respond or participate in retaliatory actions.
The focus on responsibility and obligation to community is key here. For example, where a male respondent is asked if he would get involved in retaliations, the response is consistently strong, with statements such as ‘Yes we have to get involved’. Another explained, ‘Hey! I am man, I can’t sit or hide myself somewhere and let my community be killed, … it is my responsibility to defend my people and my community’.
Again, failure to respond leads to accusations of being ‘fearful’ and invites ridicule or social exclusion. As explained by one respondent, ‘People will mock him, say that he is fearing. That is why he doesn’t want to fight when the enemies are around. Nobody will listen to his advice’. Another described how, ‘If people are going for an attack on the Murle [another ethnic group] as retaliation, and I do not go, when they come back nobody will talk with me, they will say this guy is fearful’. This type of man is denied recognition as a ‘proper’ man, not even worthy of marriage – another important marker of male personhood or respect – ‘People will say that they are fearing to die, people will mock them so much and nobody will talk to them, they won’t be able to take girls [for marriage]’.
Our research (publication upcoming) shows that the risk of shame or social exclusion can have both material and social consequence, including ostracisation from family and community. Thus, shame acts as a driver of violence where there are few alternatives to fulfilling the masculine provider role.
The third form of violence emerges from a more inherently shameful starting point. This is violence without purpose, described as violence fuelled by alcohol or madness. While alcohol is also described as being taken to embolden an individual when carrying out retaliatory violence, it also relates to irrational violence.
Alcohol is very dangerous [..] When a person is drunk, you will be disrespected and anyone can beat you. In the village, alcohol has done so much damage. [A drunk person] can shoot a soldier or beat his wife over small issues.
For those that engage in alcohol-fuelled violence or are unable to rationalise violence due to psychological problems – often recognised as a being brought on through previous experiences of violence – they are referred to as ‘useless’ or ‘bad’. These are described as people who ‘don’t want to hear elders’ advice’. Those who ‘drink and will abuse anyone including elders’. They will lose respect and will become ‘useless’ in the community.
Social and structural conditions clearly underpin the complex interplay between masculine expectations, community and individualised obligation, and the distinction between violence that commands respect and violence that brings shame. The possibility for dissension then remains hard to discern. Key areas that we will explore in forthcoming publications is the role of elders, as respected members of the community, in advising on alternative options to violence, and the role of fathers in advising sons to limit engagement in violence. This is not to overshadow the vital role of women in violence prevention initiatives and peace meetings. However, without alternative options for the acquisition of resources to fulfil the responsibilities as a provider or through change in structural conditions, expectations of masculinity are likely to remain a driver of violence.
With thanks to Anna Sebit for her valuable input.
Growing geopolitical divisions and the use of vetoes by permanent members of the UN Security Council have increasingly constrained collective responses to conflict. This has renewed attention on the role of the UN General Assembly and the tools available to Member States when the Security Council is unable to act.
The General Assembly has a longer history of engagement in peace and security than is sometimes recognised, including past involvement in establishing and supporting peace operations. While its powers are not equivalent to those of the Security Council, precedent points to ways in which it can help maintain international engagement when consensus in the Council breaks down.
Drawing on the Assembly’s powers and past practice, this blog explores how it could play a greater role in sustaining collective action on peace and security.
The renewable energy transition is crucial to mitigate climate change and enhance energy security. However, it also has a large material footprint because it depends on the mining of critical minerals. Local communities frequently resist such mining due to their impact on resource access, pollution, and livelihoods, leading to tensions with mining companies and governments. This blog explores why such tensions turn violent and what can be done to manage them peacefully.
When we think about the renewable energy transition, we think of solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries that help us to mitigate climate change and achieve energy security at the same time. By contrast, most of us are unlikely to associate the renewable energy transition with violent events, such as the police throwing white phosphorus bombs at local activists in Myanmar or with large-scale community protests in Ghana. But such events are closely tied to the renewable energy transition as well.
