Summary

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz accelerated an emerging trade pathway linking Iraq with Syrian and potentially Lebanese ports on the Mediterranean, creating the prospect of a ‘Levant Corridor’ in a region long viewed primarily through a security lens. Drawing on 71 interviews with policymakers, border officials, traders and transport operators across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, the research examines the infrastructure needed to support this shift towards formal economic exchange. Border crossings currently face long delays, inadequate inspection and logistics facilities, deteriorating roads and limited financing. With none of the three governments able to upgrade every crossing, investment will need to be carefully prioritised. The corridor’s longer-term durability will also depend on Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut aligning infrastructure priorities and coordinating investments across shared borders.

Key Findings

• The closure of the Strait of Hormuz accelerated Iraq’s use of overland export routes through Syria, while Syria has sought to strengthen its role as a regional transit hub and Lebanon has pursued a share of the emerging energy trade.
• Existing infrastructure is not equipped for substantially higher trade volumes. Damaged or inadequate crossings, limited scanning and inspection facilities, insufficient truck-handling capacity and deteriorating roads contribute to bottlenecks, delays and higher transport costs.
• Al-Waleed/Al-Tanf offers the most direct route between Baghdad and Damascus and already carries the bulk of the oil trade. Traders also expressed a preference for this route over Al-Qaim/Al-Bukamal, citing distance and the presence of armed groups along the latter.
• Al-Rabia/Al-Yarubiyah is strategically important because of its connections with Türkiye and the wider Development Road initiative, but its development carries political sensitivities because it could divert trade from the Kurdistan Region.
• Masnaa/Jdaidet Yabous remains the mainstay of Syrian–Lebanese trade, but Tripoli is better positioned to support a future multi-country transit corridor, with greater port capacity and space for expansion.
• Fiscal constraints and competing political priorities mean that none of the three governments can adequately fund every crossing. The shape of the emerging corridor will therefore depend substantially on which routes they choose to prioritise.

Policy Implications

• Infrastructure investment on the Iraq–Syria border should concentrate on Al-Waleed/Al-Tanf, completing permanent border facilities and connecting road networks while Baghdad and Damascus have a shared interest in expanding the route.
• Investment decisions should account for the political and security conditions surrounding individual routes, including the presence of armed groups around Al-Qaim/Al-Bukamal and the federal–regional tensions associated with Al-Rabia/Al-Yarubiyah.
• On the Syria–Lebanon border, investment priorities depend on the objective. Masnaa/Jdaidet Yabous remains critical for bilateral Syrian–Lebanese trade, while Tripoli is the priority for a wider corridor capable of carrying Iraqi oil and, potentially, other goods to the Mediterranean.
• Developing the northern route through Tripoli will require years and considerable investment, but preparatory feasibility studies and planning can begin before financing for major infrastructure is secured.
• Bilateral initiatives between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are important but insufficient for a corridor spanning all three countries. Its durability will ultimately require trilateral coordination so that Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut align their infrastructure priorities rather than developing them piecemeal.
• Physical infrastructure alone will not determine the corridor’s viability. Greater coordination on customs procedures, documentation, payment systems and data sharing will also be required to reduce delays and support sustained cross-border trade.

This policy brief was published as part of the Levant Corridor: Cross-border trade between Iraq, Syria and Lebanon project, and was first published on the Institute of Regional and International Studies (IRIS) website.