In April 2025, the leader of the White Army Youth in Akobo, South Sudan, met with the region’s diaspora community via the online Lou Nuer Community Forum. The White Army members were given money to buy food for their families, and, in return, they agreed to keep out of the conflict taking place in Nasir and to maintain peace in Akobo. South Sudan’s diaspora population, which is estimated to be 1.2 million, plays a significant role in influencing developments at home. Between 2014 and 2022, the diaspora contributed $5.7 billion USD in the form of remittances.[i] These funds are often utilised to fulfil basic needs and support development, but they also provide an important source of finance to armed groups.[ii] Alongside this, the diaspora community uses its significant influence to shape the ways in which its home communities respond to, or view, political and ethnic issues.[iii]

In the Greater Akobo region of Jonglei state, an area marked by persistent conflict and marginalised by the central government – due both to its inaccessibility and its assumed support of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army–In Opposition (SPLM/A–IO) – understanding the way in which the diaspora influence conflict dynamics is crucial to ensure effective peacebuilding efforts. While many diaspora communities contribute positively through remittances, education sponsorships, and peace advocacy, others unintentionally or deliberately sustain cycles of violence through the support of kinship-based retaliation, cattle raiding, and politically charged rhetoric.[1] Clarifying this dual role can help inform efforts to strategically engage the diaspora and redirect their energies towards projects that promote reconciliation and help local communities build resilience against violence.

Who are Greater Akobo’s diaspora communities?

The diaspora communities from Greater Akobo are largely comprised of individuals from the counties of Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror, who fled South Sudan during the country’s civil wars or who left in search of safer living conditions and better economic opportunities. Many found asylum in the Global North, particularly in Australia, the United States, Canada, and Europe, and have established semi-formal kinship-based associations abroad. These often mirror the social organisation and politics back home and are frequently organised around ethnic identities.

The diaspora communities from Greater Akobo are largely comprised of individuals from the counties of Akobo, Nyirol, and Uror, who fled South Sudan during the country’s civil wars or who left in search of safer living conditions and better economic opportunities. Some found asylum in the Global North, particularly in Australia, the United States, Canada, and Europe, while others moved to different cities in South Sudan, notably to Juba. Many of these diaspora communities have since established semi-formal kinship-based associations, which often mirror the social organisation and politics back home and are frequently organised around ethnic identities.

Kinship-based mobilisation and resource transfers

Greater Akobo’s diaspora organisations take an active role in responding to incidents of conflict or communal grievances from afar. As they often view conflict through a lens of ethnic solidarity, however, this means that their assistance can take the form of support for retaliatory raids, often justified as self-defence, rather than initiatives for reconciliation. For example, diaspora members have provided support and mobile airtime to coordinate cattle raids and to transport the injured during conflict. In periods of heightened tensions, diaspora actors have also been known to fund armed youth groups under the guise of ‘community defence’.

While some diaspora groups are structured with formal leadership, collecting contributions and funding operations in response to particular incidents, others operate informally, transferring money to individuals or small groups for specific retaliatory actions. Members of the diaspora also act outside of the group setting, with individuals contributing money to buy bullets and airtime. In some cases, outspoken members of the diaspora emerge only when crises erupt, advocating for violence and offering rapid mobilisation support.

In most instances, the actions taken by the diaspora are intended to protect their families or communities, but the outcome is frequently the same: escalated violence, abduction of children and women, widespread trauma, and a deepening cycle of revenge.[v]

The problem of distance and diverging priorities

One of the fundamental issues with diaspora involvement is the gap in lived experiences between those abroad and those on the ground. Despite their ability to remain in communication with their home communities, through the use of social media and satellite services, diaspora actors are often far removed from daily insecurities. At the same time, they may have different priorities, including political recognition or ethnic dominance. Meanwhile, communities in Greater Akobo face urgent needs, such as food, water, health, and security.

This difference in situation can increase feelings of resentment and distrust towards the diaspora community, with some questioning their patriotism and motivations.[vi] Nevertheless, the reality of daily life in Greater Akobo means that the diaspora can use the resources at their disposal to influence actions. When faced with a lack of alternative livelihoods, young people often listen to the voices of those who can offer them material incentives.

The influence wielded by the diaspora has negatively affected peace efforts on the ground, especially in areas where state presence is minimal or absent. Locally driven efforts to promote dialogue and peace education are sometimes contradicted by diaspora narratives on social media that encourage revenge or ethnic exceptionalism. In one example, a South Sudanese resident in Canada presented himself as the spokesman for the Lou Nuer White Army and posted press releases online ‘which in effect urged South Sudanese in Jonglei to go on killing each other’.[vii] The South Sudan Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund similarly reported that the diaspora’s influence in Jonglei was largely negative and undermined local engagement with their peacebuilding work.[viii]

The positive influence of the diaspora

Greater Akobo’s diaspora community undoubtedly contributes to the cyclic violence in the region, but members of the community also work to support peace, maintaining relationships with local peace activists, religious leaders, and teachers in order to encourage unity. Many of the churches, which promote messages of peace within and between communities, were established by those who had lived in the diaspora. These churches serve as vital links between the diaspora and local communities, and their founders maintain this connection by visiting the congregations on a yearly basis.