Renewable energy technologies have a large material footprint because they are highly reliant on so-called transition minerals (sometimes also termed critical minerals) like lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earths, and copper. The rise of solar, wind, and battery technologies resulted in a rapid growth in demand for these transition minerals. Most of this demand is met by the expansion of existing or the establishment of new mining sites, particularly in the Global South. Communities in the mining areas concerned about land-grabs, water scarcity, environmental pollution, and a range of other mining impacts often mobilize against the mine, resulting in (usually non-violent) conflicts. Some studies estimate that such resistance results in over 4,500 mining conflicts globally every year.
Transition mineral conflicts can take vastly different forms. In Myanmar, for instance, local communities protested against land grabbing, air pollution, and livelihood losses associated with the expansion of the Monywa Letpadaung Copper Mine between 2010 and 2014. The conflict escalated quickly into verbal abuse and physical altercations. Protestors blocked the road to the mine and allegedly engaged in vandalism and verbal threats. In 2012 and again in 2014, state security forces conducted violent crackdowns of protests camps, resulting in one death and over one hundred injuries.
By contrast, conflicts around the proposed extraction of bauxite in the Atewa Forest in Ghana remained less intense. Local communities, the mining company (SinoHydro), and the government strongly disagreed on the mining projects, but carried out their struggle through lawsuits, electoral campaigns, and lobbying. No (threats of) physical violence were involved.
Contrasting these two cases of transition mineral extraction and comparing them with other mining sites across the Global South reveals at least two relevant insights.
The first insight is that transition mineral mining can result in intense and even violent conflicts, with adverse impacts on political stability, human rights, and supply chain security. The Monywa Letpadaung Copper Mine, which saw intense local resistance and repressive violence by security forces, is a case in point. Even in politically stable and democratic countries like Chile, the government has deployed the military police to monitor (and presumably also to intimidate) anti-mining protestors in the Putaendo Valley. In this sense, and despite their association with positive outcomes like climate protection and energy security, transition minerals are not different from other natural resources. For example, Oil extraction has been accompanied by massive state and company violence in Nigeria.
However, just as the link between oil and conflict is no one-way street, transition mineral mining does not always lead to intense struggles. The non-violent and even sometimes cooperative relations between the communities, the mining company, and the state in the Atewa Forest in Ghana are a case in point. Another example would be the Cerro Verde Copper Mine in Peru, where the surrounding communities and the mine owner (Freeport-McMoRan) negotiated in good faith and did not engage in violent activities. Eventually, the agreed on an expansion of mine in 2012 under the condition that the mining company would construct a wastewater treatment plant to address local water insecurity.
The second insight is that political culture and polarization are important for how transition mineral conflicts play out. On first glance, the violent Monywa Letpadaung conflict and the much more peaceful Atewa Forest conflict have a lot in common; the mining was an intense threat to local livelihoods, local communities received a lot of support from civil society actors, the (proposed) mine was run by a Chinese, state-owned company, and the mining was deeply tied to the interests of political elites (in Myanmar, the government co-operated the mine, while in Ghana, then-President Akufo-Addo conceived bauxite mining as crucial for his “Ghana Beyond Aid” political vision).
Yet, upon closer look, significant differences between mining projects become apparent. These are closely related to the political culture and levels of polarization. In Myanmar, an authoritarian government and a culture of impunity among security forces undermined trust in state institutions by the local communities, while also facilitating disproportionate violence by the police. Ghana, by contrast, is a stable democracy. Furthermore, the president supporting the Atewa Forest Mine (Nana Akufo-Addo) had close ties to the region, which facilitated mutual trust and a desire for non-confrontational means of conflict. Likewise, the Atewa region has been home to artisanal gold mining and agriculture for hundreds of years, meaning there is an established (even if still sometimes tense) culture of co-existence between both industries. By contrast, communities have complained about the Monywa Letpadaung Mine and its adverse impacts at least since 1996 and have felt that the state has always ignored their concerns.
To conclude, research demonstrates that not only climate change itself but also climate change mitigation measures like the renewable energy can be a major source of local tensions and even of political violence and instability. However, if designed in a conflict-sensitive way, the renewable energy transition can occur in a peaceful and just way.
