Studies on local cross-border governance, however robust, may seem overly abstract when encountered in the form of a research report. This blog piece aims to counter such perceptions by demonstrating the relevancy of cross-border research. More specifically, it explains how, building on lessons learned from XCEPT-funded field research conducted between October 2023 and April 2024, Concordis International facilitated a series of peace conferences in 2025 between ethnic groups from the borderlands of South Darfur (Sudan) and the Central African Republic (CAR).[1]
At the time of the XCEPT research, those interviewed—including Concordis staff—emphasised that the affected communities were keen to engage in such dialogue as a means of moving forward. That aspiration has now become a reality.
Causes and consequences of the South Darfur–CAR borderland violence
The town of Um Dafoug sits on the border between Sudan and CAR.[2] The residents of the town and its surrounding areas make their livings through a mix of trades, including the seasonal migration of livestock (transhumance), which involves multi-ethnic cattle and camel herders moving their livestock across the border in search of pasture.[3] Against this backdrop, unregulated, poorly negotiated transhumance is a key instigator of inter-communal tensions.
North of the border, the hawakeer system—which predates colonialism in Sudan and governs tribal land ownership rights throughout Darfur—has contributed to local grievances among those pastoralist communities granted fewer land rights.[4] Particularly problematic has been the re-demarcation of land boundaries under Sudan’s President Bashir (in power from 1989 to 2019), which effectively transferred areas of land between tribal groups, perpetuating and in some cases escalating cross-border disputes related to livelihoods. Thus, segments of land east of Um Dafoug, formerly owned by Taaisha settled communities, have now become part of the Falata tribe’s territory. Typically, clashes between Taaisha and Falata communities occur when transhumant Falata return from CAR to Sudan at the start of each rainy season.
With state and international actors largely absent, local customary and religious elites have been left to play a central governance role in the CAR–Sudan borderlands. As such, localised agreements governing cross-border relations and livelihoods are predominantly unwritten and highly informal. At the same time, a variety of community mechanisms exist to mitigate tensions between and among pastoralist and farming communities. Ultimately, the overarching aim of these informal local agreements is to ‘manage (local) disorder’ in the CAR–Sudan borderlands.[5]
In 2021, there were a series of violent clashes between the Falata and Taaisha communities. In the wake of this, grassroots-level figures have called for acknowledgement of, as well as reparations for, losses suffered—both historically and more recently. This is seen by both communities ‘as a prerequisite to move’ forward. Locally-led negotiations have left the issue of reparations unaddressed, focusing instead on a fragile cessation of direct hostilities and the resumption of daily activities.
Moving forward
In 2024, a delegation of Taaisha leaders undertook a reconciliatory visit to the town of Tullus on the Sudanese side of the border, territory largely associated with the Falata. This led to the delegation and 50 Falata leaders pledging ‘to put aside their past grievances and embark on a new chapter of peaceful coexistence, fostering harmony among all tribes residing in four localities: Tullus, Demso, Um Dafoug, and Rehaid Albirdi’. This coincided with the February 2024 return of Taaisha-looted cattle, facilitated by members of a local, Concordis-established Advisory Group in Um Dafoug. These events precipitated a commitment to engage in further joint dialogue, with the ultimate aim of establishing joint mechanisms to govern access to land.
The Head of the Advisory Group, Omda Al Habib Altegani Omer, emphasised a conference between the Falata and Taaisha tribes should take place as soon as possible.[6] As a consequence, and at the invitation of the communities, Concordis worked in and around Tullus, Demso, Um Dafoug, Rehaid Albirdi and a fifth locality, Um Dukhan, to identify leaders who could bring the wider Taaisha and Falata communities together to engage in constructive dialogue.
In April 2025, Concordis facilitated extensive meetings in Um Dafoug, laying the groundwork for a possible cross-border peace conference with communities from Vakaga in CAR. The process involved over 200 community stakeholders, including traditional leaders, women, youth, herders and farmers. Between them, the participants identified various factors exacerbating clashes between CAR communities and herders, including prolonged stays, armed robbery and environmental degradation.
The meetings revealed a strong desire among the community for structured agreements, shared early-warning systems and inclusive decision-making. Women demanded safe migration routes and participation in peace structures, while herders emphasized the need for access agreements and corridor protection. On April 13th, Concordis brought together 112 participants from the five Sudanese localities and two cross-border representatives from CAR for a four day peace conference in Um Dafoug. Conversations were widened to maximize the chances of reducing violence, killings and burning of villages, participants included Omdas and Nazir-level leaders representing ethnic groups including the Taaisha, Falata, Beni Halba, Masalit, and Barno, alongside women, youth, and traders.
Key issues for discussion
The discussions addressed early cattle migration (Talaga), land use disputes and accountability for theft. The conference produced concrete outcomes. Local authorities committed to:
- formalise seasonal livestock movement calendars
- reactivate agriculture and harvest committees
- adopt a coordinated framework to manage corridor access and prevent tribe-based protection of criminal acts
Applying lessons learned
During the process, Concordis applied a number of learnings on cross-border governance agreements gleaned during XCEPT-funded research.[7] Of particular importance are the following:
- Local ownership of borderland governance agreements is imperative when it comes to building trust and encouraging implementation.
- A diverse array of actors have critical roles to play in initiating, negotiating and delivering on borderland governance.
- Agreements are more effective when supported by implementation and monitoring mechanisms.
- Agreements that focus on what needs to be solved—especially immediate community needs around security, trade and livelihoods—have a greater likelihood of succeeding. This may require setting aside broader sources of conflict that cannot be addressed at the local level.
- Local borderland governance is an ongoing process, with existing agreements offering a potential platform for shaping new agreements and generating a framework for accountability.
The process has become a live example of translating research into tangible peace infrastructure, especially in borderland areas with little state presence.
[1] The XCEPT research was facilitated by European Union funding as part of the ‘Zones frontalières pacifiques et résilientes III’ action across CAR, Chad, Cameroon and Sudan.
[2] The settlement on the CAR side of the border is known as Am Dafok, while the settlement on the Sudanese side of the border is variously translated from the Arabic as Um Dafoug, Um Dafuq or Um Dafok. All refer to the same place.
[3] Louisa Lombard, ‘The Autonomous Zone Conundrum: Armed Conservation and Rebellion in North-Eastern CAR’, in Making Sense of the Central African Republic,eds. Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard, London: Zed Books, 2015; Stephen W. Smith, ‘CAR’s History: The Past of a Tense Present’, in Making Sense, Carayannis and Lombard, 40.
[4] See Mohamed Dawalbit, ‘Narratives that Drive Conflict – Unpacking the Term “Settler” and What it Means in Darfur’, The Conflict Sensitivity Facility, 6 February 2024. https://csf-sudan.org/settler-in-darfur/.
[5] Allard Duursma, ‘Making Disorder More Manageable: The Short-term Effectiveness of Local Mediation in Darfur’, Journal of Peace Research 58/3 (2021): 554–567; Jan Pospisi , ‘Dissolving Conflict. Local Peace Agreements and Armed Conflict Transitions’, Peacebuilding 10/2 (2022): 1–16.
[6] Advisory Group Work Plan, February 2025, available on request from [email protected].
[7] Concordis International, ed., Recognising the Local in Borderland Governance, London: Concordis International, 2025.