One resident of Akobo County, when talking about the installation of internet in the youth centre, also remarked on how contact with family in the diaspora can actually build peace: ‘When you decide to [harm] the other clan, you can communicate with people far away through a video call with people in the outside world, especially if you have relatives in America, or even Kenya and Uganda. They can tell you: “You guys, this is not how life should be.”’[ix]

Similarly, just as remittances contribute towards instances of armed conflict, the diaspora also dedicates fundraising efforts to helping the welfare of their communities. From December 2024 to January 2025, the Lou Nuer diaspora community raised $6,000 USD for a local initiative to support Akobo Hospital’s operational costs. In April 2025, Australia’s Lou Nuer community also raised money through their local church to help youth who were undergoing treatment after fighting in Nasir. Most Nuer students who attend schools in East Africa and Ethiopia are able to do so largely thanks to the financial support of relatives in the diaspora. Alongside this, those living in refugee camps receive assistance from diaspora members to help fill critical gaps created by insufficient food supplies.

A double-edged sword

The role of the diaspora in the conflict in Greater Akobo is a double-edged sword. While the promotion of revenge narratives and remittances can sustain violence, the community also holds largely untapped potential for supporting peacebuilding and building resilience against violence. In order to ensure the diaspora’s energies contribute to positive outcomes, their influence should be strategically engaged, rather than ignored or condemned.

One example of successful strategic engagement can be seen in Jonglei State, where the Twic East community has established a forum to unite its local and diaspora associations under a common purpose: to ensure the groups work together to achieve shared goals and to ensure that these goals actually meet the needs of the Twic East community in Jonglei.

In the forum, the leaders of diaspora associations across the world meet with the leaders of local community groups to coordinate support. The Twic East community in Juba then takes charge of disseminating and implementing this support amongst the community in Jonglei. This joint initiative has built stronger ties between the community and diaspora members, and has shown success in achieving shared goals, such as funding and building flood defence systems and providing educational scholarships to young girls.

By recognising the influence and importance of diaspora voices, and steering them towards positive outcomes, the people of Greater Akobo may have a chance to break free from cycles of violence. The challenge is immense, but so is the opportunity.


[1] This blog post is based on the author’s own fieldwork and observations.


[i] African Development Bank Group. (2024, 31 July). Country Focus Report 2024 – South Sudan. Driving South Sudan’s Transformation: The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture. African Development Bank Group. Accessed at: https://vcda.afdb.org/en/system/files/report/south_sudan_2024.pdf

[ii] Carver, F., Deng, S. A., Kindersley, N., Kirr, G., Lorins, R. & Maher, 2. (2018). South Sudan Diaspora Impacts. Rift Valley Institute. Accessed at https://riftvalley.net/projects/sudan-and-south-sudan/south-sudan-diaspora-impacts/

[iii] Kiir Amoui, G.,  & Carver, F. (2022). Perceptions about Dual Citizenship and Diaspora Participation in Political, Economic, and Social Life in South Sudan. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol. 22 (1); Voller, Y. (2020). Advantages and Challenges to Diaspora Transnational Civil Society Activism in the Homeland: Examples from Iraqi Kurdistan, Somaliland and South Sudan. Conflict Research Programme, LSE, p. 25.

[iv] Meraki Labs. (2021). Conflict Dynamics Driving Displacement in Akobo. Danish Refugee Council.

[v] POF South Sudan. (2025,17 March). Forging a sustainable path: Jonglei-GPAA Strategy Dialogue for a shared 2030 vision. Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund South Sudan. Accessed at: https://www.pofss.org/blog/forging-a-sustainable-path-jonglei-gpaa-strategy-dialogue

[vi] Kiir Amoui, G., & Carver, F. (2022). Perceptions about Dual Citizenship and Diaspora Participation in Political, Economic, and Social Life in South Sudan. Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol. 22 (1).

[vii] Johnson, D., H. (2014). South Sudan’s Experience at Peacemaking: The 22nd Annual Gandhi Peace Festival. In Bertrand Russell Peace Lecture: Symposium on Conflict and Peacemaking in South Sudan. Ontario, Canada: McMaster University.

[viii] Vincent, D. N., & Comerford, M. (2021, July). Lessons Learned #5 Practising peacebuilding in South Sudan. Peacebuilding Opportunities Fund South Sudan.

[ix] Trimble, J. (2022, 14 January). Building peace through connectivity. Norwegian Refugee Council. Accessed at: https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/stories/building-peace-through-connectivity/index.html