First and foremost, this requires an early, inclusive, transparent, and open-ended consultation with the local communities affected by the mining activities. Government, shareholders, and mining companies must also watch their investments and avoid contexts where mining is associated with intense tensions, local resistance, and human rights violations. This is also a long-term investment into supply chain security, given that once mining conflicts occur, a quarter of all projects suffer from (costly) delays and cancellations. Finally, more efforts need to go into the monitoring of mining conflicts and into researching strategies for conflict-sensitivity in such contexts.
This blog was originally published on the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute (PRIF) website.
Event Note: The topic of this Blogpost will further be discussed on November 18 in the following XCEPT Webinar: “Critically insecure? Critical minerals in the context of geopolitical competition, social conflict and environmental sustainability”. Moderated by Tobias Ide, Daryl Bosu, Joel Watson, Zung Ting, Ramon Balcazar and Shahila Perumalpillai will discuss how states, companies and civil society navigate the tensions between securing critical mineral supply chains, protecting the environment and upholding social rights.
In this episode of the War Studies podcast, XCEPT’s Nafees Hamid speaks with Lord John Alderdice about the history and future of the rules-based international order. They discuss the importance of relationships, human psychology and moral values in maintaining global stability, as well as lessons from history, the impact of hypocrisy and how genuine human connections can foster peace.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Soundcloud
This research took place in Eastern Equatoria State with the Toposa community. The region has experienced decades of civil war, and violence continues today, often caused by scarcity of resources. Toposa rely on livestock for income, milk, meat, hides, and to pay bride price. But limited water and grazing land mean that in the dry season, men migrate long distances in search of pasture. Food can be scarce and cattle raiding is common.
On the first day that I visited a village in Kapoeta North County, the very first thing to do, as usual, was to see the chief. He was welcoming, and we discussed the research topic briefly. The chief said they have frequent issues with conflict and raiding, which were creating fear and stress within the community. I was glad when he said that he was interested in being interviewed too.
When we were talking with the chief, an old man was sat next to him. After listening to what I was explaining, he said, “Come and interview me, I have a lot to tell you.” He got up, and I followed him to his hut, where we began the introduction part of the process. But after a few minutes, we heard a voice screaming. It was a girl who had collapsed. I rushed over with the old man. She was having a seizure, which continued for about five minutes, and she had bitten her tongue until it bled.
I stood there, not knowing how to help, as the old man looked at me and said, “This is what I wanted to tell you, and see how you can help me. It has been three years since I found this girl from my farm and took her in. I think her family might have abandoned her in the bush.” He asked me, “Do you know where I can take her to get good treatment? The hospital hasn’t got the right medication for her.” I felt helpless and told him, “I wish I could help but I don’t have the answer.”
After a week, the old man visited me where I was staying. He had no phone; he simply asked around and found me. We talked for hours about losing his relatives in the wars and losing his cattle to raids. He told me he hardly sleeps and sometimes cries at night, wondering what wrong he did. I gave him some words of encouragement, but there was little more I could do.
In that same village, on the second day, many women came requesting interviews. Most of them experienced severe hardships in daily life, and some of them spoke to me about very personal topics like forced marriage, widow inheritance and trauma.
I spent a week returning to that particular community. After the interviews, some of the participants asked if I had finished recording and then they would reveal deeper experiences. We would sit together and talk for several hours before I left. One woman said she felt relieved when she talked about her problems with me.
There were many moments during the interviews when participants became very emotional, especially women. A person’s mood might shift completely when they talked about very traumatic experiences, like seeing the body of a relative killed by enemies in raiding or acts of revenge. Some interviewees would pause before answering, their voices would become quieter and their speech would slow. Others would have tears in their eyes and would look away before they spoke again.
I was mentally prepared for these conversations by Dr Peter Hughes, a psychiatrist, who trained me in Psychological First Aid. This was very helpful both for supporting the interviewee and looking after our own mental health. I used strategies such as taking breaks during interviews and asking participants if it was okay to continue. I also shared my own personal experiences to show empathy.
One woman shared the story of how her brother died during a raid and that they could not bring his body home. She said she was always dreaming about him – terrible dreams where vultures and wild animals gorged on his corpse. I saw tears forming in her eyes. I gave her time, offered her some water from my bottle, and although she initially refused, she later accepted it. I skipped the difficult questions and moved to a less sensitive discussion.
