Brief

Syria’s conflict has given rise to Captagon traffickers in Lebanon, who wield greater political and institutional influence than traditional clan-based hashish traffickers. This is driven by several factors, including a growing cash economy in Lebanon, facilitating illicit trade, and a decline in rent from Gulf countries. Any effective response must account for economic realities in Lebanon and postwar Syria and be implemented swiftly to capitalize on the Assad regime’s downfall in Syria.

Key Themes

  • The Syrian conflict allowed for the emergence of Captagon traffickers in Lebanon, alongside traditional clan-based hashish traffickers in the Beqaa Valley;
  • The convergence of international sanctions on Syria and Lebanon’s growing cash-based economy—exacerbated by the financial collapse of 2019—created a fertile environment for illicit networks to expand;
  • Captagon traffickers have strong connections on both sides of the Lebanese-Syrian border. They cut across political fault lines, fostering parallel interests among a wider array of actors than clan-based traffickers and building connections in Lebanon and Syria as well as with transnational traffickers;
  • The traffickers’ ability to find collaborators among Lebanese parties, such as Hezbollah, and in the security forces is a new, more worrisome characteristic of their behavior when compared to clan-based drug traffickers.

Findings/Recommendations

  • While the Assad regime played a vital role in the expansion of Captagon trafficking, its downfall may not mark the end of the drug trade. Opposition groups were also involved in trafficking and are well-positioned to continue in the regime’s absence;
  • Demand from the Gulf countries remains a primary driver of Captagon trafficking, but Lebanon must ensure that its exports to the Gulf are not again negatively impacted by boycotts, because traffickers have used them to hide consignments of drugs;
  • That is why, as Lebanon’s government seeks to limit the reach of Captagon traffickers, it will have to adopt security measures along its borders and also engage in a more comprehensive approach that integrates steps to spur an economic recovery;
  • Without economic improvement, members of Lebanon’s security forces, whose salaries were greatly diminished by the financial crisis starting in 2019, will remain vulnerable to cooptation by trafficking networks;
  • Hezbollah’s weakening following the most recent conflict with Israel is insufficient to ensure a sustained decline in Captagon trafficking. Tighter border controls and an economic recovery plan for the Beqaa Valley, from where much trafficking takes place, are required to create alternative sources of funding for the region’s inhabitants.

Read full report here.