I helped a woman who was in pain after giving birth five days earlier. She had asked to be interviewed, but when her baby was screaming, she couldn’t pick him up because of the pain. I held the baby, offered words of encouragement and shared some of my own experiences. After I had opened up to her, she felt a little better, and we were able to continue talking normally.
Despite having the knowledge and skills to handle stress during interviews, I still felt vulnerable during some discussions. After the fieldwork, I would go home and think about the most painful stories I had heard that day, asking myself, “How can I help?” when I knew I did not have the ability to do so.
Throughout the interviews, men often appeared brave and strong when speaking, but I could see stress hidden in their faces and their voices.
I interviewed a man who had served as a soldier in Khartoum during the civil war. As he spoke, he repeatedly took deep breaths and picked up a small stick to draw on the ground. This seemed to be a way of gathering the courage to talk about the pain he had endured. He described how he had been humiliated by a senior officer who took his wife, causing him severe distress. He recounted how he became mentally unwell and how his family rejected him.
In Toposa society, men are not expected to show weakness or emotions, such as crying. Looking vulnerable or defeated can result in insults and mockery. People sometimes even make up songs to make fun of men who are considered weak.
Men therefore try to hide their pain and maintain a strong, heroic reputation within the community. One young man said to me that it was better to risk dying in a raid, because it is the only opportunity for an orphan like him, who has no family inheritance. Another man added that if he dies on the battlefield, his name will live on as a hero and warrior, and people will sing about him during ceremonies for generations.
Some men told me they often turned to alcohol, saying it helped reduce distress. When they were drunk, they could temporarily forget their problems – but they might not recognise when they are in danger. One chief mentioned that when men and youth consume alcohol, their fear of raiding and battle is reduced. They feel brave and courageous and do not think twice because alcohol affects their judgment.
While waiting for the vehicle that would take me back to the office after interviews, I was able to offer words of counselling to a few participants. I discussed the dangers and consequences of alcohol use. Although they understood the risks, many still insisted that it was their best option for coping with trauma, stress, and difficult life circumstances.
Generally, most people had limited knowledge about mental health and trauma. After interviews, I tried explaining that mental health issues can be linked to stress, alcohol use, and conflict-related trauma. In a conversation with a traditional healer, who described herself as a witch doctor, she explained that she treats people with mental illness or those believed to be cursed through livestock sacrifices and herbal medicine. She said that while some people recover, others relapse and, in some cases, they eventually lose their lives.
Communities need greater awareness of mental health issues. Despite the efforts to provide training and raise awareness about trauma, there is still much more to be done. The community needs facilities that can support people experiencing mental health problems and provide access to appropriate medical care and attention.
The communities are waiting for feedback from this – and other – research. Many people said they had already spent a lot of time speaking to researchers, who had then disappeared. They never returned, the communities never heard their findings, and nothing changed. It was a privilege to speak with participants and learn from them – and I hope that we can do better follow-up. Even if that is simply by explaining to participants how their information has been used, and disseminating findings to them.
The UK and South Sudan research teams, together with local and regional stakeholders, are discussing ways to approach feedback and dissemination at a workshop in Nairobi next month.
In this episode of Multilateralism Unpacked, Catharina Nickel of the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research draws on recent field research in South Sudan to explore how financial cuts are reshaping UN peace operations. From closing field sites and reducing patrols to shrinking personnel numbers, she examines what a smaller UN presence means for civilian protection, local communities and engagement with political and security actors.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
In this episode of KCL Department of War Studies podcast, Dr Nafees Hamid speaks with Dr Iain McGilchrist about how the brain’s left and right hemispheres attend to the world in fundamentally different ways. They explore how shifts in hemispheric dominance have shaped trust, institutions and the rise and fall of civilisations throughout history, and what this means for how governments, mediators and practitioners build, and lose, legitimacy in fragile and conflict-affected settings today.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Soundcloud
This blog from King’s College London features a personal reflection by Maya Yamout, Vice President of the Lebanese NGO Rescue Me and a survivor of the 2020 Beirut Port explosion, six years after the disaster. Drawing on both her lived experience and her professional work in conflict and violence prevention, she argues that the explosion remains an ongoing crisis due to the lack of accountability for those responsible. She reflects on the lasting physical and psychological impacts on survivors, the role of civil society in preserving public memory and demanding justice, and the wider consequences of impunity for trust in state institutions and social cohesion.
This interview with King’s College London researcher Dr Rajan Basra explores the motivations behind jihadist hostage-taking during the 2014 Arsal hostage crisis in Lebanon. Drawing on interviews with families of 30 hostages, the discussion challenges conventional assumptions that kidnappings are driven solely by strategic goals such as ransoms or prisoner exchanges. Instead, it highlights the role of revenge, power and status in shaping the behaviour of militant groups and their members. The interview offers valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners working on hostage negotiations, civilian protection and conflict response, while also drawing attention to the often-overlooked experiences and support needs of victims’ families.
In this episode of Order from ashes, Peter Salisbury discusses the groundbreaking research behind Beyond the Axis, which examines how Yemen’s Houthi movement sources components and builds drones despite sustained international efforts to disrupt weapons supplies. The findings challenge conventional assumptions about arms trafficking and reveal how armed groups are adapting to an increasingly globalised war economy. Peter reflects on what this means for current conflicts in the Middle East, the limits of military responses, and how policymakers can better understand the evolving relationship between technology, supply chains and modern warfare.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
In this episode of Disorder, Jane Kinninmont is joined by Peter Salisbury to discuss how the Houthis learned to manufacture their own drones and missiles rather than simply receiving them from Iran, the outsized role China now plays in supplying the components that power this new generation of weapons, the fragile Saudi-Houthi truce since 2022, and what the changing economics of drone warfare mean for the future of arms control.
Listen to the podcast episode below, or on Spotify
Across conflict-affected borderlands, checkpoints are often treated as informal sites of taxation or obstruction along otherwise coherent trade routes. The TRACE project challenges this view.
Bringing together a set of comparative case studies from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, TRACE examines checkpoints as central political and economic institutions that shape how trade, authority and violence are organised. Rather than sitting on top of existing systems, checkpoints frequently constitute the infrastructure of circulation itself – enabling, regulating and transforming flows of goods, people and information.
TRACE explores the politics of circulation through detailed empirical research across diverse settings, including the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, Libya, Yemen, Myanmar, West Africa, Afghanistan and South Sudan.
Across these cases, the research highlights three broad insights:
Together, these findings push beyond state-centric frameworks and offer a new way of understanding how power operates in conflict-affected economies.
Checkpoints, not territory: rethinking conflict | Peer Schouten
This policy brief challenges conventional understandings of conflict by showing that control over circulation – rather than territory – lies at the centre of many contemporary wars. Drawing on comparative research across Yemen, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Great Lakes, South Sudan, Myanmar, and West Africa, it argues that checkpoints offer a critical but underexplored lens on conflict dynamics. In doing so, the brief highlights how these systems of control shape power, governance and everyday life, and sets out important implications for policy and programming.
Wars over checkpoints | TRACE researchers
This working paper is a collective effort taking stock of discussions during the TRACE workshop held in Entebbe, Uganda, from 19-21 November 2025. The paper unpacks the political and economic logic of checkpoints as central institutions of circulation. Drawing on comparative insights from DR Congo, Libya, Myanmar, South Sudan, Afghanistan, West Africa and Yemen, the paper advances nine theses that challenge conventional readings of roadblocks and reframe them as generative nodes of governance.
The TRACE working papers are designed not only as stand-alone contributions, but as building blocks for a broader comparative argument. Taken together, the research moves beyond describing checkpoint practices to explaining how checkpoint regimes emerge, evolve and reshape political and economic order. The following papers illustrate this collective effort, bringing together country-based studies led by individual authors whose work grounds the wider comparative insights.
On 18 June 2026, XCEPT hosted a briefing on how checkpoint economies shape conflict dynamics, governance, humanitarian access, and livelihoods across fragile and conflict-affected settings. Watch the recording of the briefing below.